The Military Balance 2012, Notas de estudo de Relações Internacionais

Baixe The Military Balance 2012 e outras Notas de estudo em PDF para Relações Internacionais, somente na Docsity! Tale LRP BALANCE 2012 ER ESTES  1 The War in Libya ...................................................................................15 2 Afghanistan ...........................................................................................29 3 Japan’s Earthquake, Tsunami and Nuclear Accident ........... 221 4 Côte d’Ivoire ....................................................................................... 412 5 Arctic .......................................................................... Inside back cover 1 DoD Budget Authority (Constant FY2010 $) ..............................45 2 US Defence Expenditure (Budget Authority) as % of GDP ....48 3 NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ........................................................................................................75 4 Non-NATO Europe Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ..............................................................................................75 5 United Kingdom Defence Budget Trends (FY2008/09–FY2014/15) .....................................................................84 6 Estimated Russian Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ......... 190 7 South and Central Asia Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ........................................................................................... 210 8 East Asia and Australasia Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ........................................................................................... 210 9 Asia Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Sub-Regional Breakdown ............................................................................................ 211 10 Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Sub-Regional Breakdown ............................................ 306 11 Middle East and North Africa Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ................................................................. 307 12 Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ................................................................. 363 13 Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Defence Expenditure as % of GDP ........................................................................................ 419 Index of Maps Index of FIGUREs Index of TablEs Essays 1 Operation Odyssey Dawn ...............................................................14 2 Operation Unified Protector ...........................................................14 North america 3 DoD’s War Budget Authority by Title FY2010 ............................43 4 US National Defense Budget Authority FY2008–FY2011 .....44 5 Budget Authority for Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Overseas Contingency Operations FY2001–FY2011 (US$bn) ................45 6 US National Defense Budget Function and Other Selected Budgets 1992, 2002–2012 .............................................46 7 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, North America ......................................................................................69 Europe 8 NATO Europe Gross Government Debt and Real Defence Expenditure 2008–101 ...........................................74 9 French Defence Budget Proposals ................................................78 10 Germany: Future Force Numbers ..................................................79 11 Expenditure on Operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya ... 84 12 Recent and Planned UK Defence Personnel, Equipment and Estate Measures ...................................................85 13 Post-Main Gate Major Equipment Projects ...............................85 14 Breakdown of UK Defence Expenditure ....................................86 15 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Europe ......... 174 Russia 16 Russia National Defence Expenditure Trends (2000–14) ... 189 17 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Russia .......... 204 asia 18 Asia Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Top 10 and Sub-Regional Breakdown.............................................................. 209 19 China Defence Budget Trends and Estimates (2008–10) .. 215 20 Indian Defence Expenditure by Function (FY2009/10–FY2011/12) ............................................................... 218 21 Japan Defence-Related Expenditures Breakdown and Trends (2009–12) .................................................................... 223 22 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Asia ............... 294 Middle East and North africa 23 Middle East and North Africa Defence Expenditure 2010–11: Top 10 and Regional Breakdown (US$bn) ........... 306 24 Saudi Arabia Macroeconomic and Budgetary Trends 2001–10 (SR bn) ................................................................. 314 25 Notifications of October 2010 Proposed US Foreign Military Sales to Saudi Arabia ($bn) .......................... 315 26 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Middle East and North Africa ....................................................... 357 latin america and the Caribbean 27 Latin America Defence Expenditure 2010–2011: Top 10 and Sub-Regional Breakdown (US$ bn) .................... 364 28 Brazilian Defence Expenditure by Function (R$ m) ............. 368 29 Breakdown of Brazilian Defence Budget (2011) (R$ m) ................................................................................................... 369 30 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Latin America and the Caribbean .............................................. 408 sub-saharan africa 31 South African Defence Budget by Programme, 2007–2013 .......................................................................................... 418 32 Selected Arms Procurements and Deliveries, Sub-Saharan Africa .......................................................................... 462 Country comparisons 33 Selected Training Activity 2011 ................................................... 464 34 International Comparisons of Defence Expenditure and Military Manpower ................................................................. 467 35 Arms Deliveries to Developing Nations – Leading Recipients in 2010........................................................... 474 36 Arms Transfer Agree ments with Developing Nations – Leading Recipients in 2010........................................................... 474 37 Global Arms Deliveries – Leading Suppliers in 2010 .................................................................................................. 474 38 Global Arms Transfer Agreements – Leading Suppliers in 2010 ............................................................. 474 39 Value of Global Arms Transfer Agreements and Market Share by Supplier, 2003–10 .......................................... 474 40 Value of Global Arms Deliveries and Market Share by Supplier, 2003–10 ..................................................................... 474 41 Arms Deliveries to Middle East and North Africa, by Supplier, 2003–10 ...................................................................... 475 Non-state Groups and affiliates 42 Non-State Groups and Affiliates ................................................. 478 Reference 43 List of Abbreviations for Data Sections ................................... 495 44 Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations ............................... 498 D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 03 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 7Editor’s Foreword tion, Indonesia’s defence capacities received a boost in November 2011 with the announcement of acquisition of 24 F-16 C/Ds from the US. In China, sustained growth has enabled large increases in defence spending over the past decade; offi- cial expenditure in 2011 was more than two-and-a-half times the 2001 level. The defence budget grew by an average of approximately 10.9% per year in real terms over the period, slightly faster than the economy as a whole. China has been translating these increases into capability enhancements but, despite the PLA’s aspira- tions, there remain weaknesses in the country’s military capabilities. The technological advances demonstrated by the J-20 and Varyag carrier are more modest than some alarmist hypotheses of China’s military development have suggested. The Varyag is ageing, China does not yet have the capability to operate fixed-wing combat aircraft from a carrier and, while its maritime exercises may have become more wide ranging and sustained in recent years, it has no experience of integrated carrier battle group operations. Moreover, while China’s defence industry has made strides in recent years, Beijing still relies on external defence technology to fill capability gaps. The parallel development of anti-satellite capaci- ties, anti-ship ballistic missiles and cyber-war capabili- ties, however, concerns defence planners perhaps as much as Beijing’s drive to boost its conventional capa- bility. The killing of al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden in a May 2011 US military raid has led to reflections on how war and military capability have changed since 9/11. Certainly in the West, many armed forces, particularly land forces, have changed substantially in outlook, training and equipment from how they began the decade. In some cases these changes were driven by the requirements of counter-terrorism or counter- insurgency operations; the imperatives of shrinking budgets now mean that forces have to consider which of the lessons learned from and equipment procured for these conflicts are retained. Recent military operations have, for many Western forces, reinforced the benefits of flexibility; access to a full spectrum of capabilities; ‘joint’ military operations; having access to enough ‘boots on the ground’ if needed; and the enduring utility of intel- ligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, logistical and support capacities and good doctrine, leadership and training. They have also highlighted the rising impor- tance of force protection. Many Western nations no longer retain full-spectrum capabilities, and are likely to shrink forces further, while others may soon have to face such choices. But the relative unpopularity of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars could also make it harder for Western governments to use their declining equipments. The US and other Western nations will look to main- tain a qualitative and quantitative edge over states such as China through continued investment in research and development, as well as stress on the quality and reliability of equipment, leadership and training and a focus on maximising value from military partner- ships and cooperation agreements. Further advantages may be sought in areas such as advanced-technology munitions (for instance reduced-lethality, directed- energy and high-speed weapons); unmanned systems; enhanced integration of C4ISR capacities; and informa- tion and cyber capabilities. But the gaps are narrowing. Non-Western states, often with diverse recent military experiences and defence priorities, may look to the West for lessons, and perhaps pointers to useful capa- bilities, organisations and tactics, but they may be less constrained financially. In many of these states, moves to recapitalise forces, capabilities and precise equipment and weapon variants – and how and in what contingen- cies these forces and capabilities will be employed – will be driven by local defence priorities. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 04 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 The Military Balance is updated each year to provide an accurate assessment of global military forces and defence economics. This year, 171 countries are covered. Each edition contributes to the provision of a unique compilation of data and information, enabling the reader to discern long-term trends through a study of previous editions dating back to 1959. The data in the current edition are accurate according to IISS assessments as at November 2011. Inclusion of a territory, country or state in The Military Balance does not imply legal recognition or indicate support for any government. General arranGement and contents The Editor’s Foreword contains a general comment on defence matters and a summary of the book. The Military Balance comprises the regional trends, military capabilities and defence-economics data for countries grouped by region. Land data has been reor- ganised, and this year includes combat support and combat service support. Three essays at the start of the book analyse notable defence issues, followed by a set of colour graphics detailing comparative defence statistics. Regional policy and economic analysis is complemented by in-depth essays on the top ten defence budgeting nations in 2011. Throughout, readers will find a range of tables on defence and defence economic issues as well as maps showing selected deployments in Afghanistan; conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, the military response to Japan’s earthquake, tsunami and nuclear disaster; and Arctic security issues. This year, the IISS has included short summaries of defence capability for a range of states. These are intended to inform interpretation of the organisational and inven- tory analysis contained within each country entry. This is in line with the Institute’s recognition, noted in recent editions of this book, that military capability comprises more than the study of equipment inventories. In future print and online editions, the IISS will develop more qualitative analyses such as these. The online product will also enable the IISS to provide tables and charts that, for reasons of space, cannot be included in the annual printed volumes, as well as giving subscribers flexibility in accessing IISS data and textual analysis. The Chart of Conflict inserted loose into The Military Balance is updated to show data on recent and current armed conflicts up to 1 November 2011. UsinG the military Balance In order to interpret the data in the country entries correctly, it is essential to read the Explanatory Notes beginning on page 485. The large quantity of data in The Military Balance has been compressed into a portable volume by the extensive employment of abbreviations. An essential tool is therefore the index of abbreviations for data sections, which starts on page 495. A general index is this year included at the back of the book. attriBUtion and acknowledGements The International Institute for Strategic Studies owes no allegiance to any government, group of governments, or any political or other organisation. Its assessments are its own, based on the material available to it from a wide variety of sources. The cooperation of governments of all listed countries has been sought and, in many cases, received. However, some data in The Military Balance are estimates. Care is taken to ensure that these data are as accu- rate and free from bias as possible. The Institute owes a considerable debt to a number of its own members, consultants and all those who help compile and check material. The Director-General and Chief Executive and staff of the Institute assume full responsibility for the data and judgements in this book. Comments and suggestions on the data and textual material contained within the book, as well as on the style and presentation of data, are welcomed and should be communicated to the Editor of The Military Balance at: IISS, 13–15 Arundel Street, London WC2R 3DX, UK, e-mail: milbal@iiss.org. Copyright on all informa- tion in The Military Balance belongs strictly to the IISS. Application to reproduce limited amounts of data may be made to the publisher: Taylor & Francis, 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN, UK, e-mail: permissionrequest@tandf.co.uk. Unauthorised use of Military Balance data will be subject to legal action. The Military Balance 2012 Preface D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 08 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 Chapter One Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening The upheavals that have shaken the Arab world since December 2010 have to a large extent been shaped by the behaviour of the security services in each country. As of December 2011, no clear pattern had emerged, and differences in the employment, cohesion, perfor- mance and effectiveness of military and internal security forces were notable throughout the region. These differences can be explained by factors such as varying levels of pay and benefits; sectarian, political and tribal loyalties; internal organisation; differen- tiation between, and selective deployment of, units; professionalism and politicisation of the senior ranks; and use of foreign mercenaries. Military behaviour: between repression and self-preservation During the past year, the military forces of Arab states have at times behaved as an organic extension of ruling regimes, and at times as independent insti- tutional players bent on securing and maintaining their own standing and privileges. This behaviour is a consequence of particular national situations: in Tunisia and Egypt, where there were no rulers’ rela- tives in senior army and police positions, the regular military distanced itself from the regime to decisive effect. In Libya, Syria, Yemen and Bahrain, where the security services remained cohesive or fought back, relatives of the rulers were entrusted with key command responsibilities. In these cases, depend- able elite and generally well-resourced units carried much of the repressive burden: the Republican Guard in Yemen, led by Brigadier-General Ahmed Saleh, son of President Ali Abdullah Saleh; the ethnic- Alawite-dominated 4th Armoured Division in Syria commanded by Brigadier-General Maher al-Assad, brother of the president, Bashar; the 32nd ‘Khamis’ Brigade in Libya, named after Muammar Gadhafi’s youngest son; the Bahrain Defence Forces and internal security forces headed by senior members of the ruling Al-Khalifa family. In broader terms, tech- niques to exert control over the military have had variable effect. In Syria, the policy of appointing an Alawite officer as deputy to any Sunni commander, and vice versa, has so far succeeded in preventing dissent among the senior ranks of the army (although the effect of further reported army defections in late 2011, and attacks by the ‘Free Syrian Army’, remains to be seen). In Egypt however, the Mubarak strategy of placating the military by allowing it to run its own businesses did not ensure its loyalty. Tensions between the regular military, internal security forces, paramilitaries and militias also played a role. In Tunisia, the army, often sidelined by the regime of former President Zine el-Abidene Ben Ali, fought the loyalist Republican Guard in the days following Ben Ali’s departure. In Egypt, rivalry between the military and the Interior Ministry was on display during and after the February 2011 protests: the army did not back the police in earlier days and did not coordinate with them once the police left the street. In Syria, raids by the shabbiha (armed regime thugs) against protesters often motivated army defec- tions. Indeed, the fact that regimes that invested heavily in internal security and coup-proofing could succumb so quickly to popular, often peaceful upris- ings suggests that this emphasis was as much a reason for their own demise as a guarantee of survival. A review of the behaviour of the Arab mili- taries shows that they often reflected the evolutions, complexities and tensions within their own soci- eties rather than necessarily following the wishes and interests of their political leaders. In Tunisia, the military facilitated regime collapse and volun- tarily stepped aside during the transition. In Egypt, an ambivalent yet pivotal army command eased the transition from Mubarak – only to adopt a heavy- handed, albeit uncertain, approach to the transition, when it became concerned to protect its institutional power and privileges. In Libya, the regular military rapidly split, with significant numbers immediately joining, and organising, the rebellion against Gadhafi. In Syria, the military remained largely cohesive, although growing numbers of mostly low-rank defectors joined protesters in clashes against loyal elite units. In Yemen, while some senior military commanders and their troops defected to the opposition, the Saleh regime maintained the allegiance of elite units under the command of family members. In Bahrain, the military demonstrated its absolute loyalty to the D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 12 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2012 vendor Mohamed Bouazizi in Tunisia after a dispute with local authorities about a permit for his business. In Egypt, a key Facebook group behind the January revolution was named ‘We are all Khaled Said’, after a young man beaten to death by police. Security- sector reform (SSR), which would include political, cultural, doctrinal and organisational changes, will be necessary to sustain efforts at political liberalisation. This is a demand of Egypt’s revolutionaries, as evidenced by the storming and subsequent dissolu- tion of the State Security Investigations Service, an internal-security and counter-terrorism force criti- cised for its methods. The Interior Ministry was simi- larly sacked and its head sentenced to jail after the revolution. Yet it remains uncertain whether popular demands will lead to significant change. The Supreme Council for the Armed Forces (SCAF), Egypt’s de facto ruling body, has agreed to limited reforms under pres- sure from the street. But with the military seem- ingly unwilling to shoulder the task of maintaining fragile internal order for much longer, expediency may well prevail over long-term requirements to reform the security system. The SCAF has another reason to resist wholesale reform: its hold on power and steering of the transition is primarily motivated by the desire to shape the new political order; to preserve institutional power and autonomy; and to limit any governmental and parliamentary oversight of its mission, budget, internal functions or extensive business interests. In Bahrain, the Independent Commission of Inquiry established to investigate events including actions by protesters and security forces during February and March 2011, documented a range of abuses by security forces and described the routine use of excess force by these agencies. Its recommen- dations included the revocation of arrest powers from the country’s National Security Apparatus and the establishment of training programmes for Bahrain’s police. While some low-level officers have been dismissed pending investigation into their actions, the question remains whether the upper echelons of the Bahraini security apparatus – many of whom are members of the royal family – will be held account- able, whether the practice of recruiting foreign Sunnis will end, and whether the ranks of the security forces will be opened to Bahraini Shi’ites. Across the Arab world, political leaders will find themselves locked in awkward, uncomfortable relations with military leaders, as both groups struggle to adjust to new real- ities and find ways to satisfy popular demands while maintaining their influence. The wAr In LIbyA In February 2011 internal protest in Libya disinte- grated into civil war. By mid-March Gadhafi’s forces had cleared rebels from much of western Libya and were close to recapturing Benghazi, the first city to rise up. Though some rebel strongholds remained in the Jebel Nafusa mountains south of Tripoli and Misrata to the west, the rebels had little prospect of holding out and Gadhafi had signalled his intent to exact retribution. The passing of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, and the subsequent mili- tary operations by NATO and non-NATO states, provided crucial support to rebel forces. NATO forces maintained this military mission for seven months, and the Alliance ended Operation Unified Protector on 31 October, following the fall of Sirte, and the death of Gadhafi on 20 October. However, the operation exposed gaps in both NATO capability and will, with criticism from senior US officials over atrophying capability and continuing falls in funding. Indeed, that the war lasted so long was in some ways a consequence of these resource constraints. So while the war might lead to short-term satisfaction in many European capitals, it highlights a number of cold realities that European NATO states will have to consider. Course of the war UNSCR 1973, passed on 17 March, authorised ‘all necessary means’ to protect civilians and established a no-fly zone. It forbade any ‘occupation force’. Enforcement began on the afternoon of 19 March with French air-strikes on a regime column nearing Benghazi, joined that night by UK and US attacks on Libyan air defences, which were rapidly neutral- ised. A maritime force also deployed to enforce an arms embargo. Two weeks later, military command passed from USAFRICOM to NATO. President Barack Obama withdrew US forces from direct combat on 4 April, although the US continued to play a major supporting role, providing suppres- sion of air defences and ISR coverage, and 80% of NATO air-to-air refuelling. Six months of cumula- tive attrition of regime targets by NATO-led attacks followed. The international Libya Contact Group and NATO’s command structure provided political and military frameworks that bound together NATO and D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 13Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening participating non-NATO nations, including Sweden, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE, the latter two nations providing considerable discreet political and military support to the rebels. The campaign initially concentrated on the threat to rebel enclaves. In the west, a combination of tough defence and NATO air-strikes defeated regime efforts to capture Misrata. The rebels had access to supplies brought by sea from eastern Libya, and the failure of regime attempts to close this access by mine-laying proved costly. Rebel positions in the Jebel Nafusa came close to falling, causing such concern to France that it covertly air-dropped weapons and supplies in late May. Political divergence manifested itself in varying degrees of military commitment to the operation. Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Turkey limited themselves to supporting roles and flying combat air patrols. After the US withdrawal from combat missions, ground attack was left to Belgian, Canadian, Danish, French, Norwegian, Qatari, UAE and UK forces. From April, half the combat power and much of the non-US support, such as intelligence gathering, was provided by the UK and France. Many NATO members, notably Poland and Germany (whose foreign minister publicly criticised NATO’s actions), deployed no forces in harm’s way. From late June, attacks on regime targets increased, benefiting from improved intelligence and surveillance from defectors and the Benghazi-based National Transitional Council (NTC). The attacks sought to achieve a coercive effect on the regime lead- ership to persuade it to comply with UNSCR 1973. But while rebels in the east pushed regime forces back from the edge of Benghazi, they were unable to dislodge government defences at Brega, exposing their limited military effectiveness. In the west, rebels pushed back regime troops encircling Misrata and expanded their position in the Jebel Nafusa. The rebels and their supporters used this time to supply arms, improve rebel military and governance capa- bility and to improve coordination with NATO. Meanwhile, the UK led an international effort to help the NTC develop a plan for Libyan-led post-conflict stabilisation and reconstruction, seeking to avoid the problems experienced after previous conflicts, notably Iraq. Lessons learnt in combat, as well as external supplies, training and advice, increased the effec- tiveness of the rebel forces. By July NATO adopted a more aggressive interpretation of UNSCR 1973, reflecting UK and French views that the regime was such a threat to Libyan civilians that it had to be directly attacked. By 20 August, the military, internal security and repressive capabilities of the regime had been sufficiently eroded by coalition attacks that it was outmatched by both rebel military forces and the confidence of anti-Gadhafi citizens of Tripoli. The city fell to a synchronised operation that combined preci- sion strikes by NATO, advances and an amphibious landing by rebel units, activation of sleeper cells, public calls for an uprising by anti-government imams and external disruption of Libyan state broad- casting. This was followed by political and military efforts by the rebels and NTC to stabilise Tripoli, prevent retribution and re-start essential services. All these efforts were guided, like the NATO mili- tary effort, by a desire to avoid the perceived failures of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions. Gadhafi’s death at the end of October marked the end of organ- ised resistance. explaining the outcome In February and early March, Gadhafi’s security forces were incapable of quickly overwhelming the rebels, principally because the regime lacked suffi- cient loyal and competent troops. After 19 March, Gadhafi’s forces rapidly adapted by concealing tanks, armoured vehicles, artillery and rockets in urban areas. And they equally rapidly fielded large numbers of armed 4×4 vehicles or ‘technicals’. These were agile, manoeuvrable and easy to hide, but as they were also the principal rebel weapons platform, it was difficult for NATO to distinguish regime and rebel columns. Gadhafi never articulated a strategy. It may be that he was hoping for a ceasefire, followed by a period of negotiation, or he may have hoped that time would lead the coalition to fracture. However, the regime inflicted no NATO casualties. NATO air-strikes neutralised Gadhafi’s air force and air defences and, in time, neutralised naval and coastal-defence forces, eliminating the regime’s ability to challenge the rebel sea line of communication from Benghazi to Misrata. No attacks were mounted on NATO ships outside the range of coastal artillery, NATO air bases, HQs or command and control networks. There were no special forces or state-sponsored terrorist attacks in coalition states. This forfeited opportunities to inflict casualties and militarily disrupt NATO forces where they were most vulnerable, or to raise the military and political costs of the operation. D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 14 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2012 The rebels The rebels began the war with a low standard of military effectiveness. This stemmed from a combi- nation of inexperience – many rebels were formerly civilians – as well as the result of Gadhafi’s starving the rump Libyan Army of resources. He had priori- tised loyal units and this led to poor levels of training and maintenance in the mainstream military. As the war progressed, rebels in western Libya modestly increased their effectiveness, for example through the use of improvised anti-tank obstacles in Misrata – probably the result of learning from combat as well as advice, training, mentoring and supplies from outside, such as those forces from Qatar. An example is the ‘Tripoli Brigade’, reportedly trained by forces from the Gulf. Along with the attrition of regime forces by NATO attacks, these factors eventually meant that combined NATO and rebel combat power outstripped the regime’s ability to defend itself. Coalition strategy NATO claims that its operation to implement UNSCR 1973 reduced regime attacks on civilians, thus saving lives. Certainly, without the intervention rebels in Benghazi and eastern Libya would have been rapidly defeated, followed by rebels further west. Large-scale retribution by Gadhafi’s forces was thus averted. Both USAFRICOM and NATO moved quickly to establish command-and-control frameworks, which allowed the US to move from a leading to supporting role on 4 April. This support – including airborne refuelling, intelligence collection, combat search and rescue, and resupply of precision weapons – was nonetheless vital. UNSCR 1973 set a political and military frame- work that bound together NATO and participating non-NATO nations. In theory, it was impartial and implied that the coalition would have been required to attack rebel forces posing a threat to civilians. Indeed, NATO said that: ‘Our targets are those forces and installations which present a threat to the civilian population. … So far, the opposition forces have shown every indication that they are committed to the protection of civilians and respect for human rights. We expect this commitment to continue. Our targets are those forces and installations which Table 1 Operation Odyssey Dawn (19 March – 30 March) (indicative) naval Assets Submarines (6) France: 1 SSN; Spain: 1 SSK; UK: 1 SSN with SLCM; US: 3 SSGN with SLCM Principal Surface combatants and Principal Amphibious Ships (20) canada: 1 FFGHM; France: 1 CVN, 3 DDGHM, 1 FFGHM; italy: 1 CVS, 2 DDGHM, 1 FFGHM, 2 LPD; Spain: 1 DDGHM; UK: 2 FFGHM; US: 2 DDGHM, 1 LCC, 1 LHD, 1 LPD Other Ships (10) France: 1 AORH; italy: 1 FSM, 2 PSOH, 1 PCO, 1 AORH; UK: 1 MCMV; US: 2 AFSH, 1 AO Air Assets combat aircraft (181) Belgium: 8 Ftr; canada: 7 FGA, 2 ASW; Denmark: 6 Ftr; France: 4 Ftr, 26 FGA; italy: ε6 Ftr, ε12 FGA; norway: 6 Ftr; Qatar: 6 FGA; Spain: 4 FGA; UK: 20 FGA; US: 6 Bbr, 56 FGA, 8 Atk, 4 ASW Support aircraft/UAVs (92) canada: 2 Tkr; France: 6 Tkr, 4 AEW&C; Greece: 1 AEW&C; nATO: ε5 AEW&C; Spain: 1 Tkr; UK: 1 ELINT, 2 ISR, 2 AEW&C, 9 Tkr; US: 7 EW, 2 ELINT, 1 ISR, 4 AEW&C, 3 Tkr/Tpt, ε40 Tkr, ε2 ISR UAV Table 2 Operation Unified Protector (31 March – 31 October) (indicative) naval Assets Submarines (4) France: 1 SSN; Spain: 1 SSK; Turkey: 1 SSK; UK: 1 SSN with SLCM Principal Surface combatants and Principal Amphibious Ships (19) Bulgaria: 1 FFGM; canada: 1 FFGHM; France: 1 CVN, 2 DDGHM, 1 FFGHM, 1 LHD; Greece: 1 FFGHM; italy: 1 CVS, 1 FFGHM; romania: 1 DDH; Spain: 1 DDGHM; Turkey: 4 FFGHM; UK: 1 DDGHM, 1 LPH; US: 1 FFH Other ships (10) Belgium: 1 MCMV; France: 1 FSG, 1 AORH; italy: 1 PSOH, 1 AORH; netherlands: MCMV; Turkey: 1 AORH; UK: 1 AORH, 1 AFSH, 1 MCMV Air Assets* combat aircraft/UAVs (182) Belgium: 6 Ftr; canada: 7 FGA, 2 ASW; Denmark: 6 Ftr; France: 4 Ftr, 40 FGA; italy: 8 Ftr, 20 FGA; Jordan: 6 Ftr; netherlands: 6 Ftr; norway: 6 Ftr; Qatar: 6 FGA; Spain: 4 FGA; Sweden: 8 FGA; Turkey: 8 FGA; UAe: 12 FGA; UK: 22 FGA; US: 6 FGA, 1 ASW, ε6 Cbt/ISR UAV Support aircraft/UAVs (70) canada: 2 Tkr; France: 3 ISR, 4 AEW&C, 7 Tkr; Greece: 1 AEW&C; italy: 2 Tkr; nATO: 3 AEW&C; netherlands: 1 Tkr; Spain: 1 MP, 1 Tkr; Sweden: 1 Tkr; Turkey: 1 Tkr; UK: 1 ISR, 2 AEW&C, 2 Tkr; US: 7 EW, 3 ELINT, 2 ISR, 2 AEW&C, 22 Tkr, 2 ISR UAV combat helicopters (17) France: ε2 Atk hel, ε10 MRH hel; UK: 5 Atk hel *Transport and Search and Rescue aircraft and helicopters are not included D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 17Arab militaries and the Arab Awakening Coordination The effectiveness of NATO air attacks was reduced by limited air/land cooperation between NATO and rebel forces. As the campaign progressed, there was evidence of rebel forces passing information to NATO. As Tripoli fell, NATO admitted that it was receiving information from ‘allied forces in Libya’. These were probably small teams of intelligence personnel, special forces and air controllers oper- ating under national rather than NATO command, acting in coordination with NATO. The Chief of Staff of Qatar’s military was reported in late October as saying that Qatari armed forces had organised training ‘and contact operations’, liaising between the rebels and NATO forces. This is probably why rebel tactics and NATO strikes appeared increasingly synchronised as the campaign went on. Indeed, mili- tary advisers and trainers appear to have improved rebel forces’ effectiveness and coordination. The seizure of Tripoli, which included NATO precision attacks, rebel advances, operations to disrupt Libyan state broadcasting and mass text messaging of city residents, appeared orchestrated. Military-strategic implications France and the UK exercised considerable political and military leadership of the NATO operation and their military credibility with NATO and the US has increased. London and Paris will claim that the war reinforces the requirement for closer bilateral military partnership and has provided practice in this. And the role played by the UAE and Qatar has increased their influence with the US and NATO. In Washington the war has probably increased Congressional and government disillusion with NATO and many of its European members. In his June speech, Gates asserted that NATO lacked enough modern capability, said that too many NATO coun- tries opted out of war, and questioned US willing- ness to shoulder future burdens for NATO. Obama’s decision to ‘lead from behind’ increases the potential burden for NATO as a whole, particularly members such as the UK and France that aspire to expedi- tionary warfighting capabilities and military influ- ence. This will exacerbate existing military tensions within the Alliance. Implications for future interventions The Afghanistan and Iraq interventions succeeded in toppling incumbent regimes, but their planning, execution and resourcing created many of the diffi- culties that bedevilled subsequent stabilisation. While it will take time to discern the full implications of the war on long-term Libyan stability, it is clear that this intervention, executing an impartial mandate, not only changed the political and military dynamic, but in practice could not be executed impartially. This reinforces the trend from UN and NATO interven- tions in the internal conflicts in Bosnia and Kosovo. Advocates of liberal interventionism and the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ have already claimed that the strength of their cause has been reinforced by the Libyan intervention. However, the war was in many ways most favourable to NATO. The Alliance has extensive command-and-control networks and experience integrating multinational forces. Regime propaganda was ham-fisted and there was no cred- ible Libyan conventional threat to NATO infrastruc- ture and homelands. A Libyan WMD capability could have deterred some countries from military action and posed significant challenges to NATO, as well complicating planning and diverting intelligence and attack capability from other tasks. The country’s coastline allowed sea power to be brought to bear and, as Libya is close to Europe, NATO’s limited stra- tegic lift capability was not tested. Fighting did not spill over into neighbouring states, and the flight of nearly one million people from Libya has not (so far) destabilised the region. The most important lessons of the Libyan war may be those drawn by authoritarian regimes and states and non-state actors that require a military capability to deter or fight the US, or other forces similarly trained and equipped. Their military and security planners may deduce that they need to improve their internal- security capabilities (such as well equipped, highly trained, politically loyal elite forces) to halt protests before they develop. They will seek to prevent the Security Council passing similarly broad resolutions and to undermine the formation of any coalitions against them. They might also see value in striking enemy infrastructure and employing ‘anti-access’ systems. Finally, they could consider Gadhafi foolish to have voluntarily surrendered his WMD capability. There will be no shortage of advocacy of particular capabilities by interest groups in NATO states, where militaries and defence industries will be seeking to further their own causes, but the military lessons of the Libyan conflict identified in coalition forces’ capi- tals are unlikely to be novel. Those drawn by author- itarian regimes could have greater ramifications for future conflicts. D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 18 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2012 By 11 September 2001, Western armed forces were 12 years removed from those that had, during the Cold War between the late 1940s and 1989, gener- ally trained for potential war in Europe. The period from 1989 to 2001 saw them engaged on a wide range of operations. By 2001, these forces were confident they could conduct peace-support operations as well as combat operations against state actors. At the same time, some military professionals and analysts considered that the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ (RMA) would combine greatly improved surveil- lance, communications and precision-strike weapons, resulting in superior knowledge of the enemy and better targeted and more effective strikes. This would enable a modernised networked force to more rapidly defeat adversaries that had not taken advantage of new technologies and doctrines. After the defeat of the Iraqi army in 2003, the tactics and nature of the insurgents facing coalition troops initially blunted the edge of this advantage. These adaptable adversaries adopted asymmetric tactics to counter the firepower and tactics of coalition forces. The principal factor in eventual tactical success in Iraq was the rediscovery of counter-insurgency (COIN) principles established in earlier wars, applied by concentrating sufficient ground troops to provide security for the people through a systematic ‘clear, hold and build’ approach. Nonetheless, as the Iraq War progressed, armies and air forces adapted some instruments of the RMA for counter-insurgency, including unmanned aerial vehicles providing persistent surveillance, the use of precision weapons, and high-capacity command and control networks capable of bringing accurate fire to bear quickly on enemy targets. Improvements in intelligence collec- tion and analysis included closer integration of tactical and strategic intelligence. While the Western wars since 9/11 have been primarily fought on land, operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya were, from their inception, ‘joint’, with the need for close integration of land, air and, to a lesser extent, naval forces. Further, military planning and wider operations increasingly involve non-military government departments including law enforcement and development bodies and, in some combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 cases, cross-government ‘stabilisation’ groups. Some armed forces are now having to plan and operate in an overlapping area between insurgency and law enforcement. For instance, military personnel are deployed on anti-corruption duties in Afghanistan. Other armed forces are taking on tasks that were hith- erto the preserve of internal security forces (as seen in the Mexican and Brazilian armies’ domestic deploy- ments). They are also having to take account of capa- bilities such as cyber, only relatively recently seen as having military utility. All these factors will influence the future development of Western armed forces, as they shift focus from the wars of the past ten years to broader strategic challenges. These might accrue from factors as diverse as the rise of aspirant great powers, the impact of territorial disputes on regional stability, the effect of piracy, and continuing insur- gent and terrorist activity; they will also affect, to varying degrees, the development of non-western armed forces. Ground forces Over the last decade, conventional state-versus-state land warfare has been generally confined to the first month of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 and the short Russia–Georgia war of 2008. Both these wars showed the vulnerability of conventional armies to an oppo- nent with superiority in overall firepower, air power, and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. Regime change in Iraq, and in Afghanistan, was followed by protracted COIN operations against insurgents, including efforts to build new indig- enous security forces through training, advising and mentoring. With such insurgencies the domi- nant experience, Western armies have as a result changed a great deal. However, lessons derived from the Western experience – and the developments in weapons systems arising from that experience – will likely also influence the development of non-Western armies. While the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have confirmed the continuing relevance of the classic prin- ciples of counter-insurgency (including the primacy of politics, addressing the root causes of insurgency D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 19combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 and making progress across all areas of governance and development) it is evident that there has been no substitute – in the absence of effective local security – for large numbers of troops on the ground or the ability to conduct combined arms combat operations. Protection and firepower Iraq and Afghanistan have seen periods of intense ground combat, and casualty levels have been corre- spondingly high for Western armies, local forces and civilians. Insurgents have made extensive use of IEDs, including roadside bombs, with lethal effect. The IED threat has been similar to that presented by landmines and booby traps in conventional warfare, but in Iraq and Afghanistan the scale of the threat and its success in inflicting casualties was a strategic shock for many Western armies. With increasing insurgent capability, rising casualties and a decline in support for these wars in the West, protecting troops has increased in importance. Improved body armour has been fielded to protect individual soldiers, though this has added to the weight that troops must carry. There have been considerable advances in battle- field medicine, including advanced field dressings, deployment of military paramedics down to squad level and forward deployment of advanced medical technology: as a result, survival rates among those with serious wounds are higher than in any previous war. A common counter-IED approach has been applied across NATO’s national contingents in Afghanistan. Counter-IED has become a core activity for all deployed troops, and initiatives include equip- ping infantry with hand-held detectors and forming bespoke ‘Counter-IED task forces’ with high-tech equipment such as remotely-operated ground vehi- cles. But without sufficient troops and air assets to dominate the ground and deter emplacement of IEDs, the initiative has often remained with the insur- gents. As airlifting troops can largely circumvent the IED threat, many countries have bought more heli- copters and isolated units are often supplied by para- chute. However, even the US is limited in the number of troops and supplies it can move by air with its helicopters, so logistics vehicles have in turn also had armour and jammers added. Vehicles have been fitted with additional armour, air-conditioning, remotely operated weapons and electronic countermeasures, which have increased their size and weight: variants of the British Warrior infantry fighting vehicle in Afghanistan, for example, now weigh 40 tonnes compared with the original 27 tonnes. Armies have also purchased and deployed wheeled protected patrol vehicles with special protec- tion against roadside bombs, such as the US Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle. There has been greater recognition of the utility of v-shaped hull designs, first used in southern Africa in the 1970s. The US is currently modifying a number of its Stryker vehicles into this configuration. With their combination of firepower, mobility and protection, tanks played a decisive role in the ground component of Iraqi Freedom, the Russian attack on Georgia and in the initial attempts by the Gadhafi regime to defeat the Libyan rebels. So, the tank is not obsolete, but its primary role in recent conflicts has involved supporting infantry and fighting insur- gents, rather than fighting other tanks. They remain vulnerable to air power: many Taliban, Iraqi and Libyan armoured vehicles were destroyed by air- launched munitions, albeit in relatively permissive air environments. Nonetheless, the small-arms fire generated by Iraqi and Afghan insurgents has meant that firepower from armoured vehicles, including tanks and armoured infantry fighting vehicles, has been invaluable, as has close tactical cooperation between armoured vehicles and dismounted infantry in a wide variety of terrain. And the tank’s main gun has provided a unique capability with which to attack fortified positions resistant to cannon and missiles. The tank’s potential utility is reflected in the moderni- sation and upgrade programmes devoted to tank fleets around the world. For instance, Brazil, China, India and Russia are all modernising. Conversely, some Western states are reducing their tank hold- ings due to budget cuts and questions over the utility of maintaining large tank inventories; this could increase the number of recent-generation second- hand tanks available on the international market. Combat Since 9/11, Western armies have engaged in consid- erably more dismounted close-quarter fighting than in the previous decade. The requirement for ‘boots on the ground’ makes infantry the dominant army branch in counter-insurgency and conventional fighting in urban areas. Efforts have been made to enhance infantry effectiveness through improved weapons, sights, hand-held laser range-finders, more effective tactical communications nets and night- vision devices. There has been a notable revival in sniping. But this ‘infantry renaissance’ has not yet D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 22 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2012 vessels of major navies at relatively little expense. The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps, for instance, has a fleet of small, fast attack craft that are now armed with C-702 anti-ship missiles. These could be used in a swarm effect or with hit-and-run tactics against larger vessels. Similarly, China’s fleet of Type 022 fast attack craft, which each carry eight YJ-83 anti-ship missiles, would likely be employed as very mobile platforms in coastal and littoral defence. Indonesia is also devel- oping its force of missile-armed fast attack craft. Other traditional roles are also in flux or seeing decreasing demand. Naval gunfire support, the stal- wart weapon of the imperial era, is of seemingly decreasing utility in the modern age. While utilised in the Libyan campaign in 2011, many of the shells fired were starbursts rather than high-explosive projectiles. The vagaries of modern warfare, requiring greater accuracy and fewer civilian casualties, have made naval gunfire support a less attractive option. Various programmes are currently under way to develop guided artillery rounds or rocket-assisted munitions that would permit greater use in contested shore envi- ronments, such as the BAE Systems/Lockheed Martin Long-range Land Attack Projectile to be used on the Zumwalt-class destroyer’s Advanced Gun System and Oto Melara’s Vulcano long-range guided ammunition. Large platforms persist In light of this, the UK Royal Navy’s new Type 45 destroyer appears to be something of an anomaly. Priced at £1 billion per vessel, the Type 45 seems at odds with current Royal Navy priorities, which focus on threats from asymmetric warfare. This helps explain why the initial requirement of 12 was halved to six in 2004. Primarily an anti-air-warfare vessel, they are also carrier escorts, but in a navy with no current carrier strike capabilities, it is unclear whether the ship is the right fit for present demands. Similarly, planned numbers of the Zumwalt-class destroyer to be built by the US, at a cost of more than US$3bn per ship, have been cut from 32 to just three. Budget cuts have also forced Western navies to reduce their plans for new aircraft carriers. The UK has opted to do without carrier strike capabilities until 2020, and then will pursue an Anglo-French carrier capability based on two operational carriers with fixed-wing aircraft. Even the US Navy has debated cutting one of its 11 aircraft carriers in a bid to save costs. In the developing world, however, economic growth has remained robust and aircraft carriers remain a major procurement item for emerging powers. China sent its first aircraft carrier on sea trials in 2011; India is purchasing a refitted Soviet carrier while simultaneously planning to build two more carriers indigenously. Brazil continues to operate a former Clemenceau-class carrier, although its service life is questionable and a replacement may be sought. This only serves to further highlight the dichotomy between developed and developing coun- tries’ spending and procurement trends. The former continue to move towards smaller, more mobile plat- forms adaptable for asymmetric warfare. Developing states in some cases show increasing interest in major platforms while continuing to pursue exactly those asymmetric warfare capabilities that so concern developed states’ defence planners and naval staffs. Platform developments However, both developed and developing states’ navies are interested in deploying more and larger amphibious assault vessels, essentially the largest form of multirole vessel available. For developed countries, these ships offer the opportunity to deploy rotary wing airpower at sea without using their limited aircraft carriers, while also providing the flex- ibility to deploy amphibious forces. In developing countries, where aircraft carrier programmes may be small or non-existent but the desire to project air power at sea remains, amphibious assault vessels either fill the power projection gap or can act as a stepping stone towards larger carriers. Russia’s December 2010 decision to purchase four Mistral- class landing helicopter docks (LHDs) from France emphasises the desire for multirole vessels, as they act as both helicopter carrier and amphibious assault vessel, carrying up to 16 heavy helicopters, 40 tanks and 900 troops. South Korea commissioned the first of its Dokdo-class LHDs in 2007, while Spain brought the Juan Carlos I into service in 2010. Landing plat- form docks (LPDs), meanwhile, offer amphibious capabilities with reduced helicopter carrying capa- bility: China commissioned its first Type 071 LPD in 2007 (with a second undergoing sea trials and a third in build) and Chile purchased the Foudre from France in October 2011. Algeria ordered a San Giorgio-class LPD from Italy in August 2011 which, if delivered, would be a substantial boost to its amphibious capa- bilities. Australia, meanwhile, purchased the landing ship dock RFA Largs Bay from the UK, which was offi- cially handed over in October 2011. The utility of rotary-wing naval aviation has been proven in recent missions, from the intelligence-gath- D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 23combat and capability: military trends since 9/11 ering capabilities of counter-piracy missions to attack helicopters off the coast of Libya. Although helicop- ters are more vulnerable to air defences, in conflicts involving near-total air dominance, they can enhance capabilities and, at sea, they increase a ship’s radius of action, making them invaluable when dealing with smaller, faster vessels. Diesel-electric submarines (SSK) equally appeal to both developing and developed country navies that aim to improve their sea denial (as opposed to sea control) capabilities without the expense and expertise required for nuclear submarine operations. Countries in Southeast Asia have been active in this field. Vietnam has ordered six Kilo-class submarines, Malaysia has taken delivery of its first two SSKs, Singapore is bringing the Archer-class of upgraded ex-Swedish boats into service, and Indonesia and Thailand are expressing interest in new submarine purchases. Japan is seeking to expand the number of its submarines from 16 to 22, while Australia has long-term plans for 12 new, larger SSKs as replacements for its six Collins- class boats. These developments may at least in part indicate unease over China’s efforts to enhance its own submarine capabilities. In Europe, Germany and Italy will commission the last of their Type 212 subma- rines in 2012 and 2014 respectively, while Algeria has improved its capabilities with two improved Kilo-class boats. Air-independent propulsion, which allows these submarines to patrol without having to snorkel, is also an increasingly common feature. Overall, the past decade has greatly influenced naval thinking and tactics in developed navies. Multirole vessels are increasingly common as the perceived threat has migrated from state-based naval assets to non-state threats from small, fast craft. Ship-to-shore power projection, particularly in the initial stages of a land campaign, mean aircraft carriers, amphibious assault ships and their escorts remain relevant, but the declining use of traditional naval gunnery and vulnerability to anti-ship missiles undermines, in the short term at least, the utility of capital ships. Nonetheless, key emerging countries still perceive a strong navy as crucial to ensuring the security of their increasingly globalised interests, and will pursue major shipbuilding programmes to improve their power projection at sea. Aerospace The conflicts since 9/11 in Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya have underscored the strategic importance of airpower to deliver kinetic and non-kinetic effect, and to provide intelligence, surveillance and recon- naissance (ISR). However, the funding crisis facing many governments and defence ministries is having a profound effect on military aerospace, particularly in Europe. It is also – along with the lessons of recent conflicts – helping to propel developments in the technology, employment and even theory of air and space power. In common with the land and sea envi- ronments, these will be studied closely by defence planners and air staffs in countries which are still prospering economically. While air power’s contemporary utility is not in question, there is less certainty among strategic thinkers and defence planners in the US (where air power has long been central to national war-fighting and deterrent capacity) and elsewhere over its future direction. The recent wars in which the US has been engaged have generated doctrinal uncertainty over how to best configure the air force and other US mili- tary aviation in the face of a kaleidoscope of emerging threats. ISR During the initial phases of military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq leading to regime change, advanced ISR and air-launched precision weapons enabled the US and its allies to deploy ground forces at substantially lower levels than would previously have been required. ISR gave the West an asym- metric edge in terms of improved tactical- and theatre-level situational awareness. These campaigns have seen a distribution of ISR assets to platoon level, enhancing the usability and timeliness of their product. Meanwhile, ISR platforms now boast an array of sensors and systems across an increasingly broad range of radar frequencies and electro-optical bandwidths, with new developments in multi-spec- tral imagery systems. Systems such as the Predator UAV have also been developed as weapons plat- forms. Combat operations over Libya during 2011 further reinforced awareness of the value of air- and space-based ISR systems. Space-based ISR as well as communications systems, traditionally the domain of only a handful of states, will likely proliferate following the emergence of cheaper, and smaller, satellites. The UK has considered small satellites as a means of acquiring a national geo-spatial intelligence capability, while Singapore has examined the utility of comparatively low-cost remote sensing satellites. Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, also known as RPAS or Remotely Piloted Air Systems) have emerged D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 24 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2012 from recent wars as important platforms for carrying ISR systems. Equipping a UAV with a capable sensor suite and an endurance of tens of hours is of immense value, but also raises the issue of survivability. The level of airborne ISR available in Afghanistan and Libya is highly desirable for Western armed forces, but similar provision in contested air space would be another, possibly much more costly matter. In Iraq the permissive air environment enabled the US to deploy a successful lower-cost platform in the form of the MC-12 Liberty ISR aircraft, based on the 350 King Air, which moved from concept to first mission-flight in less than a year; less costly solutions like this might prove attractive to militaries with less resources. Anticipated cost savings may have influenced interest in unmanned systems, but experience over the past decade shows that these systems – at least at the high-end – are expensive and require a consid- erable number of support personnel. These systems may thus only be affordable for rich, technologically- advanced states’ air forces. This problem of afford- ability may be even more acute in relation to the low-observable long-range combat UAVs now in the early stages of development. While such systems will doubtless find a place in future air force inventories, the extent and pace of their introduction, and the way they are employed operationally (not least in terms of the level of autonomy granted to the platform) all remain areas of contention. Air arms will need to consider carefully the optimum force balance between manned and unmanned platforms, the ownership and operation of which is likely to remain a source of friction between armed services. There have been debates in the US and in the UK over ownership of UAVs between respective air and land forces. Funding for air power The funding problems facing many air forces, notably in the West, are jeopardising procurement plans. Still deeper cuts are in prospect. One important example concerns US Air Force tactical combat aircraft. The USAF’s ageing fighters need to be replaced: the majority of F-15s are more than 20 years old, while most F-16s are around 15–20 years old. However, delays to the Lockheed Martin F-35 programme, and the threat of an extended and reduced procurement of that type, pose major problems for air force plan- ners. Life-extension programmes for combat aircraft will place additional strain on air force budgets. Meanwhile, funding constraints are forcing many European air arms, as well as the various branches of US military aviation, to continue reducing their personnel and orders of battle. The UK’s 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review further cut the Royal Air Force. The latest defence cuts announced in the Netherlands in April 2011 axed a fighter squadron, while a German review in late October is expected to lead to reductions in the size of the air force. New generations While the US F-35 programme struggles with delays and cost escalation, watched with anxiety by partner nations in the project, Russia and China are flight- testing their own ‘fifth-generation’ combat aircraft. Three Sukhoi T-50s were being used for flight trials by late 2011, and the Chengdu J-20 first flew in January 2011. After well over a decade of stagnation, Russia has revitalised its defence aerospace research and development. Whether, and to what extent, it can maintain this effort in the medium-to-long term is uncertain: Russia’s defence industry – while innova- tive and capable in small-scale production – continues to face challenges in serially producing equipment (see Russia, p. 183). The collapse of defence spending in the 1990s resulted in the contraction of Russia’s defence industry, and a loss of intellectual capital. This adversely affected serial production manufac- turing capacity. For Beijing, the J-20 marks a step change in ambition from the Chengdu J-10 fighter, though how quickly and on what scale production of operational variants will commence is unclear. Nonetheless both the T-50 and J-20 projects high- light a closing of the defence-technology gap with the US and Europe. Given the constraints on US defence spending, Washington may have to accept a reduced technological edge, though it will try to ensure that it remains ahead of its rivals. The Russian, and prob- ably eventually Chinese, platforms may proliferate as a result of export sales, offering some nations access to high-capability combat aircraft not available from the West. Moscow has already secured Delhi as a partner in the T-50, while Beijing shows every inten- tion of increasing its defence aerospace exports. The JF-17 is already in service with Pakistan. Moscow is promoting what may be the ultimate version of the Sukhoi Su-27 Flanker, the Su-35S, for export. But combat and ISR platforms are not alone in receiving closer attention from air force planners. Recent wars have reinforced the value of air-to-air refuelling as well as strategic and tactical airlift. In the latter case, fixed- and rotary-wing platforms have been increasingly employed for in-theatre movement, D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 The war in Afghanistan remains the main focus of military effort for the US and many other countries in NATO and beyond (see The Military Balance 2011, p. 9), as the refusal to divert resources from Afghanistan to the Libya campaign demonstrated. But despite some military successes, and record numbers of foreign troops, political progress remains elusive. In November 2010, NATO and Afghan President Hamid Karzai agreed that Afghan authorities would take the lead for security across the country from the end of 2014, a move enabled by the 2009–10 surge of 30,000 additional US troops. In June 2011 US President Barack Obama announced that the surge had peaked and numbers would begin to reduce, with 10,000 US troops due to depart by the end of 2011. Remaining surge reinforcements were to be withdrawn by September 2012. Obama stated that the remaining 68,000 US forces would be ‘coming home at a steady pace’ as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) assumed security leadership. US General David Petraeus, then commander of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), recommended a much smaller drawdown. US Marine Corps General John Allen, who replaced Petraeus in July 2011, is conducting a review of the campaign plan and the development of the ANSF. The ANSF continued to grow during 2011. By October, the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan National Police (ANP) were around their target strengths of 171,600 and 134,000 respectively. The intent is to have 195,000 ANA and 157,000 ANP by 31 October 2012, and these targets will probably be met. The ANA is improving its combat support and combat service support and, as NATO forces reduce, it will probably be capable of holding those areas in southern Afghanistan that are now clear of insurgents. The ANP will also progress, but its effectiveness is dependent on wider improvements in the justice system, including courts, lawyers and prisons. These areas lag even further behind, with reports that NATO will decline to send detainees to Afghan prisons that fall below minimum inter- national standards. Although there has been some reduction in casualty and absence rates, the attri- tion rates for the ANA, the border police and the The war in Afghanistan elite Civil Order Police are still well above the 1.4% monthly target. The war in 2011 ISAF continued offensive operations in 2011, for example successfully contesting insurgent control of Kunduz and Balkh provinces. This built on progress in 2010, which included improved intelligence, clear- ance of Taliban strongholds in Helmand and Kandahar provinces, and significant attrition of insurgent leaders inside Afghanistan by special forces. In July 2011, Lashkar Gah (the provincial capital of Helmand); Kabul (less one district); Bamiyan; Panjsher; Herat; Mazar-e Sharif and Mehtar Lam were transferred to Afghan security leadership. A second tranche of districts and provinces was announced in November 2011, to begin transition by the end of the year. Southern Afghanistan remained the main effort; it appeared that ISAF’s offensive operations to clear and hold populated areas in the south had improved security there. Although the insurgents continued to attack ISAF and ANSF with small arms and IEDs throughout the country, the territorial gains of 2010 were not reversed. Indeed, NATO displayed cautious optimism that security improvements would endure. For example, British officers and officials were confi- dent that the combination of greater troop numbers, successful ‘clear, hold and build’ operations, growing ANSF capability and confidence, the successful Just how capable? In June 2011, ISAF delivered the following assessment of ANA capability: Of six corps and one divisional HQ, all but one of these formations were capable of operating with ‘partnered assistance’; 17 of 20 brigades had reached the same level; of 158 kandaks (battalions) two were independent, 55 effective with advisers, 56 effective with assistance and the remainder ‘developing’. By 2014, the majority need to be independent or effective with advisers. This transition will require practical assessment, not that driven by scorecards, by combined ISAF and ANSF commanders and the Afghan government. Many units are now being tested and some, such as special forces, are well rated, although all operate with ISAF supporting assets available. The real test for the ANSF will come in 2014 and afterwards. D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 28 The MiliTAry BAlAnce 2012 handover of Lashkar Gah to Afghan security lead- ership, and the maturing of many civilian develop- ment projects meant that Helmand was on the way to a successful transition to Afghan security lead by the end of 2014. There was a modest reduction in the level of NATO fatalities – 285 in the first six months of 2011 compared with 324 in the same period in 2010. However, civilian deaths rose. In its mid-year report in July 2011, the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) documented 1,462 civilian deaths in the first six months of the year, an increase of 15% over the same period in 2010. UNAMA said that the main factors behind this rise were ‘increased and widespread use of IEDs, more complex suicide attacks, an intensified campaign of targeted kill- ings, increased ground fighting, and a rise in civilian deaths from air strikes’. In total, UNAMA reported, ‘80% of all civilian deaths in the first half of 2011 were attributed to Anti-Government Elements (up 28% from the same period in 2010), 14% were attributed to Pro-Government Forces (down 9% from the same period in 2010) and 6% were unattributed.’ The UN Secretary-General’s September 2011 report to the Security Council assessed that the average number of security incidents from January to August 2011 showed a 39% increase compared with the same period in 2010. Although there was no overall increase in suicide attacks, the use of suicide bombers in complex, ‘spectacular’ attacks had increased by 50% since 2011. In Kabul, ‘spectaculars’ in summer 2011 included attacks on the InterContinental Hotel, the British Council, the US embassy and ISAF HQ. Less attention was given to attacks outside Kabul, including those in Tarin Kot, Kandahar city and Jalalabad. All of these were contained and then defeated by the ANSF, with limited support from ISAF advisers and helicopters. Insurgents have also intimidated and assassi- nated politicians and security and government offi- cials. Much of this effort has been in Kandahar where the deputy provincial governor, mayor, provincial police chief, head of the Kandahar Shura, as well as junior and mid-ranking officials, have all been killed. Two influential figures close to Karzai were also murdered: his special adviser Jan Muhammad Khan and Ahmed Wali Karzai, his half-brother and an important Pashtun power broker. Meanwhile, the October 2011 assassination of former president Burhanuddin Rabbani suggested that some insur- gents wanted to derail Kabul’s efforts to negotiate. Karzai subsequently stated that he would no longer talk to the Taliban, implying he would negotiate with Pakistan instead. Assessment As the 2011 fighting season drew to a close, it was difficult to reconcile NATO’s cautious optimism with the UN’s reporting of increased violence, the apparent success of the insurgent assassination campaign and media coverage of the ‘spectacular’ attacks in Kabul. Although UN statistics show a sustained increase in complex and ‘spectacular’ attacks, they also suggest that insurgents were less successful in areas where there is a high density of NATO and Afghan forces. NATO spokespeople claimed that this demonstrated not only the tactical success of clearance operations, but also the impact of the special-forces-led attacks on insurgent leadership. But significant security chal- lenges remain. Parts of southern Afghanistan outside the ‘cleared’ areas remain under insurgent control. The end of the surge means that it is unlikely that further offensive operations would clear more of Helmand and Kandahar. There has been much less military progress in eastern Afghanistan, the heartland of the Haqqani Network. This insurgent group has been responsible for the series of ‘spectaculars’ against iconic targets in Kabul. Although these have all been contained and then neutralised by the ANSF with ISAF support, they suggest weaknesses in the ANSF’s ability to secure their capital. If such attacks continue with sufficient frequency they will create, both within Afghanistan and internationally, a pervasive impression of ungov- ernability and failure of transition. If the insurgent campaign of assassination continues at the same intensity as in late 2011, it may cause significant attrition to politicians and officials. It also seeks to intimidate the population and reinforce propaganda that insurgent victory is inevitable after 2014. US troop reductions will probably be matched, if not overtaken, by similar reductions in the 40,000 non-US troops in the country. The Netherlands and Canada have withdrawn combat troops, leaving reduced contingents training the ANSF. Denmark plans to reduce troops in combat roles, whilst increasing the number of Danish military and police trainers. The UK announced that its 10,000-strong force would be reduced by 1,000 troops by the end of 2012 and that any UK troops remaining after 2014 will no longer be in a combat role. D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 29The war in Afghanistan © IISS KABUL BADAKSHAN TAKHAR BAGHLAN KUNAR LAGHMAN KHOST PAKTIKA GHAZNI KANDAHAR HELMAND NIMRUZ FARAH HERAT URUZGAN DAY KUNDI GHOR BADGHIS FARYAB JAWZJAN BALKH SAMANGAN KUNDUZ SAR-E PUL WARDAKBAMIYAN PANJSHIR KAPISA ZABUL LOGAR PAKTIA NANGARHAR PARWAN NURISTAN 20 (UK) 33 (GEO) 3 (US) 5 RCT (US) 2 LAR (US) (DNK) 2 (ROM) × 116 (US) || 495 (ROM) || (TUR) || (TUR) || 11 (FRA) × × 1 201 (AFG) × 45 (US) × 1 209 (AFG) × 3 209 (AFG) × 2 209 (AFG) ISAF Provincial Reconstruction Team and troop nationality (see above for key) 232 (GER) × 170 (US) || 292 (GER) || × 2 207 (AFG) 5 RAR (AUS) || × 2 215 (AFG) 8 RCT (US) 82 159 USMC AIR WG* 1 ACB Regional Command Air Assets North South East Southwest *incl UK assets × × × × Armoured || || || Battalion Infantry Key to symbols ||| Regiment Reconnaissance || Armoured reconnaissance Airborne Mountain infantry ×× Brigade × ××× Division Corps HBCT (US armoured) Mechanised Battlefield surveillance Helicopter Amphibious || ||| ||| ||| × 2 4 (US) × 1 25 (US) 504 (US) × 3 10 (US) × × 16 (ESP) × 3 207 (AFG) × SASSARI (ITA) × × 1 207 (AFG) Sources: ISAF/IISS Research. Military symbols depict unit/formations’ standard organisation, but many have re-roled for deployment to Afghanistan and operate special equipment such as PPVs and anti-IED equipment. × 1 215 (AFG) × 3 205 (AFG) × 1 205 (AFG) × 2 205 (AFG) × 4 205 (AFG) × 3 201 (AFG) 3 215 (AFG) 3 1 ID (US) × × 1 203 (AFG) 4 10 (US) × × 4 203 (AFG) 3 25 (US) × × 2 201 (AFG) ×× 111 CAPITAL (AFG) (three brigades) 172 (US) × × 2 203 (AFG) × 3 203 (AFG) 17 (POL) × Mazar-e Sharif Qal’eh-Now Herat Farah Lashkar Gah Kandahar Qalat Tarin Kowt Ghazni Pol-e Alam Wardak Pul-e Kumri Sharan Khost Jalalabad Mehtar LamNijrab NuristanPanjsher Bagram Faizabad Kunduz Gardez Maimanah Shibirghan Chaghcharan Bamiyan Asadabad Regional Command Capital – Kabul Regional Command West Regional Command North Regional Command South Regional Command East Regional Command Southwest US US US USUS ROK US US US US US US US CZE TUR NZL US ITA ESP LTU NOR TUR SWE GER HUN GER US UK AUS/US Albania 286 Armenia 126 Australia (AUS) 1,550 Austria 3 Azerbaijan 94 Belgium 577 Bosnia-Herzegovina 55 Bulgaria 597 Canada (CAN) 529 Croatia 317 Czech Republic (CZE) 694 Denmark (DNK) 750 El Salvador 24 Estonia (EST) 162 Finland 195 France (FRA) 3,932 Georgia 937 Germany (GER) 5,150 Greece 153 Hungary (HUN) 415 Iceland 4 (civilians) Ireland 7 Italy (ITA) 4,213 Jordan 720 Rep. of Korea (ROK) 350 Latvia 174 Lithuania (LTU) 236 Luxembourg 11 Macedonia (FYROM) 163 Malaysia 46 Mongolia 114 Montenegro 39 Netherlands (NLD) 183 New Zealand (NZL) 188 Norway (NOR) 562 Poland (POL) 2,580 Portugal 229 Romania 1,947 Singapore 39 Slovakia 326 Slovenia 87 Spain (ESP) 1,526 Sweden (SWE) 614 Tonga 55 Turkey (TUR) 1,840 Ukraine 23 United Arab Emirates 35 UK 9,500 US 90,000 US (OEF-A) 7,000 Total (rounded) 137,638 Estimated troop contributions of NATO–ISAF nations – October 2011 Map 2 Afghanistan D ow nl oa de d by [ ] a t 0 1: 28 0 9 M ar ch 2 01 2 32 The MiliTary BalanCe 2012 Estimated Real Defence Budget Changes (2010–2011) So ur ce : I IS S DM AP R es ea rc h M or e th an 2 0% in cr ea se in p la nn ed e xp en di tu re Be tw ee n 10 % a nd 2 0% in cr ea se in p la nn ed e xp en di tu re Be tw ee n 0% a nd 1 0% in cr ea se in p la nn ed e xp en di tu re Be tw ee n 0% a nd 1 0% d ec re as e in p la nn ed e xp en di tu re Be tw ee n 10 % a nd 2 0% d ec re as e in p la nn ed e xp en di tu re M or e th an 2 0% d ec re as e in p la nn ed e xp en di tu re In su f ci en t d at a Th is m ap il lu st ra te s th e pe rc en ta ge c ha ng e in p la nn ed d ef en ce s pe nd in g (i. e. d ef en ce bu dg et s) b et w ee n 20 10 a nd 2 01 1, m ea su re d in re al te rm s at c on st an t 2 01 0 pr ic es . T he se fig ur es d o no t r efl ec t p la nn ed c ha ng es in sp en di ng a fte r 2 01 1. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 04 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 33Comparative defence statistics 05010 0 15 0 20 0 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 Da te o f r st de liv er y In di vi du al ai rc ra ft or de rs Fl ee t nu m be rs Fl ee t n um be rs (le ft ha nd s ca le ) In di vi du al ai rc ra ft or de rs (ri gh t h an d sc al e) In di a co nt in ue s to re va m p its c om ba t a ir cr af t fl ee t, ex te nd in g th e liv es o f s om e in -s er vi ce ty pe s, w hi le a ls o ac qu ir in g m or e m od er n ai rc ra ft, a nd re tir in g ol de r p la tfo rm s. F ro m 2 01 4, it s M ed iu m M ul ti- Ro le C om ba t A ir cr af t w ill b ol st er th e in ve nt or y, w hi le th e Fi fth -G en er at io n Fi gh te r A ir cr af t p ro gr am m e is e xp ec te d to s ee fi rs t fl ee t a dd iti on s ar ou nd 2 02 0. T he T eja s ( Li gh t C om ba t A ir cr af t) is a ls o fin al ly n ea ri ng e nt ry in to s er vi ce , t ho ug h th e nu m be r t o be b ou gh t r em ai ns u nc er ta in . N ew D el hi is a ls o, in th e lo ng er te rm , co nt in ui ng it s A dv an ce d M ed iu m C om ba t A ir cr af t p ro je ct , w hi ch c ou ld e nt er s er vi ce b y th e m id dl e of th e ne xt d ec ad e. 10 00 75 0 50 0 25 0 0 De liv er ie s du e to s ta rt on th es e da te s 19 70 –7 1 56 5 19 80 –8 1 57 0 19 90 –9 1 82 4 20 00 –0 1 77 2 20 11 66 5 20 21 57 0 21 4 FG FA 12 5 M iG -2 1 B is on (u pg ra de ) 70 M iG -2 1 M /M F 31 M iG -2 1 bi s 82 Ja gu ar IS 12 7 M iG -2 7M 52 M ir ag e 20 00 H 64 M iG 29 A /U B 10 Ja gu ar IM 15 3 Su -3 0 M kI 40 Te ja s M k 1 12 6 M M RC A Th e r st 1 8 M M RC A a irc ra ft w ill b e bu ilt b y th e m an uf ac - tu re r, w ith th e re m ai nd er to b e as se m bl ed in In di a In di a is e xp ec te d to b rin g its F G FA (b as ed o n th e Ru ss ia T -5 0 pr og ra m m e) in to s er vi ce a ro un d 20 20 Th e M iG -2 1 Bi so n up gr ad e w as dr iv en b y de la y to th e Li gh t C om ba t A irc ra ft, w ith th e im pr ov ed a irc ra ft en te rin g se rv ic e w ith th e ai r f or ce in 20 01 . A to ta l o f 1 25 a irc ra ft w er e up gr ad ed . I nd ia ’s Su -3 0 e et is ex pe ct ed to e ve nt ua lly n um be r 2 70 . Th e M iG -2 7, M iG -2 9 an d M ira ge h av e ei th er b ee n or a re be in g up gr ad ed to e xt en d th ei r op er at io na l l ife . 4 0 of th e M iG -2 7s h av e be en u pg ra de d, w hi le th e M iG -2 9 an d M ira ge 20 00  ee ts a re n ow in e ar ly st ag es o f u pg ra de p ro je ct s. T he re m ai nd er o f t he M iG -2 7 e et w ill be w ith dr aw n w el l i n ad va nc e of th e up gr ad ed a irc ra ft. Th os e M iG -2 1s n ot u pg ra de d ar e lik el y to b e w ith dr aw n by 2 01 5, w hi le th e Ja gu ar is n ow th e fo cu s of a n up gr ad e pr og ra m m e to e xt en d its s er vi ce li fe . *E xc ep tin g FG FA , M M RC A an d Te ja s ai rc ra ft, to ta ls re e ct p re se nt ty pe n um be rs in s er vi ce . Indian Air Force: Tactical Aviation Variant Induction Dates D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 04 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 34 The MiliTary BalanCe 2012 Economic/Manpower Manoeuvre Projection ISTAR Strategic/Long Range Defence Budget, 2010–11 (US$bn) Modern main battle tanks (1,000 vehicles per unit) Aircraft carriers (10 per unit) Cruisers/destroyers (25 vessels per unit) Nuclear-powered submarines (25 vessels per unit) Frigates (25 vessels per unit) Principal amphibious ships (25 vessels per unit) Tanker and multi-role tanker/transport aircraft (100 aircraft per unit) Airborne early-warning and control aircraft (100 aircraft per unit) Imagery satellites (5 per unit) Electronic-/signals- intelligence satellites (5 per unit) Navigational satellites (5 per unit) Modern armoured infantry fighting vehicles (1,000 vehicles per unit) Fourth-generation tactical aircraft (500 ac per unit) Attack helicopters (250 hel per unit) Heavy/medium transport helicopters (500 hel per unit) 89.8 58.8 37.3 Defence Budget (%GDP) Active manpower (100,000 per unit) ICBM (Launchers) (25 per unit) Bomber aircraft (25 per unit) Ballistic-missile nuclear-powered submarines (10 per unit) 1.27 2.11 1.97 2.86 2.58 4.91 739.3 US 2,285,000 239,000 1,155,000 956,000 174,000 1,569,000 292 450 251 3 4 12 4 14 2,800 254 568 1,300 227 6,302 2,390 232 1,105 4,960 526 6,452 155 66 132 916280 220747 3,029 179 263 862 294 66 355 20 36 16 162 117 638 183 2,809 Fifth-generation tactical aircraft 111 13 13 10 5 83 57 24 5 6 1 7 25 65 1 11 3 1 7 29 11 8 13 28 Heavy/medium transport aircraft (100 aircraft per unit) 57 56 24 201 39 14 4 2 20 6 104 15 13 29 6 20 3n.k. n.k.4 5 370 20 847 550 Heavy unmanned aerial vehicles (50 aircraft per unit) 3 1 2 1 10 20 11 10 27 31 11 China France India Russia UK US China France India Russia UK US China France India 52.7 62.7 Russia UK Modern MBT/AIFV: ISD post 1980 Fourth-generation aircraft: ISD post 1980 (includes upgraded third-generation designs) Fifth-generation aircraft: those designed with low-observable characteristics as a fundamental design driver Key defence statistics D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 04 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 37Comparative defence statistics LH D LH A LP H LP D LS D LS L29 7 2 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 2 4 5 2 U SA U K N et he rla nd s Br az il Sp ai n Fr an ce Au st ra lia Si ng ap or e In do ne si a Ita ly Ch in a Ta iw anSo ut h Ko re a In di a 1 Ch ile Global Principal Amphibious Ship Holdings D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 04 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 38 The MiliTary BalanCe 2012 Fr an ce G er m an y Ca na da U ni te d St at es U K N or w ay N et he rla nd s D en m ar k Be lg iu m Po la nd H un ga ry Sl ov ak ia Cr oa tia Po rt ug al Sp ai n Ita ly Tu rk ey Ro m an ia Bu lg ar ia Cz ec h Re p. G re ec e TO TA LS Ft r FG A A tk EW Tk r U S 47 0 2, 44 8 33 4 18 4 55 0 O th er N AT O 68 4 1, 58 3 81 38 78 N AT O To ta l 1, 15 4 4, 03 1 41 5 22 2 62 8 = 10 u ni ts Ta nk er Ai rc ra ft in te nd ed fo r ai r-t o- ai r r ef ue llin g Fi gh te r Co m ba t a irc ra ft ta sk ed pr im ar ily fo r t he a ir- to -a ir ro le FG A Ai rc ra ft c ap ab le of b ot h ai r-t o- su rfa ce a nd a ir- to -a ir m iss io ns (t he e xt en t o f t he la tt er ca pa bi lit y is a/ c de pe nd en t) At ta ck Ai rc ra ft d es ig ne d so lel y fo r t he ai r-t o- su rfa ce ta sk , w ith li m ite d or n o ai r-t o- ai r c ap ab ilit y El ec tr on ic w ar fa re Ai rc ra ft in te nd ed fo r ele ct ro ni c co un te rm ea su re s NATO Tactical and Tanker Aircraft Comparison D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 04 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 N or th A m er ic aChapter Three North America The UniTed STaTeS US forces continued to be heavily engaged in combat and stabilisation actions in Afghanistan while, at the end of December 2011, the last US troops left Iraq. The aftermath of these wars, combined with the impact of the financial crisis on government budgeting and US perceptions of its allies’ willingness to shoulder the burden in conflict, may have an impact on the nature and extent of US involvement in future crises. This is not to say that full-scale global retrench- ment is on the horizon. For a start, it is difficult for a superpower to retrench. Moreover, the US maintains a number of alliances and security and treaty relation- ships, such as those with South Korea, Taiwan and Japan, that could lead to the deployment of military assets. Nor do current circumstances mean that the US will stop providing military support to allies engaged on operations: as happened in Libya, this support may in some cases consist of force enablers, as well as applications of combat power. Yet Washington is likely to give more careful thought to whether inter- vening in crises is necessarily in the US interest; to the nature and duration of any military response; and to the type of forces the US should develop and main- tain. That said, not every military emergency will be of Washington’s choosing, so maintaining flexible forces capable of acting in a wide range of contingen- cies will also preoccupy military planners. Debates on the future of American policy and strategy are taking place at a time when cuts in defence budgets are widely expected, and when pres- idential hopefuls, in anticipation of the November 2012 election, have begun to stake out their foreign- policy positions. The strategies and financial reali- ties that emerge from these debates will ultimately shape the size, role and posture of US military forces in the future. Spending will be cut; the question is by how much, and how the US military will change as a result. Leadership changes 2011 was a transitional year for US defence policy, both in terms of leadership and of priorities. On 30 June, Secretary of Defense Dr Robert Gates stepped down after four and a half years in charge; his deputy, William J. Lynn III, announced his depar- ture soon after. Leon Panetta, former director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), succeeded Gates at the Pentagon, and Dr Ashton Carter, until recently under secretary of defense for acquisition, technology and logistics, replaced Lynn. Panetta and Carter are both experienced Washington hands. Panetta’s earlier service in the US Congress and the Office of Management and Budget are particularly relevant in ongoing defence-budget debates. Panetta, like Gates before him, was keen in his early speeches to stress the need for carefully considered defence cuts, rather than attempt to realise set financial savings, such as those that would result from sequestration (in the absence of congressional agreement over the budget proposals made by the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction, wide-ranging automatic spending cuts – a ‘sequestration’ – of $1.2 trillion over 10 years will be triggered, starting in January 2013: see p. 44). In Panetta’s words, the latter ‘would force across-the- board salami-slicing cuts of the worst kind. It would hollow out the force, it would leave our military defi- cient in people, in training, and equipment.’ At the White House, meanwhile, Thomas Donilan replaced James Jones as National Security Advisor; and James R. Clapper, a retired Air Force lieutenant- general who had previously served as under secretary of defense for intelligence, took over as the director of national intelligence from retired Admiral Dennis Blair. Panetta was replaced at the CIA by General David Petraeus, who retired from active army service and handed command of NATO’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan over to Marine Corps General John Allen. General Martin Dempsey, after a very brief tenure as Army chief of staff, replaced retiring Admiral Michael Mullen as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Raymond T. Odierno replaced Dempsey as Army chief of staff, having moved from US Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), which was disestablished on 31 August as a cost-saving measure. (JFCOM’s functions were redistributed to other combatant commands.) Dempsey and Odierno bring deep operational expe- rience to their positions from their service in Iraq. D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 42 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 tering violent extremism; deterring and defeating aggression; strengthening international and regional security; and shaping the future force), is subtitled ‘Redefining America’s Military Leadership’. In his introduction, Admiral Michael Mullen, although emphasising ‘how the Joint Force will redefine America’s military leadership to adapt to a chal- lenging new era’, also acknowledged that ‘hard near-term choices must be made in light of broader economic constraints’. The US military will, according to Mullen, have to ‘find innovative and affordable ways to provide the full range of capabilities neces- sary to fulfill this strategy while making difficult trad- eoffs between modernization, capacity, capability, posture, and risk’. Although the NMS discusses the gamut of global challenges for which the US military must prepare, its clear priorities are in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. As US military capabilities are pressured by budgetary reductions, the relative importance of these regions and the priority they demand will only increase. Other regions will receive less attention. China is at the top of the agenda. The strategy communicates a clear preference for constructive engagement rather than military competition with China, expressing a desire, through improved mili- tary-to-military relationships, ‘to expand areas of mutual interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation’. Nevertheless, the NMS’s main message is one of concern about China’s military modernisation and growing assertiveness, and the implications of this trend for US interests, the military balance, access to and use of the global commons and cyberspace, and stability in the region. Indeed, improved Chinese military capabilities, particularly in the areas of anti- access and area denial, were the impetus for coop- eration between the US Navy and the US Air Force in moves to develop the Air–Sea Battle concept, as discussed in The Military Balance 2011 (p. 47). The NMS’s insistence that ‘the Nation’s strategic priorities and interests emanate from the Asia-Pacific region’ echoes broader US policy, as expressed by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton who, in November 2011, wrote in Foreign Policy that ‘one of the most important tasks of American statecraft over the next decade will … be to lock in a substantially increased investment – diplomatic, economic, strategic, and otherwise – in the Asia-Pacific region’. Thus, there is a commitment in the NMS to ‘expand our military security coopera- tion, exchanges, and exercises with the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia, Pakistan, Indonesia, Singapore, and other states in Oceania’. China aside, North Korea remains the most volatile problem in Asia, particularly given perennial uncertainties about its intentions and leadership succession, its military behaviour, and its nuclear activities. Regarding the Middle East, the NMS, published before the Arab Awakening and operations in Libya, identifies ‘an Iranian regime that continues to seek nuclear weapons, as well as continuing to provide support to terrorist organizations throughout the broader Middle East’ as the principal threat to regional stability. Thus far, all indications are that Iran is proceeding with its nuclear programme, despite international sanctions. Preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear-armed state is a US policy objec- tive; how this will be realised remains uncertain. The October 2011 allegations of an Iranian plot against the Saudi ambassador in Washington only added to tensions, as did the findings of the November 2011 IAEA report on Iran. The evolving situation in the Middle East will force a re-evaluation of US military strategy in the region. This is particularly true with the end of the Mubarak regime in Egypt and the uncertainty that the removal of this pillar of US regional policy has caused. In addition, the US military presence in Iraq has ended. Although the United States ‘seeks a long- term partnership with Iraq’, Baghdad’s long-term orientation, and the strength of American influence in that country, remain to be seen. In the realm of capabilities, the NMS says that American strategy is focused ‘on fielding modular, adaptive, general purpose forces that can be employed in the full range of military operations’. This should not necessarily be interpreted as entailing a substantially reduced emphasis on operations such as counter-insurgencies: the ‘force will operate with an aptitude for precise and discriminate action and increasingly possess security force assistance exper- tise’. There is also a strong indication in the NMS that future operations could increasingly be mounted from the US homeland or from areas abroad requiring ‘a smaller logistical footprint’, given the emphasis on expeditionary operations. Finally, the NMS reaffirms US nuclear policy: ‘Joint nuclear forces will continue to support strategic stability through maintenance of an assured second-strike capability … We will retain sufficient nuclear force structure to hedge against unexpected geopolitical change, technological prob- lems, and operational vulnerabilities’. D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 43North America N or th A m er ic a In April 2011, Obama signed another key defence document, the Unified Command Plan (UCP). The UCP establishes the missions, responsibilities and geographical areas covered by US combatant commands. Key changes include: • Shifting AOR (area of responsibility) bound- aries in the Arctic region to leverage long- standing relationships and improve unity of effort. • Giving US Northern Command responsi- bility to advocate for Arctic capabilities. • Codifying the President’s approval to dises- tablish US Joint Forces Command. • Expanding US Strategic Command’s respon- sibility for combating weapons of mass destruction and developing Global Missile Defense Concept of Operations. • Giving US Transportation Command responsibility for synchronising planning of global distribution operations. The publication of the NMS and the UCP was followed in September by the classified Defense Planning Guidance. This document contains more detailed strategic guidance for key planning and program- ming priorities to support the NMS and guide the implementation of cuts in the force structure. defence economicS changing fiscal environment Most observers expected US defence spending to decline as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan tapered off. Spending to cover the cost of the wars alone, known as ‘supplemental budgets’, currently accounts for nearly 20% of total spending. With those dollars no longer available, defence spending, which in 2011 exceeded $710bn, would decline to roughly $550bn. Instead, US defence spending was captured by a much larger debate about overall national priorities. Obama had already singled out defence for a $400bn reduction, but more cuts are now in the making. Those who advocate sustaining US defence spending have been drowned out by those seeking to protect entitlement spending – particularly health-care and old-age spending – and those seeking to reduce taxes. Reducing long-term deficit spending became more important over the year, even as American political and economic leaders sought new ways to stimulate the economy in hopes of avoiding a double-dip reces- sion. Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, the combination of falling house prices, large debt over- hangs and high unemployment have caused the economy to experience a sustained period of nega- tive or low growth. Following a brief spell of stronger economic activity in late 2010, lacklustre economic performance returned in 2011 as consumer demand – which accounts for more than two-thirds of total US output – stagnated in an economic climate character- ised by high oil prices; supply disruptions due to the March 2011 Japanese earthquake and tsunami; and declining consumer and business confidence. Overall, the International Monetary Fund expects real growth rates to halve from 2010 levels to 1.5% in 2011. Partisan wrangling in Congress over raising the $14.3tr federal debt ceiling in July 2011 led to a historic downgrade of US debt by the ratings agency Standard & Poor’s. This caused further uncertainty over US economic prospects, amid fears that legislative deadlock over fiscal policy may persist, at least until the 2012 elec- tions. However, despite the acrimonious debates over the appropriate balance between revenue and tax measures, both Democrats and Republicans agree that, in the medium term, US governmental outlays will be characterised by retrenchment. Table 3 dod’s War Budget authority by Title fY2010 (US$bn) regular Titles 2010 Military Personnel 16.8 Operations & Maintenance 99.2 Defence Health 1.3 Other Defence Programmes 0.4 Procurement 28.0 RDT&E 0.5 Working Capital Funds 0.4 Military Construction 2.0 Subtotal: regular Titles 148.7 Special Funds Iraqi Freedom Fund 0 Afghan Sec Forces Training Fund 9.2 Iraq Sec Forces Training Fund 1.0 Joint IED Defeat Fund 1.8 Strategic Reserve Readiness Fund 0 Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund 0 Subtotal: Special Funds 11.9 DoD Total 160.7 D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 44 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 The last-gasp debt-ceiling deal achieved just days before the 2 August deadline enabled passage of the Budget Control Act of 2011, which mandates a total of $917bn in cuts over ten years, mostly to discre- tionary spending, starting with $21bn in reductions for FY2011/12. A bipartisan ‘super-committee’ (the Joint Select Committee on Deficit Reduction) was also created to propose a further $1.2tr in cuts over the forthcoming decade, proposals which needed to be approved by Congress before 23 December 2011. In the absence of congressional agreement over the committee’s proposals, wide-ranging automatic spending cuts (a ‘sequestration’) of $1.2tr over ten years will be triggered, starting in January 2013. If this occurs, the defence budget will bear the burden of fully half of the $1.2tr in required reductions. Cuts of this magnitude would bring overall US defence spending more in line with Cold War aver- ages, though aggregate numbers can be misleading. US defence spending from 1948 to 1973 was premised on a conscript force. The United States adopted an All-Volunteer Force (AVF) after 1973, but the fully burdened cost of a professional force was not fully understood until much later, as pay and benefits, especially health and retirement benefits, grew over time. Comparing current spending with spending from decades past may not offer a good benchmark for the American defence effort. defence spending by the numbers US defence spending in 2011 exceeded $710bn. That total accounts for both the base budget and supple- mental funds (sometimes called overseas-contin- gency operations funds). The latter are appropriated separately to pay the incremental costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is higher than the previous peaks of US defence spending during the Korea and Vietnam wars and during the Reagan-era defence build-up. Defence spending in 2011 is up nearly 90% from the previous low in 1998. Dollar allocations per service tell a different story. While it is often said that the US military services are given equal shares of defence dollars – a third each for the Army, Navy (including the Marines) and Air Force – the picture since 1998 is more complicated. The military services have experienced unequal growth; so, too, have the defence agencies (such as the Missile Defense Agency and the National Security Agency), which now consume a growing share of the overall defence budget. Among the military services, the Army has experienced the most significant growth at 167%; the defence agencies grew at 105%; and spending on the Navy and Air Force grew at 56% and 55% respectively. When compared with the last peak in spending in 1985, Army spending is up nearly 65%, Navy spending is down almost 5%, and Air Force spending is down nearly 20%. From peak to peak, defence-agency spending is up almost 100%. (Missile defence is covered by defence-agency spending, as is operational intelligence in Iraq and Afghanistan.) Spending within budget categories has changed as well. Since 1985, spending for operations and main- tenance has grown 50%; research and development has grown nearly 20%; military personnel spending is Table 4 US national defense Budget authority fY2010–fY2012 (US$million) 2010 2011 continuing resolution 2012 request Base + enacted OcO Supplemental request Overseas contingency OperationsTotal Base Total Military Personnel 157,100 140,131 16,643 156,774 148,304 11,229 159,532 Operations & Maintenance 293,630 185,307 109,648 294,956 205,259 90,761 296,020 Procurement 135,817 104,789 29,375 134,164 113,028 15,022 128,050 R D T & E 80,234 80,387 518 80,905 75,425 397 75,822 Military Construction 22,577 15,920 1,399 17,319 13,072 0 13,072 Family Housing 2,267 2,272 0 2,272 1,694 0 1,694 Other 4,022 24,817 1,449 26,266 1,109 435 1,544 Total Department of Defense 695,646 553,623 159,033 712,656 557,891 117,843 675,734 Department of Energy (defence-related) 18,233 19,039 19,281 Other (defence-related) 7,430 7,622 7,791 Total National Defense 721,309 739,317 702,806 D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 47North America N or th A m er ic a Enhancing the US military posture in East Asia has been a policy focus for some time, but is today receiving greater attention. Military planners are increasingly concerned by the growing vulnerability of locations close to China and North Korea, particu- larly on Okinawa. They have sought to expand the US network of access arrangements while at the same time investing in hardening key bases such as Guam, which has seen substantial investment in the last ten years. Meanwhile, developing defence relations with Australia appears to be a favourite option for US planners, borne out by the mid-November agreement to enhance US training and base a Marine contin- gent. However, prospects across the region are being considered, and the US has, for instance, indicated a wish to station Littoral Combat Ships in Singapore. In Europe, there will probably be further reductions in US ground and air forces, along with commen- surate changes to the rank structure among key US personnel there. The senior Army officer, long a four- star general, now holds three-star rank. The Air Force and Navy are expected to follow suit. The military services themselves are adjusting to this change in focus. The Army was heavily taxed by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but is now poised for a series of reductions. Army strength is currently authorised at 562,000 full-time soldiers along with 22,000 temporary authorisations, which were added to support the war. As troop withdrawals from Iraq are completed in late 2011, the Army will begin personnel reductions, first in temporary authorisations and later in full-time personnel. Army leaders have cautioned about reductions in manpower that are too fast or too deep. New Army chief General Raymond Odierno publicly endorsed a long-held view that manpower must not fall below 520,000 full-time soldiers, though many observers believe cuts could go much deeper. Some think manpower numbers will soon approach those of the Clinton years, which had targeted the active army at 480,000 soldiers. Perhaps in anticipa- tion of such an outcome, Odierno has also observed that, when it comes to force restructuring and troop reductions, it is important that ‘we do it in such a way that we allow ourselves the flexibility and … capa- bility to expand’. At the same time, Army leaders hope to protect their investment accounts. Army ground vehicles are relatively new, but the V-hulled protected patrol vehicles (MRAPs), which were purchased for duty in Iraq and Afghanistan, are not the vehicles Army leaders would like in the future. They certainly are not a substitute for heavy armour. The Army’s plan for a ground combat vehicle, which was part of the answer to the now defunct Future Combat System, remains troubled. So, too, are the prospects for the army light tactical vehicle, which would replace the venerable Humvee. Army helicopters, which have extensive wear-and-tear from the recent wars, are in need of replacement, though there is little prospect of this happening soon. The United States Marine Corps (USMC) is attempting to position itself between the Army and special forces. According to Marine Commandant General James Amos: ‘I refer to our Marine Corps of today as a “middleweight force.” I liken it to boxing, where a middleweight boxer can box up into the heavyweight division or box down to the lightweight division simply by changing his weight and training regime. The same is true for the Marine Corps.’ Few doubt that the corps’ role is secure, but many see changes coming to its troop numbers and espe- cially to its equipment. With active-duty manpower now at 202,000, the Marines might well face substan- tial personnel reductions. Following the cancella- tion of the Marines’ expeditionary fighting vehicle in early 2011, their aviation programmes will almost certainly be a target for serious reductions, with the F-35B programme widely thought to be vulnerable. Fraught with delays and cost overruns, the F-35B was placed by former Defense Secretary Robert Gates on a two-year probation in 2011. USMC leaders will not easily forgo the programme, but may be forced by financial considerations to do so. Perhaps more trou- bling for the Marines, a growing chorus of observers have questioned the broader viability of Marine avia- tion and asked why a ‘middleweight force’ needs to possess a fifth-generation stealth fighter, or any fighter aircraft for that matter. The Navy and Air Force appear to be in better posi- tions, but the pressures on each service will be no less striking. Neither service has fared well in the budget debates over the past decade, and both gave up substantial manpower and force-structure elements. The Navy chose a path of incremental modernisation, particularly of its air and submarine arms, and was by 2010 considerably more capable than it was ten years earlier. But it still needs to modernise its surface fleet, both carriers and principal surface combatants, and is scheduled to purchase roughly ten ships a year under the Future Years Defense Plan (the service’s fiscal- year shipbuilding plan). Even at this rate, naval combatant vessels will fall well below the 313-ship D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 48 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 This leaves the Air Force committed to a new long- range strike programme and the F-35, though few believe the Air Force ultimately will procure the 1,763 F-35s currently planned. As Schwartz hinted, the Air Force may ultimately trade some of its fighter force to build a new long-range bomber. The Air Force also remains committed to a new refuelling tanker, Boeing’s KC-46A, though if its force mix were to change, the Air Force might find itself needing fewer tankers to support its missions. US special-operations forces (SOF) appear to be the one element of the force that might emerge rela- tively unscathed from the budget debates. While US special forces have been under significant pressure – its leaders have expresed concern about ‘fraying at the edges’ – Admiral William McRaven, new commander of US special-operations command, had this to say about the forces’ future: ‘As require- ments begin to subside across United States Central Command’s area of responsibility, SOF employment can return to a more balanced application against the highest priority countries and capability areas from missions that currently consume 86% of the deployed force ... SOF presence retains operational access for decisive action if required through a small, unobtru- sive, persistent forward engagement in many coun- tries where a more overt presence is unacceptable.’ debate to intensify Thus far, the military services have been relatively restrained in the downsizing debate, focusing atten- tion primarily on how they expect their own services to change and staking out their claims in the defence- budget talks. The year 2012, though, will bring a pres- idential election, and with it intensified scrutiny of floor that Navy leaders have identified; and the force will be nowhere near the goal that some naval leaders have mentioned of a 375-ship force. In the current round of reductions, aircraft-carrier numbers could fall to ten or fewer; cruiser numbers could shrink; and purchases of the littoral combatant ship could be cut back. More worrisome to some, attack-submarine numbers could fall well short of a 55-submarine goal. Finally, the Navy is waiting for the F-35 programme to modernise its air arm, though, with continuing purchases of the F/A-18E/F, it perhaps has more fall- back options than the other service partners. The Air Force faces similar challenges. It is confronted with ageing fighter and bomber forces, delays and cost overruns to its space modernisation efforts, and an intelligence, surveillance and recon- naissance force that is optimised for the current counter-terror and counter-insurgency campaigns rather than emerging anti-access and area-denial challenges. Transport aircraft are the one portion of the force that have emerged in a relatively healthy position. Yet, since the mobility force is linked to Army structure, it, too, will likely be reduced in coming years. So far, Air Force leaders have shown some willing- ness to trade numbers for capability. In the words of Air Force Chief General Norton Schwartz, ‘it is pref- erable to have a smaller, superb force than a larger, hollow one’. The Air Force is also contemplating a different mixture of forces. According to Schwartz, ‘right now, we have got about 150 bombers and 2,000 fighters … That balance might change some going forward. I think it is absolutely clear that you need both long legs and short legs to deal with the likely threats we are going to face.’ 0 1 2 3 4 5 3.31 3.46 4.16 4.21 4.07 4.68 4.53 4.31 4.68 4.77 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 % o f G D P Figure 2 US defence expenditure (Budget authority) as % of GDP D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 49North America N or th A m er ic a defence issues. To the extent that American electoral politics turns to foreign and defence policy, discus- sion of future missions and commitments, and roles for the military services, will heat up. The relatively polite debate seen as of October 2011 may well give way to a more raucous argument over the relative merits of ground, air and naval power in an era of changing missions and shrinking finances. All of this will take place in the context of a larger discussion about America’s role in the world, and the resources it should devote to fulfilling its aspirations. canada After five years of minority government, voters gave Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s Conservative Party a majority for the first time in the May 2011 federal election. Government economic plans will likely focus on stimulus measures and moves to reduce the deficit, in an environment of continuing GDP growth. According to the Department of National Defence (DND), the 2010 strategic-review process, which was used to identify a series of cost-saving measures within the department, has led to ‘savings of close to $1.6bn’ for 2013–14. In a bid to facilitate its Deficit Reduction Action Plan, the government asked the DND’s Chief of Transformation, Lieutenant- General Andrew Leslie, to propose ‘organizational changes that are appropriately balanced and aligned across [the department] and the Canadian Forces’. His report was submitted in July 2011. In the fore- word, Leslie noted that he and his team had looked at new ways of combining organisations ‘to achieve potential efficiencies, to streamline ourselves while maintaining the required operational focus. We have identified areas that will lead to about $1B in potential yearly administrative savings.’ The report also iden- tifies possible means of reducing overheads while protecting deployable forces and associated equip- ment, training and infrastructure. ‘This will require a determined, collective effort to reduce headquar- ters and overhead, and will involve the rerolling and re-investing in the order of about 11,000 mili- tary and civilian people’. The report’s recommenda- tions include the possible demobilisation of full-time reservists – whom the report notes are employed ‘mainly in headquarters and support functions at an approximate cost of $1B annually’ – ‘back to a baseline of approximately 4,500’ from a total of about 9,000. It also argues that the government should reduce ‘by over 30% over several years the $2.7B spent on contractors, consultants and private service providers and [invest] the funds in future capital programs as outlined in [the Canada First Defence Strategy].’ In parliamentary testimony, Leslie was reported as cautioning against cuts in the procurement budget, while defending the wider findings of the document. The extent to which the government will enact the report’s findings was unclear at the time of writing, though Defence Minister Peter MacKay has said that ‘the work of the Transformation Team will help define necessary organizational changes to prepare the Canadian Forces for the next decade’. Canada has been maintaining its significant procurement plans, in line with the aspirations detailed in the 2008 Canada First Defence Strategy (see The Military Balance 2011, p. 52). The plan to replace Canada’s F/A-18 A/B Hornets with 65 F-35As has been the cause of some controversy, with the procurement featuring in political jousting around the 2011 election, as well as in parliament and the media. Disagreement has focused on, among other issues, the initial cost and potential implications for Canada of any rises in development costs. The DND is indicating, however, that the ‘$9bn in capital costs will come out of the [department’s] existing allocation/budget’. Ottawa argues that Canada’s future operational requirements ‘can only be met with fifth generation capabilities’ and that the F-35 ‘is the only available fifth generation fighter that meets the requirements’ of the air force. The 19 October announcement of a Request for Proposals under the National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy marked another waypoint in the country’s procurement plans. Nova Scotia-based Irving Shipbuilding Inc. was selected to build the 21 combat vessels in the package, while Vancouver Shipyards was selected to build the seven non-combat vessels. The combat component includes between six and eight ice-capable offshore patrol vessels capable of operating in the High North and Canada’s exclu- sive economic zones in the Atlantic and Pacific. It also includes construction of the Canadian Surface Combatant vessels, designed to replace capabilities currently seen on the Iroquois and Halifax classes. The non-combat ship package includes offshore science vessels for the Coast Guard and a polar icebreaker. Canada withdrew its combat contingent from Afghanistan between July and December 2011 (as anticipated in The Military Balance 2011, pp. 51–2) with the handover of the Kandahar AOR to US forces. Operation Athena was due to close at the end of 2011. Ottawa deployed a Mission Transition Task Force to D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 52 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 foRceS BY RoLe COMMAND 10 bde gp HQ MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 18 armd recce regt Light 51 inf regt COMBAT SUPPORT 14 fd arty regt 2 indep fd arty bty 1 cbt engr regt 7 engr regt 3 indep engr sqn 1 EW sqn 4 int coy 6 sigs regt 16 indep sigs sqn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 10 log bn 14 med coy 4 med det 4 MP coy Royal canadian navy 11,000 eQUiPmenT BY TYPe SUBMARINES SSK 4 4 Victoria (ex-UK Upholder) with 6 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT (2 currently operational) PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 15 DESTROYERS • DDHM 3 mod Iroquois with 1 Mk 41 VLS with SM-2MR SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King ASW hel) FRIGATES • FFGHM 12 Halifax with 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Block II Harpoon AShM, 2 octuple Mk48 lnchr with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM/RIM-162 ESSM SAM, 2 twin 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, (capacity 1 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King ASW hel) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MCO 12 Kingston LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 18 AOR 2 Protecteur with 3 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King ASW hel AGOR 1 YDT 8 (2 MCM spt; 6 diving tender/spt) AX 9: AXL 8 Orca; AXS 1 reserves 4,150 reservists foRceS BY RoLe MANOEUVRE Other 24 navy div (tasked with crewing 10 of the 12 MCO, harbour defence & naval control of shipping) Royal canadian air force (Rcaf) 19,900 (plus 2,350 Primary Reservists integrated within total Air Force structure) foRceS BY RoLe FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F/A-18A/B Hornet (CF-18AM/CF-18BM) ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 3 sqn with SH-3 Sea King (CH-124) MARITIME PATROL 3 sqn with P-3 Orion (CP-140 Aurora) SEARCH & RESCUE/TRANSPORT 4 sqn with AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant); C-130E/ H/J (CC-130) 1 sqn with DHC-5 (CC-115) Buffalo TANKER/TRANSPORT 1 sqn with A310/A310 MRTT (CC-150/CC-150T) 1 sqn with KC-130H TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-17 (CC-177) 1 sqn with CL-600 (CC-144B) 1 (utl) sqn with DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 5 sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 3 (cbt spt) sqns with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) 1 (Spec Ops) sqn with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – OPCON Canadian Special Operations Command) ISR UAV 1 unit with Heron (CU-170) RADAR 1 (NORAD Regional) HQ located at Winnipeg; 1 Sector HQ at North Bay with 11 North Warning System Long Range Radar; 36 North Warning System Short Range Radar; 4 Coastal Radar; 2 Transportable Radar eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT 95 combat capable FGA 77: 59 F/A-18A (CF-18AM) Hornet; 18 F/A-18B (CF- 18BM) Hornet ASW 18 P-3 Orion (CP-140 Aurora) TKR/TPT 7: 2 A310 MRTT(CC-150T); 5 KC-130H TPT 60: Heavy 4 C-17 (CC-177) Globemaster; Medium 37: 24 C-130E/H (CC-130) Hercules (16–E, 8–H, of which 3 grounded); 13 C-130J (CC-130) Hercules Light 10: 6 DHC- 5 (CC-115) Buffalo; 4 DHC-6 (CC-138) Twin Otter PAX 9: 3 A310 (CC-150 Polaris); 6 CL-600 (CC-144B) TRG 4 DHC-8 (CT-142) Nav Trainer HELICOPTERS ASW 28 SH-3 (CH-124) Sea King MRH 78 Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) (incl 10 spec ops) TPT 20 Heavy 6 CH-47D (CH-147D) Chinook Medium 14 AW101 Merlin (CH-149 Cormorant) UAV • ISR • Heavy 5 Heron (CU-170) (leased for 3 yrs) RADARS 53 AD RADAR • NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 47: 11 Long Range; 36 Short Range STRATEGIC 6: 4 Coastal; 2 Transportable MSL ASM AGM-65 Maverick AAM • IR AIM-9L Sidewinder SARH AIM-7M Sparrow ARH AIM-120C AMRAAM BOMBS Conventional: Mk 82; Mk 83; Mk 84 Laser-Guided: GBU-10/GBU-12/GBU-16 Paveway II; GBU-24 Paveway III D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 53North America N or th A m er ic a naTo flight Training canada eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT TRG 45: 26 T-6A Texan II (CT-156 Harvard II); 19 Hawk 115 (CT-155) (advanced wpns/tactics trg) contracted flying Services – Southport eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT TRG 34: 11 Grob G120A; 7 King Air C90B; 7 Jet Ranger (CH-139); 9 Bell 412 (CH-146) TPT • Light 7 Beech C90B King Air TRG 11 G-120A HELICOPTERS MRH 9 Bell 412 (CH-146) TPT • Light 7 Bell 206; Jet Ranger (CH-139) canadian Special operations forces command 1,500 foRceS BY RoLe SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt (Canadian Special Operations Regiment) 1 SF unit (JTF2) MANOEUVRE Aviation 1 sqn, with Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon – from the RCAF) COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 CBRN unit (Canadian Joint Incidence Response Unit – CJIRU) eQUiPmenT BY TYPe RECCE 4 LAV Bison (NBC) HEL • MRH Bell 412 (CH-146 Griffon) canadian operational Support command 2,000 foRceS BY RoLe COMBAT SUPPORT 1 engr spt coy 1 (joint) sigs regt COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 3 (spt) log unit 4 (movement) log unit 1 med bn 1 (close protection) MP coy canadian coast guard 4,500 (civilian) Incl Department of Fisheries and Oceans; all platforms are designated as non-combatant. PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 73 PSO 2: 1 Leonard J Cowley; 1 Sir Wilfred Grenfell PCO 7: 2 Cape Roger; 1 Dumit; 1 Eckaloo; 1 Gordon Reid; 1 Nahidik; 1 Tanu PCC 4: 1 Arrrow Post; 1 Harp; 2 Louisbourg PB 60: 4 Cove Island; 4 Point Henry; 3 Post; 1 Quebecois; 1 Tembah; 1 Vakta; 5 Type 100; 10 Type 300-A; 31 Type-300B AMPHIBIOUS • LANDING CRAFT • UCAC 4 LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 35 AG 5 AGB 13 (2 hvy; 4 med; 7 lt) AGOR 10 (coastal and offshore fishery vessels) AGOS 7 HELICOPTERS • TPT 22 Medium 1 S-61 Light 21: 3 Bell 206L Long Ranger; 4 Bell 212; 14 Bo-105 cyber Canada published its Cyber Security Strategy in October 2010. The White Paper said that the Communications Security Establishment Canada, the Canadian Security Intelligence Service and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police will all investigate incidents according to their relevant mandates. Meanwhile, the armed forces will strengthen their capacity to defend their own networks. The Canadian Forces Network Operation Centre is the ‘national operational Cyber Defence unit’ permanently assigned to support Canadian Forces operations under Canadian Expeditionary Force Command and Canada Command. dePLoYmenT afghaniSTan NATO • ISAF • Operation Athena/Attention 529; 1 air unit with CC-130J BoSnia-heRzegoVina OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 cYPRUS UN • UNFICYP (Operation Snowgoose) 1 democRaTic RePUBLic of The congo UN • MONUSCO (Operation Crocodile) 8 obs egYPT MFO (Operation Calumet) 28 geRmanY NATO (ACO) 287 haiTi UN • MINUSTAH (Operation Hamlet) 11 Jamaica Operation Jaguar 65 (providing SAR spt) middLe eaST UN • UNTSO (Operation Jade) 7 obs SeRBia NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise (Operation Kobold) 5 OSCE • Serbia 2 OSCE • Kosovo 9 SieRRa Leone IMATT (Operation Sculpture) 9 SoUTh SUdan UN • UNMISS (Operation Safari) 3; 5 obs SUdan UN • UNAMID 4 SYRia/iSRaeL UN • UNDOF (Operation Gladius) 3 D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 54 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 UniTed STaTeS US CENTCOM (Operation Foundation) 3 US NORTHCOM/NORAD/NATO (ACT) 303 foReign foRceS United States 131 United States US United States Dollar $ 2010 2011 2012 GDP US$ 14.5tr 15.1tr per capita US$ 47,121 48,432 Growth % 3.0 1.5 inflation % 1.65 3.0 National Def Budget BA US$ 721.3bn 739.3bn 702.8bn Outlay US$ 693.6bn 768.2bn 737.5bn Population 311,050,977 Age 0 – 14 15 – 19 20 – 24 25 – 29 30 – 64 65 plus Male 10.3% 3.5% 3.6% 3.5% 22.7% 5.7% Female 9.8% 3.4% 3.5% 3.4% 23.3% 7.5% capabilities The US remains the world’s pre-eminent military power: its highly trained armed forces are capable of large-scale sustained high-intensity full-spectrum operations around the world. The US military, particularly elements of its land and air forces, will in the foreseeable future enter a period of recuperation and equipment recapitalisation following a decade of combat in Iraq and Afghanistan. While the strain of these two prolonged conflicts may have led to some ‘war weariness’, morale and motivation within the military is good, though uncertainty resulting from funding issues could prove unsettling. Debates on policy and strategy are being formulated in an environment anticipating declining defence budgets and the opening debates over the foreign-policy positions of presidential hopefuls. The foreword to the National Military Strategy (NMS), published in April 2011, said that the military should ‘find innovative and affordable ways to provide the full range of capabilities … while making difficult tradeoffs between modernization, capacity, capability, posture, and risk’. While Army manpower numbers will likely reduce, leaders will hope to protect some of the key equipment investments of recent years. As for the Marine Corps, while its role is secure, some of its equipment plans, as well as its manpower, may come under scrutiny. Looming budget cuts are likely to constrain future equipment plans across the armed forces. Key air, land and naval procurement projects remain under scrutiny. The short take-off and vertical landing variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, the F-35B, is on ‘probation’; the Army has trimmed its long-term tactical vehicle procurement plan; and the Navy’s ambition to eventually field a 313-ship fleet is under threat. acTiVe 1,569,417 (Army 641,470 Navy 333,248 Air Force 344,568 US Marine corps 206,533 US coast Guard 43,598) ciViLian 11,035 (US Special Operations command 3,376 US coast Guard 7,659) ReSeRVe 865,370 (Army 486,029 Navy 104,622 Air Force 163,341 Marine corps reserve 103,894 US coast Guard 7,484) oRganiSaTionS BY SeRVice US Strategic command HQ at Offutt AFB (NE). Five missions: US nuclear deterrent; missile defence; global strike; info ops; ISR US Navy eQUiPmenT BY TYPe SUBMARINES • STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio (mod) SSBN with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5 strategic SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT US Air Force • Global Strike Command foRceS BY RoLe MISSILE 9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III BOMBER 6 sqn (incl 1 AFRC) with B-52H Stratofortress 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit eQUiPmenT BY TYPe BBR 91: 19 B-2A Spirit; 72 B-52H Stratofortress MSL • STRATEGIC ICBM 450 LGM-30G Minuteman III (capacity 1-3 MIRV Mk12/Mk12A per missile) ALCM AGM-86B; AGM-129A Strategic Defenses – early Warning North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a combined US–CAN org eQUiPmenT BY TYPe SATELLITES (see Space) RADAR NORTH WARNING SYSTEM 15 North Warning System Long Range (range 200nm); 40 North Warning System Short Range (range 80nm) OVER-THE-HORIZON-BACKSCATTER RADAR (OTH-B) 2: 1 AN/FPS-118 OTH-B (500–3,000nm) located at Mountain Home AFB (ID); 1 non-operational located at Maine (ME) STRATEGIC 2 Ballistic Missile Early Warning System BMEWS located at Thule, GL and Fylingdales Moor, UK; 1 (primary mission to track ICBM and SLBM; also used to track satellites) located at Clear (AK) SPACETRACK SYSTEM 11: 8 Spacetrack Radar located at Incirlik (TUR), Eglin (FL), Cavalier AFS (ND), Clear (AK), Thule (GL), Fylingdales Moor (UK), Beale AFB (CA), Cape Cod (MA); 3 Spacetrack Optical Trackers located at Socorro (NM), Maui (HI), Diego Garcia (BIOT) D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 57North America N or th A m er ic a UAV • ISR 278 Heavy 42: 3 I-Gnat; 20 RQ-5A Hunter; 4 Sky Warrior; 15 Warrior Medium 236 RQ-7A Shadow AD• SAM 1,281+ SP 798: 703 FIM-92A Avenger (veh-mounted Stinger); 95 M6 Linebacker (4 Stinger plus 25mm gun) TOWED 483 MIM-104 Patriot MANPAD FIM-92A Stinger RADAR • LAND 251: 98 AN/TPQ-36 Firefinder (arty); 56 AN/TPQ-37 Firefinder (arty); 60 AN/TRQ-32 Teammate (COMINT); 32 AN/TSQ-138 Trailblazer (COMINT); 5 AN/ TSQ-138A Trailblazer AEV 250 M9 ACE ARV 2412+: ε2,400 M88A1/2; 12 Pandur; some M578 VLB 60+: some M48/M60 AVLB; 20 REBS; 40 Wolverine HAB MW Aardvark JSFU Mk4; Hydrema 910 MCV-2; M58/M59 MICLIC; M139; Rhino US navy 328,648; 4,600 active reservists (total 333,248) Comprises 2 Fleet Areas, Atlantic and Pacific. All combatants divided into 6 Fleets: 2nd – Atlantic, 3rd – Pacific, 4th – Caribbean, Central and South America, 5th – Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf, Red Sea, 6th – Mediterranean, 7th – W. Pacific; plus Military Sealift Command (MSC); Naval Reserve Force (NRF); for Naval Special Warfare Command, see US Special Operations Command element. eQUiPmenT BY TYPe SUBMARINES 71 STRATEGIC • SSBN 14 Ohio (mod) opcon US STRATCOM with up to 24 UGM-133A Trident D-5 strategic SLBM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT TACTICAL 57 SSGN 43: 4 Ohio (mod) with total of 154 Tomahawk LACM , 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT 8 Los Angeles with 1 12 cell VLS with Tomahawk LACM; 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM 23 Los Angeles (Imp) with 1 12 cell VLS with Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM 8 Virginia with 1 12 cell VLS with Tomahawk LACM, 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 ADCAP mod 6 HWT (4 additional vessels in build) SSN 14: 11 Los Angeles with 4 single 533mm TT with Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT/UGM-84 Harpoon AShM 3 Seawolf with 8 single 660mm TT with up to 45 Tomahawk LACM/UGM-84C Harpoon AShM, Mk48 Sea Arrow HWT PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 114 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS • CVN 11: 1 Enterprise with 3 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM- 7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM- 116 SAM (typical capacity 55 F/A-18 Hornet FGA ac; 4 EA-6B Prowler/EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C Hawkeye AEW ac; 4 SH-60F Seahawk ASW hel; 2 HH- 60H Seahawk SAR hel) 10 Nimitz with 2–3 octuple Mk29 lnchr with RIM- 7M/P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM- 116 SAM (typical capacity 55 F/A-18 Hornet FGA ac; 4 EA-6B Prowler/EA-18G Growler EW ac; 4 E-2C Hawkeye AEW ac; 4 SH-60F Seahawk ASW hel; 2 HH- 60H Seahawk SAR hel) CRUISERS • CGHM • 22 Ticonderoga Aegis Baseline 2/3/4 with Aegis C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 2 61 cell Mk41 VLS with SM-2ER SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2 127mm gun (capacity 2 SH- 60B Seahawk ASW hel); (extensive upgrade programme scheduled from 2006–2020 to include sensors and fire control systems; major weapons upgrade to include Evolved Sea Sparrow (ESSM), SM-3/SM-2 capability and 2 Mk45 Mod 2 127mm gun) DESTROYERS 61 DDGHM 33 Arleigh Burke Flight IIA with Aegis C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 32 cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASsW/SM-2ER SAM/ Tomahawk (TLAM) LACM, 1 64 cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASsW/SM-2 ER SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel), (additional ships in build) DDGM 28 Arleigh Burke Flight I/II with Aegis C2, 2 quad lnchr with RGM-84 Harpoon AShM, 1 32 cell Mk41 VLS with ASROC ASW/SM-2ER SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 1 64 cell Mk 41 VLS with ASROC ASsW/SM-2 ER SAM/Tomahawk LACM, 2 Mk49 RAM with RIM- 116 RAM SAM, 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 127mm gun, 1 hel landing platform FRIGATES 20 FFHM 2: 1 Freedom with 1 21 cell Mk99 lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, Mk15 Phalanx CIWS, (capacity 2 MH-60R/S Seahawk hel or 1 MH-60 with 3 MQ-8 Firescout UAV) 1 Independence with 1 11 cell SeaRAM lnchr with RIM-116 SAM, Mk15 Phalanx CIWS, (capacity 1 MH-60R/S Seahawk hel and 3 MQ-8 Firescout UAV) FFH 18 Oliver Hazard Perry with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 28 PCF (8 Cyclone currently non-operational) PBF 12 PBR 16 MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 MCO 9 Avenger (MCM-1) with 1 SLQ-48 MCM system, 1 SQQ-32(V)3 Sonar (mine hunting) COMMAND SHIPS • LCC 2: 2 Blue Ridge (capacity 3 LCPL; 2 LCVP; 700 troops; 1 med utl hel) AMPHIBIOUS PRINCIPAL AMPHIBIOUS SHIPS 29 LHD 8 Wasp with 2 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7M/ RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM (capacity: 5 AV-8B Harrier II FGA; 42 CH- 46E Sea Knight hel; 6 SH-60B Seahawk hel; 3 LCAC(L); 60 tanks; 1,890 troops) D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 58 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 LHA 1 Tarawa with 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 RAM SAM (capacity 6 AV-8B Harrier II FGA ac; 12 CH-46E Sea Knight hel; 9 CH-53 Sea Stallion hel; 4 LCU; 100 tanks; 1,900 troops) LPD 8: 2 Austin (capacity 6 CH-46E Sea Knight hel; 2 LCAC(L)/LCU; 40 tanks; 788 troops) 6 San Antonio with 2 21 cell Mk49 GMLS with RIM- 116 SAM (capacity 1 CH-53E Sea Stallion hel or 2 CH-46 Sea Knight or 1 MV-22 Osprey; 2 LCAC(L); 14 AAAV; 720 troops) (5 additional vessels in build) LSD 12: 4 Harpers Ferry with 1–2 Mk 49 GMLS with RIM-116 SAM, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 2 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) 8 Whidbey Island with 2 Mk49 GMLS with RIM-116 SAM, 1 hel landing platform (capacity 4 LCAC(L); 40 tanks; 500 troops) AMPHIBIOUS CRAFT 269+ LCU 34 LCU-1600 (capacity either 2 M1-A1 Abrams MBT or 350 troops) LCVP 8 LCPL 75 LCM 72 LCAC 80 LCAC(L) (capacity either 1 MBT or 60 troops; (undergoing upgrade programme)) SF 6 DDS opcon USSOCOM combat logistics Force LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT AOE 5: 4 Sacramento (capacity 2 CH-46E Sea Knight tpt hel); 1 Supply (capacity 3 CH-46E Sea Knight tpt hel) Navy reserve Surface Forces PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 8 FFH 8 Oliver Hazard Perry in reserve with 2 triple 324mm ASTT with Mk46 LWT, 36 SM-1 MR SAM, 1 76mm gun, (capacity 2 SH-60B Seahawk ASW hel) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 5 MCO 5 Avenger in reserve with 1 SLQ-48 MCM system, 1 SQQ-32(V)3 Sonar (mine hunting) INSHORE UNDERSEA WARFARE 45 HDS/IBU/MIUW Naval reserve Forces 109,222 (incl 6,224 active) Selected reserve 66,455 individual ready reserve 42,767 Naval inactive Fleet Under a minimum of 60–90 days notice for reactivation; still on naval vessel register PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 2 AIRCRAFT CARRIERS 1 CV FRIGATES 1 FFH AMPHIBIOUS 12 2 LHA 5 LPD 5 LKA LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 1 ATF Military Sealift command (MSc) Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 42 AEH 1 Kilauea ARS 4 Safeguard AH 2 Mercy, with 1 hel landing platform ATF 4 Powhatan AO 15 Henry J. Kaiser AOE 4 Supply class AKEH 12 Lewis and Clark (1 additional vessel in build) Maritime Prepositioning Program LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 31 AOT 1 Champion AG 1 AK 8 AKR 12: 3; 1 Bob Hope; 8 Watson AKRH 5 AVB 2 TPT 2 HSV Strategic Sealift Force (At a minimum of 4 days readiness) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 16: AGMS 1 AOT 2 (long-term chartered) AK 3 AKR 10: 6 Bob Hope; 2 Gordon; 2 Shughart Special Mission Ships LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17: AS 2 Emory S Land AGM 2 (additional vessel awaiting commissioning) ARC 1 Zeus AGOS 5: 1 Impeccable; 4 Victorious AGS 7: 6 Pathfinder; 1 Waters US Maritime Administration Support • National Defense reserve Fleet LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 34: AOT 4 ACS 3 Keystone State AFS 1 AGOS 3 AGS 3 AK 16: 4; 12 T-AK (breakbulk) AKR 2 AP 2 ready reserve Force Ships at readiness up to a maximum of 30 days LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 48: ACS 6 Keystone State AK 6: 2 T-AK (breakbulk); 4 T-AK (heavy lift) AKR 35: 1 Adm WM M Callaghan; 8 Algol; 26 Cape Island AOT 1 Petersburg Augmentation Force COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (active) Cargo Handling log bn 12 (reserve) Cargo Handling log bn D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 59North America N or th A m er ic a Orion PAX 9: 1 Gulfstream III (C-20A); 2 Gulfstream III (C-20D); 5 Gulfstream IV (C-20G); 1 Gulfstream V (C- 37); TRG 647: 47 T-6A Texan II; 2 T-6B Texan II; 269 T-34C Turbo Mentor; 9 T-38 Talon; 1 T-39D Sabreliner; 8 T-39G Sabreliner; 15 T-39N Sabreliner; 55 T-44A Pegasus; 74 T-45A Goshawk; 144 T-45C Goshawk; 21 TC-12B Huron; 2 TE-2C Hawkeye TRIALS AND TEST 50: 5 EA-18G Growler; 1 NF/A- 18A Hornet; 2 NF/A-18C Hornet; 3 NF/A-18D Hornet; 1 NP-3C Orion; 11 NP-3D Orion; 1 NT-34C Mentor; 1 NU-1B Otter; 2 QF-4N Phantom II; 16 QF-4S Phantom II; 2 X-26A; 1 X-31A; 1 YF-4J Phantom II (prototype, FGA); 1 YSH-60 Seahawk (prototype); 1 YSH-60B Seahawk; 1 YSH-60F Seahawk HELICOPTERS MRH 123 MH-60S Knight Hawk (Multi Mission Support) ASW 255: 35 MH-60R Strike Hawk; 148 SH-60B Seahawk; 72 SH-60F Seahawk MCM 28 MH-53E Sea Dragon ISR 3 OH-58A Kiowa SAR 63: 23 HH-1N Iroquois; 4 HH-46D Sea Knight; 36 HH-60H Seahawk TPT 37 Heavy 18: 9 CH-53D Sea Stallion; 9 CH-53E Sea Stallion Medium 14: 9 UH-46D Sea Knight; 3 UH-60L Black Hawk; 2 VH-3A Sea King (VIP) Light 5: 1 UH-1N Iroquois; 4 UH-1Y Iroquois; TRG 132: 44 TH-57B Sea Ranger; 82 TH-57C Sea Ranger; 6 TH-6B TEST 3 N-SH-60B Seahawk UAV 45: Heavy 10: 5 MQ-8B Fire Scout (under evaluation and trials); 5 RQ-4A Global Hawk (under evaluation and trials) Medium 35 RQ-2B Pioneer MSL AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder, IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II, SARH AIM-7 Sparrow, ARH AIM-120 AMRAAM ASM AGM-65A/F Maverick; AGM-114B/K/M Hellfire; AGM-84E SLAM/SLAM-ER LACM; AGM-154A JSOW; AShM AGM-84D Harpoon; AGM-119A Penguin 3; ARM AGM-88 HARM BOMBS Conventional: BLU-117/Mk 84 (2,000lb); BLU-110/ Mk 83 (1,000lb); BLU-111/Mk 82 (500lb); Mk 46; Mk 50; Mk 54 Laser-Guided: Paveway II; Paveway III (fits on Mk 82, Mk 83 or Mk 84) INS/GPS guided: JDAM (GBU-31/32/38); Enhanced Paveway II Naval Aviation reserve foRceS BY RoLe FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 1 sqn with HH-60H Seahawk 1 sqn with SH-60B Seahawk ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-6B Prowler Naval Aviation 98,588 11 air wings (10 active; 1 reserve). Average air wing com- prises 7 sqns: 4 each with 12 F/A-18 (2 with F/A-18C, 1 with F/A-18E, 1 with F/A-18F), 1 with 6 SH-60, 1 with 4 EA-6B, 1 with 4 E-2C foRceS BY RoLe (Numbers exclude Fleet Replacement Squadrons) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with F/A-18A+ Hornet 13 sqn with F/A-18C Hornet 11 sqn with F/A-18E Super Hornet 10 sqn with F/A-18F Super Hornet ANTI-SUBMARINE WARFARE 7 sqn with HH-60H Seahawk; SH-60F Seahawk 3 sqn with MH-60R Seahawk 9 sqn with SH-60B Seahawk ELINT 2 sqn with EP-3E Aries II ELINT/ELECTRONIC WARFARE 9 sqn with EA-6B Prowler 4 sqn with EA-18G Growler MARITIME PATROL 12 (land-based) sqn with P-3C Orion AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 10 sqn with E-2C Hawkeye COMMAND & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-6B Mercury MINE COUNTERMEASURES 2 sqn with MH-53E Sea Dragon TRANSPORT 2 sqn with C-2A Greyhound TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F/A-18C/D Hornet; F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 1 (aggressor) sqn with F/A-18B/C/D Hornet 1 sqn with F/A-18E/F Super Hornet 3 sqn with T-6A/B Texan II/T-39D/G/N Sabreliner 5 sqn T-34C Turbo Mentor 2 sqn with T-44A Pegasus 4 sqn with T-45A/C Goshawk 2 hel sqn with TH-57B/C Sea Ranger TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 9 sqn with MH-60S Knight Hawk eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT 964 combat capable FGA 817: 33 F/A-18A Hornet; 24 F/A-18B Hornet; 268 F/A-18C Hornet; 41 F/A-18D Hornet; 201 F/A-18E Super Hornet; 250 F/A-18F Super Hornet ASW 147 P-3C Orion EW 147: 92 EA-6B Prowler; 55 EA-18G Growler ELINT 11 EP-3E Aries II ISR 4: 2 RC-12F Huron; 2 RC-12M Huron AEW&C 66 E-2C Hawkeye C2 16 E-6B Mercury TPT 92: Medium 3: 2 LC-130F Hercules; 1 LC-130R Hercules; Light 80: 4 Beech A200 King Air (C-12C Huron); 21 Beech A200 King Air (UC-12B Huron); 35 C-2A Greyhound; 1 Cessna 560 Citation Encore (UC- 35D); 1 Sabreliner (CT-39G); 2 DHC-2 Beaver (U-6A); 7 SA-227-BC Metro III (C-26D); 4 UP-3A Orion; 5 VP-3A D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 62 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 SAR 27: 21 HC-130H Hercules (additional 5 in store); 6 HC-130J Hercules TPT 14 Light 12 CN-235-200 (HC-144A); PAX 2: 1 CL- 604 (C-143-A); 1 Gulfstream V (C-37A) HELICOPTERS SAR 125: 35 HH-60J Jayhawk (additional 7 in store); 90 AS-366G1 (HH-65C) Dauphin II (additional 12 in store) TPT • Light 8 MH-68A (A-109E) Power UAV 3 (trials) US air force (USaf) 333,729; 6,641 active ANG; 4,198 active AFR (total 344,568) Flying hours Ftr 189, bbr 260, tkr 308, airlift 343 Almost the entire USAF (plus active force ANG and AFR) is divided into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF), each on call for 120 days every 20 months. At least 2 of the 10 AEFs are on call at any one time, each with 10,000–15,000 personnel, 90 multi-role Ftr and bbr ac, 31 intra-theatre refuelling aircraft and 13 aircraft for ISR and EW missions. Global Strike Command (GSC) 2 active air forces (8th & 20th); 6 wg foRceS BY RoLe MISSILE 9 sqn with LGM-30G Minuteman III BOMBER 5 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress 2 sqn with B-2A Spirit Air combat command (Acc) 2 active air forces (9th & 12th); 15 wg. ACC numbered air forces provide the air component to CENTCOM, SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM. foRceS BY RoLe BOMBER 4 sqn with B-1B Lancer FIGHTER 4 sqn with F-22A Raptor FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 4 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II ELECTRONIC WARFARE 1 sqn with EA-6B Prowler; EA-18G Growler (personnel only – USN aircraft) 2 sqn with EC-130H Compass Call ISR 5 sqn with OC-135/RC-135/WC-135 2 sqn with U-2S/TU-2S AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 5 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry COMMAND & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-4B COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 6 sqn with HC-130J/N/P King; HH-60G Pave Hawk TRAINING 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 UAV sqn with MQ-1B Predator 1 UAV sqn with MQ-9A Reaper COMBAT/ISR UAV 4 sqn with MQ-1B Predator 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/MQ-9A Reaper 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/RQ-170 Sentinel 3 sqn with MQ-9 Reaper ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk Pacific Air Forces (PAcAF) Provides the air component of PACOM, and commands air units based in Alaska, Hawaii, Japan and South Korea. 4 active air forces (5th, 7th, 11th & 13th); 8 wg foRceS BY RoLe FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 3 sqn with F-22A Raptor FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 2 sqn with E-3B/C Sentry COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 2 sqn with KC-135R TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-200 (C-40B); Gulfstream V (C-37A) 2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21); UH-1N Huey TRAINING 1 (aggressor) sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon United States Air Forces europe (USAFe) Provides the air component to both EUCOM and AFRICOM. 2 active air forces (3rd & 17th); 5 wg foRceS BY RoLe FIGHTER 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with F-15E Strike Eagle 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 1 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 1 sqn with HH-60G Pave Hawk TANKER 1 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker TRANSPORT 1 sqn with C-130J Hercules 2 sqn with Gulfstream III/IV (C-20); Gulfstream V (C- 37); Learjet 35A (C-21) Air Mobility command (AMc) Provides strategic and tactical airlift, air-to-air refuelling and aero medical evacuation. 1 active air force (18th); 13 wg and 1 gp D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 63North America N or th A m er ic a foRceS BY RoLe TANKER 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender 8 sqn with KC-135 Stratotanker (+3 sqn with personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 VIP wg with B-737-200 (C-40B); B-757-200 (C-32A); Gulfstream III/IV (C-20); VC-25 Air Force One 2 sqn with C-5 Galaxy 11 sqn with C-17A Globemaster III 8 sqn with C-130E/H/J Hercules 1 sqn with Gulfstream V (C-37A) 4 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21) Air education and Training command 2 active air forces (2nd and 19th), 10 active air wgs foRceS BY RoLe TRAINING 1 sqn with C-5 Galaxy 1 sqn with C-17 Globemaster 1 sqn with C-21 Learjet 3 sqn with C-130E/J Hercules 6 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor 1 sqn with F-35A Lightning II 2 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker 24 (flying trg) sqn with T-1 Jayhawk; T-6 Texan II; T-38 Talon; T-43 eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT 1,435 combat capable BBR 139: 64 B-1B Lancer (2 more in test); 19 B-2A Spirit (1 more in test); 56 B-52H Stratofortress (4 more in test; 18 in store) FTR 277: 113 F-15C Eagle; 11 F-15D Eagle; 153 F-22A Raptor FGA 833: 212 F-15E Strike Eagle; 500 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 115 F-16D Fighting Falcon; 6 F-35A Lightning II ATK 186 A-10C Thunderbolt II EW 14 EC-130H Compass Call ISR 76: 37 Beech 350ER King Air (MC-12W Liberty); 2 E-9A; 2 OC-135B Open Skies; 28 U-2S; 5 TU-2S; 2 WC-135 Constant Phoenix ELINT 22: 8 RC-135V Rivet Joint; 9 RC-135W Rivet Joint; 3 RC-135S Cobra Ball; 2 RC-135U Combat Sent AEW&C 32 E-3B/C Sentry (1 more in test) C2 4 E-4B TKR 170: 140 KC-135R Stratotanker; 30 KC-135T Stratotanker TKR/TPT 59 KC-10A Extender CSAR 22 HC- 130J/P/N King TPT 464 Heavy 219: 33 C-5B Galaxy; 2 C-5C Galaxy; 3 C-5M Galaxy; 181 C-17A Globemaster III Medium 186 C-130E/H/J Hercules; Light 35 Learjet 35A (C-21) PAX 24: 2 B-737-700 (C-40B); 4 B-757-200 (C-32A); 5 Gulfstream III (C-20B); 2 Gulfstream IV (C-20H); 9 Gulfstream V (C-37A); 2 VC-25A Air Force One TRG 1,130: 179 T-1A Jayhawk; 405 T-6A Texan II; 546 T-38A Talon HELICOPTERS CSAR 81 HH-60G Pave Hawk TPT • Light 62 UH-1N Huey UAV 223: Cbt ISR • Heavy 199: 130 MQ-1B Predator; 69 MQ-9 Reaper ISR • Heavy 24: 23 RQ-4B Global Hawk; 1 RQ-170 Sentinel MSL AAM • IR AIM-9 Sidewinder IIR AIM-9X Sidewinder II SARH AIM-7M Sparrow ARH AIM-120A/B/C AMRAAM ASM 1,142 AGM-86B (ALCM) LACM (strategic); 239 AGM-86C (CALCM) LACM (tactical); 50 AGM-86D LACM (penetrator) 460 AGM-129A (ACM) LACM (strategic); AGM-130A; AGM-158 JASSM; AGM-65A Maverick/AGM-65B Maverick/AGM-65D Maverick/AGM- 65G Maverick; AGM-88A HARM/AGM-88B HARM ARM BOMBS Conventional: BLU-109/Mk 84 (2,000lb); BLU-110/Mk 83 (1,000lb); BLU-111/Mk 82 (500lb) Laser-guided: Paveway II, Paveway III (fits on Mk82, Mk83 or Mk84) INS/GPS guided: JDAM (GBU 31/32/38); GBU-15 (with BLU-109 penetrating warhead or Mk 84); GBU-39B Small Diameter Bomb (250lb); Enhanced Paveway III reserve Organisations Air National Guard 106,680 reservists (incl 6,641 active) foRceS BY RoLe BOMBER 1 sqn with B-2A Spirit (personnel only) FIGHTER 5 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 1 sqn with F-22A Raptor (+1 sqn personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 13 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon GROUND ATTACK 5 sqn with A-10C Thunderbolt II ISR 3 sqn with E-8C J-STARS (mixed active force and ANG personnel) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 9 sqn with HC-130 Hercules/MC-130P Combat Shadow; HH-60G Pavehawk TANKER 20 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn with personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C); Gulfstream G100 (C-38A) 3 sqn with C-5A Galaxy 2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with C-27J Spartan 17 sqn with C-130H/J Hercules (+1 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with C-130H/LC-130H Hercules 4 sqn with Learjet 35A (C-21A) TRAINING 1 sqn with C-130H Hercules 1 sqn with F-15C/D Eagle 4 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator (+ 3 sqn personnel only) 1 sqn with MQ-9A Reaper D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 64 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT 596 combat capable FTR 149: 108 F-15 Eagle; 21 F-15D Eagle; 20 F-22A Raptor FGA 341: 295 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 46 F-16D Fighting Falcon ATK 106 A-10C Thunderbolt II ISR 17 E-8C J-STARS ELINT 11 RC-26B Metroliner CSAR 9 HC-130P/N King TKR 183: 159 KC-135R Stratotanker; 24 KC-135T Stratotanker TPT 254 Heavy 62: 45 C-5A Galaxy; 17 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 159: 11 C-27J Spartan; 118 C-130H Hercules; 20 C-130J Hercules; 10 LC-130H Hercules; Light 26 Learjet 35A (C-21A); PAX 7: 3 B-737- 700 (C-40C); 2 B-757-200 (C-32B); 2 Gulfstream G100 (C-38A) HELICOPTERS • CSAR 17 HH-60G Pave Hawk UAV • Cbt ISR • Heavy 56: 42 MQ-1B Predator; 14 MQ- 9A Reaper Air Force reserve command 67,500 reservists (incl 4,198 active) foRceS BY RoLe BOMBER 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress FIGHTER 2 sqn with F-22A Raptor (personnel only) FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 3 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon (+1 sqn personnel only) GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with A-10A Thunderbolt II ISR 1 (Weather Recce) sqn with WC-130H/J Hercules AIRBORNE EARLY WARNING & CONTROL 1 sqn with E-3 Sentry (personnel only) COMBAT SEARCH & RESCUE 3 sqn with HC-130P/N Hercules; HH-60G Pavehawk TANKER 4 sqn with KC-10A Extender (personnel only) 6 sqn with KC-135R Stratotanker (+2 sqn personnel only) TRANSPORT 1 (VIP) sqn with B-737-700 (C-40C); DC-9 (C-9C Nightingale) 4 sqn with C-5A/B Galaxy (+2 sqn personnel only) 2 sqn with C-17A Globemaster (+8 sqn personnel only) 10 sqn with C-130H/J Hercules 1 (Aerial Spray) sqn with C-130H Hercules TRAINING 2 sqn with A-10A Thunderbolt II 1 sqn with A-10A Thunderbolt II; F-15 Eagle; F-16 Fighting Falcon 1 sqn with B-52H Stratofortress 1 sqn with C-5A Galaxy 1 sqn with F-16C/D Fighting Falcon COMBAT/ISR UAV 1 sqn with MQ-1B Predator/MQ-9A Reaper (personnel only) ISR UAV 1 sqn with RQ-4B Global Hawk (personnel only) eQUiPmenT BY TYPe AIRCRAFT 106 combat capable BBR 16 B-52H Stratofortress FGA 48: 46 F-16C Fighting Falcon; 2 F-16D Fighting Falcon ATK 42 A-10A Thunderbolt II ISR 10 WC-130J Hercules (Weather Recce) CSAR 5 HC-130P/N King TKR 64 KC-135R Stratotanker TPT 145 Heavy 44: 14 C-5A Galaxy; 14 C-5B Galaxy; 16 C-17A Globemaster III; Medium 94: 84 C-130H Hercules; 10 C-130J Hercules; PAX 7: 4 B-737-700 (C-40C); 3 DC-9 (C-9C Nightingale) HELICOPTERS • CSAR 13 HH-60G Pave Hawk civil reserve Air Fleet Commercial ac numbers fluctuate AIRCRAFT • TPT 37 carriers and 1,376 aircraft enrolled, including 1,273 aircraft in the international segment (990 long-range and 283 short-range), plus 37 national, 50 aeromedical evacuation segments and 4 aircraft in the Alaskan segment. Air Force Stand-by reserve 16,858 reservists Trained individuals for mobilisation US Special operations command (USSocom) 31,496; 3,376 (civilian); 11,247 reservists (SOF) (total 46,119) Commands all active, reserve and National Guard Special Operations Forces (SOF) of all services based in CONUS Joint Special Operations command Reported to comprise elite US SF including Special Forc- es Operations Detachment Delta (‘Delta Force’), SEAL Team 6 and integral USAF support. US Army Special Operations command foRceS BY RoLe SPECIAL FORCES 5 SF gp (3 SF bn) 1 ranger regt (3–4 ranger bn) MANOEUVRE Aviation 1 (160th SOAR) regt (4 avn bn) COMBAT SUPPORT 1 civil affairs bn (5 civil affairs coy) 1 psyops gp (5 psyops bn) 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 (sustainment) log bde eQUiPmenT BY TYPe HELICOPTERS MRH 50 AH-6/MH-6 Little Bird TPT 123 Heavy 61 MH-47G Chinook; Medium 62 MH- 60K/L/M Black Hawk UAV 57 ISR • Light 29: 15 XPV-1 Tern; 14 XPV-2 Mako; TPT • Heavy 28 CQ-10 Snowgoose D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 67North America N or th A m er ic a US Navy 470 USAF 14,726 foRceS BY RoLe 1 HQ (US Air Force Europe (USAFE)) at Ramstein AB; 1 HQ (3rd Air Force) at Ramstein AB; 1 ftr wg at Spangdahlem AB with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-16CJ Fighting Falcon; 1 atk sqn with 18 A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 tpt wg at Ramstein AB with 16 C-130E/J Hercules; 2 C-20 Gulfstream; 9 C-21 Learjet; 1 CT-43 Boeing 737 USMC 377 gReece US European Command • 378; 1 naval base at Makri; 1 naval base at Soudha Bay; 1 air base at Iraklion gReenLand (dnK) US Strategic Command • 135; 1 ballistic missile early warn- ing system (BMEWS) at Thule; 1 Spacetrack Radar at Thule gUam US Pacific Command • 4,137; 1 air base; 1 naval base eQUiPmenT BY TYPe 1 SSGN; 2 SSN; 1 MPS sqn (MPS-3 with equipment for one MEB) with 4 Logistics and Support vessels gULf of aden & SomaLi BaSin NATO • Operation Ocean Shield 1 DDGM; 1 FFH haiTi UN • MINUSTAH 8 hondURaS US Southern Command • 358; 1 avn bn with CH-47 Chi- nook; UH-60 Black Hawk iRaQ NATO • NTM-I 12 UN • UNAMI 4 obs US Central Command • Operation New Dawn 34,000 (to be withdrawn by end 2011) iSRaeL US European Command • 1 AN/TPY-2 X-band radar at Nevatim iTaLY US European Command • 10,771 US Army 3,088 (1 AB IBCT currently deployed to AFG) US Navy 3,396; 1 HQ (US Navy Europe (USNAVEUR)) at Naples; 1 HQ (6th Fleet) at Gaeta; 1 MP sqn with 9 P-3C Orion at Sigonella USAF 4,181; 1 ftr wg with 2 ftr sqn with 21 F-16C/D Fight- ing Falcon at Aviano USMC 106 JaPan US Pacific Command • 40,178 US Army 2,617; 1 HQ (9th Theater Army Area Com- mand) at Zama US Navy 6,833; 1 HQ (7th Fleet) at Yokosuka; 1 base at Sasebo; 1 base at Yokosuka eQUiPmenT BY TYPe 1 CVN; 2 CGHM; 3 DDGHM; 4 DDGM; 1 LCC; 4 MCO; 1 LHD; 1 LPD; 2 LSD USAF 13,143 foRceS BY RoLe 1 HQ (5th Air Force) at Okinawa – Kadena AB; 1 ftr wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with 2 ftr sqn with 18 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon at Misawa AB; 1 ftr wg at Okinawa – Kadena AB with 1 AEW&C sqn with 2 E-3B Sentry, 1 CSAR sqn with 8 HH-60G Pave Hawk, 2 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle; 1 tpt wg at Yokota AB with 10 C-130H Hercules; 2 C-12J; 1 Special Ops gp at Okinawa – Kadena AB USMC 17,585 foRceS BY RoLe 1 Marine div (3rd); 1 ftr sqn with 12 F/A-18D Hornet; 1 tkr sqn with 12 KC-130J Hercules; 2 tpt hel sqn with 12 CH-46E Sea Knight; 1 tpt hel sqn with 12 MV-22B Osprey; 3 tpt hel sqn with 10 CH-53E Sea Stallion KoRea, RePUBLic of US Pacific Command • 25,374 US Army 17,130 foRceS BY RoLe 1 HQ (8th Army) at Seoul; 1 div HQ (2nd Inf) located at Tongduchon; 1 armd HBCT; 1 (hvy) cbt avn bde; 1 arty (fires) bde; 1 AD bde eQUiPmenT BY TYPe M1 Abrams; M2/M3 Bradley; M109; M270 MLRS; AH- 64 Apache; CH-47 Chinook; UH-60 Black Hawk; MIM-104 Patriot/FIM-92A Avenger; 1 (APS) HBCT set US Navy 254 USAF 7,857 foRceS BY RoLe 1 (AF) HQ (7th Air Force) at Osan AB; 1 ftr wg at Osan AB with 1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon; 1 ftr sqn with 24 A-10C Thunderbolt II; 1 ISR sqn at Osan AB with U-2S; 1 ftr wg at Kunsan AB with 1 ftr sqn with 20 F-16C /D Fighting Falcon; 1 Special Ops sqn USMC 133 KUWaiT US Central Command • 23,000; 2 AD bty with 16 PAC-3 Patriot; elm 1 (APS) HBCT set (Empty – equipment in use) LiBeRia UN • UNMIL 5; 4 obs maRShaLL iSLandS US Strategic Command • 1 detection and tracking radar at Kwajalein Atoll mediTeRRanean Sea US European Command • US Navy • 6th Fleet eQUiPmenT BY TYPe 1 LCC middLe eaST UN • UNTSO 1 obs moLdoVa OSCE • Moldova 3 neTheRLandS US European Command • 433 D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 68 The MiliTAry BAlANce 2012 noRWaY US European Command • 1 (APS) SP 155mm arty bn set Pacific ocean US Pacific Command • US Navy • 3rd Fleet eQUiPmenT BY TYPe 8 SSBN; 20 SSGN; 10 SSN; 4 CVN; 8 CGHM; 14 DDGHM; 9 DDGM; 11 FFH; 2 LCS; 6 MCO; 3 LHD; 1 LHA; 3 LPD; 4 LSD PeRSian gULf Combined Maritime Forces • CTF-152: 4 MCO PhiLiPPineS US Pacific Command • 182 PoRTUgaL US European Command • 731; 1 spt facility at Lajes QaTaR US Central Command • 678; elm 1 (APS) HBCT set (Empty – equipment in use) SaUdi aRaBia US Central Command • 435 SeRBia NATO • KFOR • Joint Enterprise 796; 1 ARNG cbt spt bde; 2 avn bn with UH-60 OSCE • Serbia 4 OSCE • Kosovo 18 SeYcheLLeS US Africa Command • some MQ-9 Reaper UAV SieRRa Leone IMATT 3 SingaPoRe US Pacific Command • 157; 1 log spt sqn; 1 spt facility SPain US European Command • 1,483; 1 air base at Morón; 1 na- val base at Rota ThaiLand US Pacific Command • 162 TURKeY US European Command • 1,511; MQ-1B Predator UAV at Incirlik; 1 air base at Incirlik; 1 support facility at Ankara; 1 support facility at Izmir US Strategic Command • 1 Spacetrack Radar at Incirlik UniTed aRaB emiRaTeS US Central Command • 140: 2 bty with MIM-104 Patriot UniTed Kingdom US European Command • 9,436 foRceS BY RoLe 1 ftr wg at RAF Lakenheath with 1 ftr sqn with 24 F-15C/D Eagle, 2 ftr sqn with 23 F-15E Strike Eagle; 1 tkr wg at RAF Mildenhall with 15 KC-135R Stratotanker; 1 Spec Ops gp at RAF Mildenhall with 5 MC-130H Combat Talon II; 5 MC-130P Combat Shadow; 1 C-130E Hercules US Strategic command • 1 ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) and 1 Spacetrack Radar at Fylingdales Moor foReign foRceS Canada 3 USCENTCOM; 303 NORTHCOM (NORAD) Germany Air Force: trg units at Goodyear AFB (AZ)/ Sheppard AFB (TX) with 40 T-38 Talon trg ac; 69 T-6A Texan II; 1 trg sqn Holloman AFB (NM) with 24 Tornado IDS; NAS Pensacola (FL); Fort Rucker (AL) • Missile trg located at Fort Bliss (TX) United Kingdom Army, Navy, Air Force ε560 D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 69North America N or th A m er ic aTable 7 Selected arms Procurements and deliveries, north america Designation Type Quantity contract Value Supplier country Prime contractor Order Date First Delivery Due Notes canada (cAN) LAV III APC (W) Upgrade 550 CAN$1bn (US$859.7m) CAN General Dynamics (GDLS) 2009 2012 Focus on weapons and mobility systems. Part of FLCV upgrade and procurement project worth CAN$5bn Halifax-class FFGHM Upgrade 12 CAN$3.1bn (US$2.9bn) CAN Halifax Shipyard/ Victoria Shipyards 2007 2010 SLEP: Halifax-class HCM/FELEX project. To be fitted with Sea Giraffe 150 HC surv radar. Final delivery due 2017 National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (combat) DDGHM/ FFGHM/ PSOH 23 CAN$25 bn CAN Irving Shipyards 2011 n.k. Contract for 23 vessels signed in October 2011, to cover between six and eight Arctic offshore patrol ships, two Joint Support Ships and a mix of 15 destroyers and frigates based on a common hull design. National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy (non- combat) AG/ AGOR/ TUS/ AGB 7 CAN$7 bn CAN Vancouver Shipyards 2011 n.k. Contract includes two Joint Support Ships, one AGOR, one fisheries science vessel and one AGB. One further Joint Support Ship may be ordered F-35 Lightning II FGA ac 65 CAN$9bn (US$8.5bn) US Lockheed Martin 2010 2017 To replace F/A-18 Hornet fleet. First aircraft due in 2017-18, with deliveries continuing until 2022. C-130J Super Hercules Tpt ac 17 US$1.4bn US Lockheed Martin 2007 2010 To replace current CC-130 E. First delivered June 2010. Final delivery due 2012 CH-148 Cyclone Tpt Hel 28 US$5bn US Sikorsky 2004 2010 Incl US$1.8bn 20-year parts/training package. Delivery delayed, with handover of full standard aircraft expected to begin mid-2012. CH-47F Chinook Tpt Hel 15 US$1.15bn US Boeing 2009 2013 For army use United States (US) Stryker APC (W) 4,157 US$13.2bn US General Dynamics (GDLS) 2001 2002 Includes multiple variants M1117 Armored Security Vehicle APC (W) 1,611 US$2.51bn US Textron (TM&LS) 1997 1998 Delivery in progress M119A2 105mm towed arty 443 US$524m US Rock Island Arsenal 2005 2006 New-build programme to fully equip new modular army structure M777 155mm towed arty 932 US$2.4bn UK BAE Systems 2003 2004 Replacing M198s. 421 for the army; 511 for USMC M142 HIMARS MRL 375 US$1.74bn US Lockheed Martin 2003 2004 For army and USMC; delivery in progress FGM-148 Javelin MANPATS 26,772 US$4.44bn US Lockheed Martin/ Raytheon 1994 1996 Remains in production Gerald R Ford- class CVN 1 US$14.9bn US Northrop Grumman (NGSB) 2008 2015 Keel of lead ship laid in 2009 Virginia-class SSN 18 US$45bn US General Dynamics (Electric Boat) 1998 2004 Contract for 8 Block III boats signed in Dec 2008. Eight in service. Construction of 13th boat began in September 2011 Zumwalt-class (DDG-1000) CGHM 3 US$10.2bn US General Dynamics (BIW)/ NGSB 2008 2014 First delivery due Apr 2014 Arleigh Burke- class DDGHM 66 US$66.8bn US BIW/ NGSB 1985 1991 61 vessels in service. Contract for 63rd awarded in June 2011 D ow nl oa de d by [ N an ya ng T ec hn ol og ic al U ni ve rs ity ] at 0 2: 14 1 3 M ar ch 2 01 2 72 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 covering all of NATO’s territory. The US decision to make its emerging national missile-defence archi- tecture available as a backbone for the NATO-wide system paved the way for the agreement. Russia promoted several ideas, among them a fully inte- grated NATO–Russian missile-defence system giving both sides control and de facto veto power, and a system in which Russia and NATO would be respon- sible for different geographical sectors. Both ideas met resistance from NATO allies. NATO leaders quickly clarified: the Alliance would not have its decision- making autonomy curtailed by an integrated system and was equally unwilling to outsource the defence of parts of allied territory to third parties. Given that Russia sees NATO’s missile-defence plans as potentially undermining its own strategic deterrent, Moscow is unlikely to forgo completely the quest for assurances from NATO and attempts to limit NATO’s room for manoeuvre. Russia’s ambas- sador to NATO, Dmitry Rogozin, confirmed on the editorial page of the International Herald Tribune on 8 June 2011 that as far as Moscow was concerned, ‘European missile defenses should be based on equal participation and a common indivisible secu- rity for all the countries of the continent’. The same day, Rasmussen said that ‘our vision is two inde- pendent systems with one goal: two systems that would exchange information to make the defence of NATO territory and of Russian territory more effec- tive’. Progress is incremental, and NATO has set itself a timeline of reaching some form of agreement with Russia by the next NATO summit in May 2012. Another area where NATO moved quickly after the new Strategic Concept had been agreed was the area of partnerships with third countries and other international organisations. The Strategic Concept had made cooperative security, implemented by means of partnerships, one of the three core tasks of the Alliance. To give practical content to this agenda, NATO foreign ministers adopted a new partnership policy at their meeting in Berlin on 15 April 2011. Driven by the assumption that NATO will need partners to successfully operate in the current security environment, NATO will build on its existing programmes such as Partnership for Peace, the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative. As Rasmussen said in Berlin, NATO will try ‘to work on more issues, with more partners, in more ways’. The new partnership policy will serve differing aims. Partnerships are confidence- building measures that should contribute to stability, security and crisis prevention. Aside from coopera- tion on specific issues such as cyber security, NATO also wants to promote regional security cooperation beyond the Euro-Atlantic area. Further, partnership programmes may serve to help aspiring candidates to prepare for eventual NATO membership. The new policy puts a clear emphasis on contri- butions by third countries and organisations to NATO-led operations. A political-military annex to the document specifies the roles partners can play and is designed to strengthen their interaction with NATO. NATO uses the term ‘operational partners’ for countries providing troops, military assets or other capacity that it deems to be of operational rele- vance (including non-military capability). But even with this new policy, operational partners can only expect to play a role in decision-shaping, not decision- making; this will remain the prerogative of the North Atlantic Council. As the new policy foresees that all NATO coopera- tion activities should be open to all partner countries, there will be a single ‘menu’ to choose from as partners design their individual partnership programmes with NATO. Though established partnership frameworks will continue to exist, their practical importance is likely to decrease. But coordinating partnership activ- ities could make it difficult to take into account the requirements of NATO’s diverse partners, including Russia and ranging from Austria to Afghanistan and Switzerland to Pakistan. Finally, NATO’s operational partners are likely to enjoy a more privileged posi- tion in the future; the operational connection is likely to become the dominant lens for NATO’s partnership policy. But perhaps one lesson from Operation Unified Protector, the NATO operation over Libya (see p. 12), is that partnerships can also be ad hoc and mission specific: over Libya, NATO successfully integrated its air operations with those of Sweden, Jordan, Qatar and the UAE (though the environment was benign). A third issue is reform of NATO’s command struc- tures and agencies. On 8 June 2011, NATO defence ministers agreed to cut one Joint Force Command, three component commands (one for each service) and two combined air operations centres (CAOC). (NATO’s air operation over Libya was run from one of its CAOCs; see p. 12.) This streamlining effort will lead to a reduction in posts in NATO’s command structure from some 13,000 to about 8,800. NATO’s network of agencies will be reorganised under three areas: procurement, support and communication and information. Inevitably, a Strategic Concept D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 73Europe Eu ro pe agreed by 28 governments against the background of continuing operations and an uncertain international environment embodies many compromises. european defence after Libya NATO’s first new military mission after the Strategic Concept, Operation Unified Protector, however, revealed, according to then-US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in June 2011, ‘shortcomings – in capa- bility and will’. (He also said that problems existed in the Afghanistan mission, notably regarding the number of troops and support assets deployed by NATO states.) Gates noted that ‘while every alliance member voted for [the] Libya mission, less than half have participated at all, and fewer than a third have been willing to participate in the strike mission’. It wasn’t that many did not want to take part, he said, they simply couldn’t, with particular skill and plat- form capabilities absent. Falling defence spending and resultant falling investment in modernisation and other capabilities was one factor. The challenge wasn’t the total level of spending, but rather how and why resources were allocated. For non-US NATO members, the results of their defence investment ‘were significantly less than the sum of the parts’. Three weeks later, Rasmussen said in the July/August edition of Foreign Affairs that Libya was a reminder ‘of how important it is for NATO to be ready, capable, and willing to act’, and raised the spectre of the impact of current cuts on future operations. This of course does not mean that small militaries cannot play a mean- ingful role: indeed, Libya – like Afghanistan – has showed that small states with motivated and capable militaries, and willing politicians, can engage to great effect. Rasmussen said that ‘smart defence’ was one answer, with states setting defence priorities on the basis of ‘threats, cost-effectiveness and performance’, while multinational cooperation on procurement was another. Europe should, he said, also increase its deployable and sustainable capabilities. But for Gates, ‘ultimately, nations must be responsible for their fair share of the common defense’. His successor, Leon Panetta, continued the theme, identifying capability gaps and shortages in common areas such as targeting specialists, tanker aircraft and ISR. (He also noted shortages of supplies and muni- tions.) Panetta urged European states to consult before cutting capabilities, to ensure that these remained in key areas. But he also noted positive aspects of the NATO involvement, not least that it took NATO only ‘ten days to decide to act after UNSCR 1973’. And this at a time other European responses were fragmentary: shortcomings in EU defence struc- tures were exposed and there was ‘never any ques- tion of framing the Libyan intervention as an EU crisis management mission under CSDP’ (see ‘War in Libya: Europe’s confused response’, IISS Strategic Comments, vol. 17, no. 18, April 2011). So, while the NATO mission worked relatively smoothly in terms of military command, control and operations, it was not without problems: capability gaps and shortages, the ad hoc nature of the coalition (in this case the non- participation of some member states) and imposition of caveats by other participants would all have given planners cause for concern. But in addition to these US exhortations on capability and funding, European states will have to consider what Washington’s decision to ‘lead from behind’ in Libya means for European defence, and whether Libya marks a water- shed in the attitude, nature and degree of US military involvement in the European theatre. Defence economics The protracted sovereign debt crisis in Europe wors- ened over the course of 2011 (see Strategic Survey 2011, p. 199). European banks remain undercapital- ised and excessively leveraged; while public debt-to- GDP ratios have risen to uncomfortably high levels in many countries – approaching and exceeding 100% of GDP in several cases (see Table 8) – as governments bailed out ailing banking sectors and ran fiscal defi- cits in an attempt to stimulate stagnant economies. Portugal applied for a €78bn EU/IMF bail-out in May, and Greece obtained an additional €109bn in funds in July (on top of the €110bn it received in May 2010). But the second half of 2011 saw some effects of the financial contagion spread to core Eurozone econo- mies such as Italy, Spain and even France. These events precipitated sharp falls in European bank shares amidst fears over their exposure to distressed Eurozone sovereign debt. There is a degree of sub-regional variation in economic health. Extensive trade, investment and banking links with Greece have led Balkan econo- mies to be particularly exposed to the Greek crisis; while weakened banking sectors in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland and the UK have put pressure on their public finances. Deficit reduction has dampened growth in Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia – although the strength of German indus- trial growth in 2010 contributed to their exports. By contrast, Baltic states recovered strongly following D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 74 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 severe recessions in 2009 and the Nordic states continue to maintain healthy public finances. Defence austerity As illustrated by Table 8, between 2008 and 2010, gross government debt as a percentage of GDP in NATO’s European members rose by an average of almost 40%, to an average of debt-to-GDP ratio of nearly 60%. In Belgium, Greece, Italy and Portugal, this figure approached or exceeded 100% of annual output, while for Germany, France and Hungary, debt-to-GDP ratios rose above 80%. Defence has borne a significant share of subsequent fiscal adjust- ment, with real-terms reductions in defence spending over 2008–10 occurring in approximately 16 out of 23 of the NATO Europe member states surveyed. Moreover, in over 40% of European NATO countries (10 out of 23), these real-terms declines exceeded 10%. Overall, real defence spending in European NATO states fell by an average of 7.4% per country, while total NATO Europe real defence spending fell by 5.4% over the period (not shown). The decline in NATO European defence spending has caused significant concern in the United States as well as Europe. Robert Gates’s speech in June 2011 noted that ‘For all but a handful of allies, defence budgets ... have been chronically starved of adequate funding for a long time, with the shortfalls compounding on themselves each year.’ Similar senti- ments were echoed earlier, in February, by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: ‘defence spending by NATO’s European members (over the preceding two years) had shrunk by around $45bn dollars – equivalent to the entire German defence budget’. (This is perhaps a slight overstatement: in nominal terms, NATO’s figures make the reduction Table 8 nato europe gross government Debt and real Defence expenditure 2008–101 Government Debt as a % of GDP real Defence Expenditure2 (US$bn) countries* 2008 2010 % change 2008 2010e % change Latvia 17.1 39.9 133.5 0.47 0.24 –48.3 Lithuania 15.6 38.7 148.1 0.47 0.33 –29.8 Bulgaria 15.5 17.4 12.4 1.12 0.83 –25.7 Romania 13.6 31.7 132.7 2.60 2.14 –17.8 Hungary 72.3 80.2 10.9 1.64 1.36 –17.6 Italy 106.3 119.0 11.9 34.0 28.2 –17.0 Slovak Republic 27.8 41.8 50.3 1.31 1.10 –16.4 Estonia 4.6 6.6 42.5 0.39 0.33 –14.5 France 68.2 82.3 20.7 60.9 52.0 –14.5 Spain 39.8 60.1 50.9 17.1 15.3 –10.2 Belgium 89.6 96.7 7.9 5.79 5.24 –9.6 Greece 110.7 142.8 28.9 9.57 8.86 –7.4 Czech Republic 30.0 38.5 28.7 2.85 2.67 –6.1 Netherlands 58.2 63.7 9.4 11.6 11.4 –1.8 Turkey 39.5 42.2 6.8 14.4 14.2 –1.1 Slovenia 22.5 37.3 65.6 0.78 0.77 –0.7 Denmark 42.2 43.7 3.5 4.48 4.49 +0.1 United Kingdom 52.0 75.5 45.1 60.1 60.4 +0.5 Norway 56.8 55.4 –2.5 6.34 6.39 +0.8 Germany 66.4 84.0 26.4 44.5 45.1 +1.4 Portugal 71.6 92.9 29.8 3.41 3.68 +8.0 Poland 47.1 55.0 16.7 7.23 8.84 +22.3 Luxembourg 13.6 18.4 35.3 0.20 0.27 +36.1 average 47.0 59.3 39.8 12.66 11.92 –7.4 *Countries listed in order of increasing percentage change in real defence expenditure. Sources: IISS analysis based on Defence Analytical Services and Advice (DASA)-derived estimates from NATO data, UKDS 2011; International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, September 2011, Gross Government Debt as a % of GDP. 1Excludes Albania and Croatia (2008 NATO statistics unavailable for these countries as they only joined the Alliance in 2009) and Iceland (which has no standing army). 2Real defence expenditures measured at constant 2010 prices and exchange rates. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 77Europe Eu ro pe France has also been at the forefront of the NATO-led military action in Libya (see p. 12), deploying substantial assets to the campaign. Aside from a significant French maritime presence, it is estimated that, up to September 2011, French aircraft had carried out 35% of strike missions (25% of overall missions), using an array of weaponry including the precision-guided SCALP-EG (used also by UK forces under the name Storm Shadow) and Armement Air-Sol Modulaire (AASM). But the campaign highlighted some problems relating to platform capabilities. As well as modern platforms like Rafale and Mistral, the French inventory also contains ageing equipment such as Mirage F1 and Super Etendard aircraft and Rubis-class nuclear submarines. The high operational tempo seen in 2011 increases the maintenance liability of older equipment but also, more generally, places stress on equipment as well as personnel. When it left the Libyan coast on 12 August 2011, the carrier Charles de Gaulle, having deployed to Libya in March 2011, had been almost continuously at sea since 30 October 2010, with only a five-day break. It did not enter port for a refit – due for March – until August. Further, actions over Libya highlighted French (and broader European) shortcomings in intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), strategic air refuelling and unmanned vehicles. President Nicolas Sarkozy hailed the Libya campaign as justification for the 2009 French rein- tegration into NATO’s integrated command struc- ture, noting during an August speech in Paris that reintegration had been an ‘indispensible element’ of the leadership role played by France. The view of some analysts is that France would have preferred Franco-British leadership, but the British preference for NATO leadership, together with the benefits NATO could bring, not least in terms of headquar- ters, interoperability and training, would be unlikely to have been matched by a smaller coalition – some- thing Paris eventually acknowledged, as reported in Le Monde on 13 September 2011. The same article noted that Paris viewed the Libyan campaign model – a coalition of the willing using NATO assets without overt US leadership – favourably. The FELIN infantry combat system was issued to three regiments in 2011. FELIN is the individual soldier element of the SCORPIO system, designed to improve networked capabilities of French ground forces. FELIN will first be used operationally when the 1st Infantry Regiment is deployed to Afghanistan at the end of 2011. The plan is for four new regiments to be equipped every year until 2015. FELIN includes portable computing, voice and data communications, new combat clothing with improved body armour, and a new ballistic helmet. The FAMAS infantry rifle has also been upgraded, now sporting a video- sight that should give personnel the ability to engage objects out of their direct vision. According to the French defence procurement agency (DGA), the capa- bility of the weapon has increased by 70% in daylight and by 160% at night. However, the overall weight of the system has increased by 5–6kgs, in comparison to the existing model. A full FELIN equipment set costs €23,000 per soldier, while the overall programme bill, including preliminary studies, engineering, fabri- cation and initial maintenance, runs to €1bn. Many nations have integrated aspects of ‘future soldier’ technology into front-line combat units, though initial aspirations for networking – particularly for dismounted troops – have had in many cases to be modified in light of reliability, ruggedisation, battery life and weight issues. But the French integration of the FELIN suit into combat units will likely provide useful lessons for allied states. Paris also signed a contract with Dassault to produce a modified version of the Israeli UAV Heron-TP by 2014 to fill the capability gap created by the progressive retirement of the current Harfang MALE UAV and before any successor enters service around 2020. French chief of staff (CEMA) Admiral Edouard Guillaud advocated the purchase of US Reapers, the blog Secret Défense reported on 21 July 2011, but the government decided otherwise. As part of the Franco-British defence cooperation agree- ment (see below), both nations are considering the joint development of a UAV in this class to meet their respective requirements. entente cordiale The ambitious goals laid out in the 2010 Franco- British defence treaty (see The Military Balance 2011, p. 78) have started to be addressed. An ‘Industry Day’ was held in June 2011 for some 30 defence companies, with discussions ranging – according to the UK MoD – ‘from joint co-operation on equipment and capabili- ties, including research and technology, to addressing export licensing and consolidation of industrial sectors and investments’. Industry has been encour- aged to more closely integrate activities, exempli- fied by the ‘one MBDA’ project, and the agreements on the light anti-ship missile and the SCALP-EG/ Storm Shadow programmes. Emphasis has also been D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 78 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 placed on joint training and interoperability, in light of the planned Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. Meanwhile brigade-level cooperation took place during Exercise Flandres 2011 in June. While the part- nership is still at an early stage, Libya has shown that the two countries can exercise political leadership while the two militaries can closely cooperate within a NATO framework. Defence economics France has so far resisted major and fundamental adjustments to its defence plans in the wake of the financial and economic crisis: this is set to change in 2012. The 2008 White Paper was completed before the budgetary implications of the crisis had become apparent. However, with the pressure mounting, some adjustments have become inevitable. At the end of 2010 a revised budget law, covering the period 2011–13, provided for a total of €91.6bn in defence spending. Compared to the original allocation in the military programme law (MPL) 2009–14 this amounts to a reduction of €3.5bn. However, in absolute terms, the defence budget is set to rise from € 30.1bn in 2011 to €31bn in 2013. Despite these initial steps to account for the changing economic situation, further cuts seem inevitable. It is estimated that, by the time the 2010 cuts were announced, the military programme law covering the period 2008–13 left a structural deficit in defence expenditure of €3.6bn. France’s 2009 rein- tegration into NATO’s military structures, as well as rising costs for overseas operations, have increased budgetary pressures further. Attempts to generate additional income, to be wholly reinvested in the defence sector according to the 2008 White Paper, through the sale of military real estate (as part of the bases de défense plan) and the auctioning off of obso- lete military radio frequencies were initially expected to generate funds of approximately €2.3bn, though €1.09bn was identified in the 2012 budget plan. Even against the increasingly bleak financial back- ground, France intended to largely shield certain capability areas – such as nuclear deterrence, intelli- gence, reconnaissance and surveillance, all of which had been singled out as key priorities in the 2008 document – from cuts. Furthermore, defence invest- ment (research and development and procurement) is set to benefit from preferential treatment in general. The resource envelope in this area is supposed to increase by just over €1bn between 2011 and 2013. So far, Paris has tried to avoid the cancellation of procurement items and has tried to respond to the financial pressure by delaying several modernisation packages, notably an upgrade for the Mirage 2000D, parts of the land-forces modernisation programme, and air-to-air refuelling. The military programme law 2009–14 had already announced a reduction in the number of fighter aircraft compared to the level noted in the 2008 White Paper. Reducing France’s military footprint in Côte d’Ivoire was another move to generate savings, the French contingent having supported UN troops during the conflict between forces loyal to former-President Laurent Gbagbo and President-elect Alassane Ouattara earlier in 2011 (see map, p. 412). Defence-industrial decisions also underline the determination of the French government to pursue a strategic posture. To keep the Rafale production line open, France has committed to buy 11 aircraft per year from Dassault between 2011 and 2013. Dassault and the French government hope for export orders to be placed in the meantime to secure the programme’s future. France continues to aggressively promote French defence-industrial interests abroad to facili- tate market access for French companies. A recent example is the government-to-government agree- ment from January 2011 paving the way for the sale of four Mistral-class amphibious assault vessels to Russia (with two to be built in Russia). This deal is an important order for the STX shipyard in St Nazaire, which is judged to be of strategic importance for France because of its expertise in the aircraft-carrier field. Following the governmental agreement, a contract between the French company DCNS and Russia’s Rosoboronexport was signed on 17 June 2011. French budgetary and defence-industrial deci- sions so far seem to be driven by a desire to maintain as much of an autonomous broad-spectrum capability as possible, reflecting the high importance attached to defence as a policy area that has broad executive room for manoeuvre. Collaborative projects seem acceptable if they guarantee access to capability, such as the Franco-British defence cooperation treaty. It is likely, however, that France will have to introduce Table 9 french Defence Budget Proposals MPl 2009–14 plan (old) revised budget 2011–13 (new) 2011: €30.6bn 2011: €30.1bn 2012: €31.8bn 2012: €30.5bn 2013: €32.7bn 2013: €31bn D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 79Europe Eu ro pe additional significant defence cuts after the 2012 elec- tions, given continuing macroeconomic pressure. germany The Bundeswehr is set to undergo wide-ranging change. Budgetary pressure, combined with persis- tent capability caps and operational demands, has ushered in defence-reform efforts. The cabinet decided in June 2010 that some €8.3bn should be cut between 2011 and 2014, almost half of which was to come from personnel expenditure. The timeline for this savings target was later extended to 2015. The defence budget for 2012 was set at €32.68bn and fore- cast to decline to €30.43bn by 2015. The chief of staff, General Volker Wieker, was asked to evaluate whether different force structures would help make the Bundeswehr a more effec- tive, flexible and deployable force. By 2010, the Bundeswehr was limited to sustaining an actual maximum deployment of 7,000 troops abroad (10,000 for a short period without rotation). The level of ambi- tion for the Bundeswehr after the new reform effort, Wieker suggested, should be a sustainable deploy- ment of 10,000 troops across several simultaneous operations, in effect cutting the level of ambition from the previous target of 14,000. A core assumption of his report (see The Military Balance 2011, p. 82), and one that had been publicly supported by then-Defence Minister Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg before publica- tion, was that savings targets could only be met with reduced numbers of personnel, both military and civilian. While conscription still had significant polit- ical support, zu Guttenberg argued in May 2010 that the budget crunch demanded structural reform of the armed forces and that in this context conscription had to be debated. The combination of radical cuts to active-service personnel with the possible abandon- ment of what many politicians thought was a main- stay of the German armed forces sparked a short but heated debate from which zu Guttenberg’s ideas of future force structures without conscription emerged largely intact. In January 2011 the last group of conscripts began their six-month service. Mandatory conscription was suspended on 1 July 2011, although the ministry still tries to attract ‘voluntary conscripts’. The announcement by zu Guttenberg that mandatory conscription should be re-evaluated and the decision to suspend it took just six months. Compared to other European countries, Germany switched to an all- volunteer force late, but did so rapidly. Thomas de Maizière, defence minister from March 2011, inherited an environment determined by cost pressures and the decision to build a smaller, more capable and all-volunteer Bundeswehr. He announced a first set of policy decisions and docu- ments in May 2011. Chief among them are the Defence Policy Guidelines (DPG): these provide guidelines for future Bundeswehr planning. Defence policy guidelines These guidelines maintan that Germany requires broad-spectrum armed forces capable of high- intensity missions and indicate a reluctance to give up capability areas in order to save money. But finan- cial pressures made some adjustment inevitable. For the ministry, this boiled down to a choice between sustainability and flexibility, and the DPG underline the decision to favour the latter. Noting the expecta- tions of partner nations, they argue that a broad spec- trum of capabilities is necessary to exert influence corresponding to Germany’s international position, while they are also justified by uncertainty over the international security environment. Current opera- tions, the DPG argue, are not necessarily the best guides to future demands and a premium has to be paid to enable flexible military responses. Capability priorities are necessary, and these will be detailed ‘according to type, quality and scale’, with number and sustainability defined on the basis of differing operational requirements. In September 2011, early decisions were announced that focused Table 10 germany: future force numbers Max strength Professional and contract Voluntary conscript Army >61,000 55,300 2,300–6,100 Navy 13,800 12,500 500–1,300 Air force 23,000 22,000 500–1,000 Medical service 15,100 – 500–1,000 Joint Support Service 38,700 – 1,250–3,250 Remaining active forces will be in training or education phases or in other organisational tasks and are not allocated to the service totals above. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 82 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 and SDSR have been strongly defended by Cameron, Fox and Fox’s successor as defence minster, Philip Hammond, who argued that events over the last year – including the Libya war – proved their value. The National Security Council has often met to give strategic direction to operations and planning and was used extensively to manage the UK role in Libya. It seems to have succeeded in making the Ministry of Defence, Foreign Office and Department for International Development integrate their work by design. Security officials consider this a significant improvement over the direction and management of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, which was criti- cised in evidence to the independent Iraq Inquiry. Defence reorganisation The Ministry of Defence has acquired a reputa- tion for inefficiency, indecision and obfuscation. In many cases, some of the blame can be shared with the services and Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S). Its handling of the aircraft-carrier programme was described by the Public Accounts Committee in its Major Projects 2010 report as ‘a new benchmark in poor corporate decision making’, while accumulated delays to the Army’s armoured vehicle programme were vividly described by former Army head General Sir Richard Dannatt in his memoir Leading from the Front. The armed forces have often complained about over-centralisation and paralysing bureaucracy. In June 2011, Fox announced the findings of the year-long Defence Reform Review, led by Lord Levene. A smaller defence board (the highest committee in the MoD exercising strategic, but not operational, management of defence) will be chaired by the defence secretary; the chief of defence staff will be the sole military representative; and the service chiefs no longer have seats on the board. The perma- nent secretary, chief of defence materiel, finance director and three non-executive directors comprise the remainder. Greater responsibility and flexibility over indi- vidual service budgets on matters of personnel, equip- ment and training will be given to the service chiefs, in a bid to improve their control over capability, and overall accountability. This measure, which reverses almost 30 years of increasing centralisation, will, Fox said, allow them to ‘veer and haul’ between elements of the budget, including equipment, manpower and training. Meanwhile, a new Joint Forces Command will own the increasing number of joint organisations, such as special forces, training units and the medical command, as well as becoming an institutional advo- cate for joint warfare. The plans have been broadly welcomed by the service chiefs, who anticipate being able to regain the means necessary to optimise their capability; the plans are also expected to improve on the previous centralised approach and could make it more difficult for future projects to become bogged down. Parallel efforts have continued to reform defence acquisition, long notorious for cost overruns and delays in delivering supplies to the front line. Bernard Gray was appointed chief of defence materiel, respon- sible for spending 40% of the MoD budget on equip- ment and support. Gray’s structural reforms to DE&S have been evolutionary rather than revolutionary. He has insisted on honesty when it comes to costing equipment and logistic programmes, part of an effort to root out the optimism that has bedevilled UK defence programmes in the past. This has resulted in much greater visibility of potential increases in cost than was available before. The government’s deficit-reduction drive required MoD to make an 8% reduction in UK defence expen- diture. It also had to manage away a prospective £36–8bn overspend inherited from previous govern- ments. By 2008 it had been identified by MoD staff but remained unresolved. In 2010, the Public Accounts Committee concluded that MoD’s ‘consistent pattern of planned overspend demonstrates serious organ- isational failings and a dangerous culture of opti- mism’. Despite the force reductions announced in 2010, it was clear that a considerable budget shortfall remained. The outcome of an exercise to match plans with resources was announced in July 2011, with Fox claiming that ‘for the first time in a generation, the MoD will have brought its plans and budget broadly into balance’. Fox contended that it allowed the funding of the Airseeker (Rivet Joint) electronic intel- ligence aircraft, the purchase of 14 Chinook helicop- ters (of 22 announced by the previous government), a mid-life update to the Warrior infantry fighting vehicle, initial funding for the Joint Strike Fighter, the fitting of catapults to the future aircraft carriers and development of a Global Combat Ship to replace existing frigates. Although UK reserves contributed significant numbers to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, resource cuts had resulted in much of their capa- bility atrophying. Fox accepted the assessment of an independent commission that reserve capa- bility had declined and the potential of the reserves D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 83Europe Eu ro pe was not fully exploited. Plans to redress this consist of enhancing the role, training and resourcing of reserves, including over £100m per year in additional funding, so they can play a greater role in overseas operations and homeland security. The SDSR directed that army capability and manpower be reduced to a lesser degree than the navy or air force, and should not be significantly downsized whilst fighting in Afghanistan. RAF and navy personnel reductions announced during 2011 followed the SDSR prescription. But it was revealed in July 2011 that the MoD was directing further army manpower reductions to balance the budget in 2011. The regular forces are now to reduce from 102,000 to 90,000 by 2015 and to 82,000 by 2020. This will be partially alleviated by increasing the Territorial Army to a trained strength of 30,000 and improving its read- iness. There is to be no reduction in the deployable forces required by the SDSR: a multi national corps HQ, two division HQs, five ‘multi-role’ brigades, an air-assault brigade and contributions to special forces and the Royal Marines amphibious brigade. But significant reductions will be required in HQs, administration, and training organisations and infra- structure; and some named battalions and regiments may be disbanded. Although funding was announced for the Warrior update and new armoured scout vehi- cles, no contracts have yet been signed. The army now has some certainty about its role and resourcing, but concern – shared by the other services – has been voiced about retention of quality personnel. Pay has been frozen and allowances reduced, and a redundancy programme is cutting the strength of the forces. There has already been an outflow of high- quality middle-ranking officers. Military officials attri- bute this to accumulated overstretch resulting from fighting two wars simultaneously, concerns about conditions of service and a sense that it is better to jump than be pushed. This may be a temporary blip, but there is a risk that a continued pay freeze, coupled with any further cuts, could trigger a major outflow, as happened in the late 1970s. capability implications The House of Commons Defence Committee is unconvinced that the reduced forces are able to meet current and future commitments, and retain ’critical mass’, or that ‘Future Force 2020’ can be delivered without increased funding, a feeling shared by many analysts. Fox stated that plans were dependent on British drawdown in Afghanistan remaining on track. The apparent success of NATO’s campaign in Libya provided a boost to UK military credibility in the Alliance. Apparent weaknesses of British opera- tions in Basra and under-resourcing of British forces in Helmand from 2006 to 2009 dented British mili- tary self-confidence and sowed doubts in the US. While these doubts may have been partly allayed by the British role in Libya, there is little doubt that, had the war lasted beyond September, some hard choices about military strategic priorities, such as withdrawing warships from lower-priority tasks to sustain the naval force in the Mediterranean, would have been unavoidable. Spared of these hard choices, the government insists that the SDSR is still valid. The US decision to lead the NATO mission in Libya ‘from behind’ may herald a new trend. The MoD previously assumed that the US would always lead any NATO combat operation, providing both combat forces and key ‘enablers’ such as EW and SEAD. If this can no longer be assumed, it will increase pres- sure to retain full-spectrum capabilities, given the UK’s aspiration to play a leading role in NATO. Afghanistan and Libya have seen many examples of successful adaptation by British forces, and employ- ment of highly capable weaponry, such as the dual- mode Brimstone missile. The dual-mode Brimstone Urgent Operational Requirement, and much new equipment, has been funded from the Treasury reserve rather than the core equipment programme. If any of these capabilities are to be retained, they will have to be funded by the MoD. For example, recent operations have greatly depended on intelli- gence surveillance, target acquisition and reconnais- sance (ISTAR) capabilities, such as the RAF’s Sentinel aircraft. Indeed, the prime minister said to the House of Commons Liaison Committee on 17 May that ‘if there was one lesson, it is that the extra emphasis we put on ISTAR and drones will be even more necessary in future’. But the SDSR declared Sentinel would be scrapped from 2015 and it is unclear whether many of the other ISTAR capabilities fielded in Afghanistan will be funded in the long term. The decision on Sentinel, however, could yet be revisited. Claims by some commentators that, as the reductions continue, the UK would not be able to mount another operation like Libya are overstated. And if the army and RAF reduce their footprint in Afghanistan as planned they will become more capable of contingency operations. Nonetheless, despite repeated declarations that there has been no ‘strategic shrinkage’, the SDSR is resulting in signifi- D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 84 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 cant reductions in UK defence capability and ambi- tion. Further difficult choices may have to be made before 2015, when another SDSR is due. Defence economics Fallout from the economic crisis continues to hamper the UK economy. A return to growth in 2010 (a modest 1.4%) reflected the lagged effects of the large- scale expansionary fiscal policies undertaken by the outgoing Labour government as well as inventory cycle effects following the decline in world trade in 2009, rather than an improvement in underlying economic fundamentals or confidence. Overall, much of the UK economy is still coping with the aftermath of a deep balance-sheet recession, as overextended households pay down consumer and mortgage debt and undercapitalised banks limit credit availability in an attempt to rebuild balance sheets. The UK entered the recession in 2009 with a public-sector borrowing requirement of 11.1% – Britain’s largest-ever peacetime general government deficit. Net debt was estimated to rocket from a pre- crisis level of 35.9% of GDP in FY 2006/07 to a peak of around 100% in FY 2014/15. Against this backdrop, the coalition government elected in May 2010 passed an emergency budget the next month, outlining a five-year fiscal consolidation programme aimed at eliminating the ‘current structural deficit’. The major burden of fiscal consolidation has focused on expenditure cuts (73%) rather than tax increases (27%), with real reductions in overall departmental expenditure of 12% by FY 2014/15 envisaged. Despite fears that the defence budget would be slashed in excess of 10%, the MoD managed to survive a more severe squeeze: it was established that, between FY2009/10 and FY 2014/15, the defence budget would be cut by around 8% in real terms (see Table 8) – although this implies a increase of 1–2% over the period in the nominal baseline defence 0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 -10 -8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 % change from FY2009/10 levels, real defence budget Defence budget as % of GDP Defence budget as % of government outlays % change Defence budget (real, nominal) (£m) Estimated Real Baseline Defence Budget1 (right hand scale) Total Defence Budget2 (right hand scale) 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Figure 5 united Kingdom Defence Budget trends (FY2009/10–FY2014/15) Sources: IISS analysis applied to: MoD Annual Report and Accounts 2010–2011, Public Expenditure Outturn White Paper 2010–2011, Public Expenditure Statistical Analyses July 2011; Defence Analytical Services and Advice, United Kingdom Defence Statistics 2011; and IMF World Economic Outlook September 2011. 1 Deflators are calculated from data released by the Office for National Statistics on 28 June 2011. The forecasts are consistent with the Financial Statement and Budget 2011. RfR1 figures shown here are real figures, and will differ from nominal figures by a factor determined by the deflator used. 2 Consists of Resource DEL and Capital DEL minus depreciation. Figures from 2012/13 are projected plans for defence budgets. Until 2012/13, figures include both RfR1 funds (Provision of Defence Capability) and RfR2 funds (Operations and Peace-Keeping). From 2012/13 onwards, although RfR2 funds have yet to be allocated, estimates of $3.8bn, £3.8bn and £3.5bn have been included based on Treasury Spending Review 2010 forecasts (see Cm 7924 p. 57). Table 11 expenditure on operations in iraq, afghanistan and Libya1 (£m)   2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 cumulative Total iraq 847 1,311 910 958 956 1,457 1381 342 92 8,254 afghanistan 311 46 67 199 738 1,504 2623 3821 3774 13,083 libya – – – – – – – – 260 260 annual Total 1 ,158 1 ,357 977 1 ,157 1 ,694 2 ,961 4 ,004 4 ,163 4 ,126 21,597 UOr approvals1 500 180 130 260 790 1,550 1,400 840 1,130 6,780 Source: DASA UKDS 2011; MoD Annual Report & Accounts; House of Commons Standard Note (SN/SG/3139) – The Cost of International Military Operations. 1UOR Approvals make up part of the Annual Total, and should not be taken as additional spending on top of the Annual Totals indicated. Of the £6.78bn in UOR approvals over the period, $4.9bn was allocated to requirements in Afghanistan. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 87Europe Eu ro pe management frameworks to prevent the cost over- runs and delays which have blighted it over the past few years. The report supports the MoD’s establish- ment of a Major Projects Review Board, audited by the National Audit Office, to oversee and hold to account the delivery of the top 50 major MoD projects. The first of these, the Valiant Jetty project, was placed on the ‘Projects of Concern’ list in early October 2011. A selection of major equipment proj- ects on which the main investment decision has been taken (‘post-Main Gate’) is shown in Table 13. Other reform proposals in the pipeline centre on the UK’s defence-industrial strategy (with a govern- ment White Paper on this due in late 2011) and the future organisational structure of DE&S. Gray is due to deliver plans for a major overhaul of the agency towards the end of 2011. Uncertain future Substantial efforts towards plugging the funding gap have been made, but the relatively small real-terms reduction in the FY2011/12 defence budget means that the budget still needs to fall by over 7% (in real terms) by FY2014/15 to achieve the cuts envisaged in the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (see Figure 5). These both pose further risk to managing the budget. The planning rounds for 2012 and 2013 are set to be even more fraught with stark choices than was the case in 2011. Furthermore, uncertainty abounds over funding provisions post FY2014/15; while the current government has allowed the MoD to plan on the basis of a 1% annual real-terms growth in its equipment budget, it cannot ensure that any subsequent government will maintain this guarantee during the 2015 Spending Review. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 88 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 albania ALB albanian lek 2010 2011 2012 GDP lek 1.24tr 1.32tr US$ 11.7bn 13.0bn per capita US$ 3,913 4,329 Growth % 3.50 2.50 inflation % 3.6 3.9 Def expa lek 13.3bn US$ 126m Def bdgta lek 13.3bn 13.8bn US$ 126m 136m FMa (US) US$ 3.0m 5.0m US$1=lek 105.89 101.95 a Excludes military pensions Population 2,994,667 age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 11.3% 5.2% 4.9% 4.0% 19.2% 4.9% Female 10.1% 4.9% 5.0% 4.2% 20.8% 5.5% capabilities A NATO member since 2009, Albania sustains limited mili- tary capability predicated on territorial defence. Efforts continue to reform its armed forces and upgrade mainly obsolete equipment, though these are constrained by limited funding. As well as wider ties with fellow NATO members, Albania is trying to develop bilateral regional ties, and in 2011 carried out a small-scale naval exercise with Slovenia. The army, the largest of the three services, is equipped mainly with obsolete Chinese-origin equipment. It has provided troops to ISAF in Afghanistan both to Ka- bul and on surveillance and force-protection duties in RC- W, and troops including an EOD team to Operation Althea in Bosnia. The small air force, now an air brigade, operates only rotary and light liaison aircraft, and the country de- pends on NATO allies for air defence. The armed forces have no ability to deploy organically for operations beyond national territory. actiVe 14,245 (Joint Force comd 8,150, Support command 4,300, TraDOc 1,000, MoD and General Staff 795) Paramilitary 500 Terms of service conscription 12 months organisations By serVice Joint forces command (Jfc) 8,150 Consists of a Land Element (comprising a Rapid Reaction Bde, Cdo Regt, Area Spt Bde, Log Bn and Comms Bn), an Air Bde and Naval Bde. JFC units are intended to conduct and support international peace support and humanitarian operations and other crisis management tasks. land Element forces By roLe SPECIAL FORCES 1 cdo regt MANOEUVRE Light 1 (rapid reaction) lt inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bn 1 cbt spt bde 1 sigs bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bn eQuiPment By tyPe MBT 3 APC (T) 6 Type 5310 ARTY TOWED 18 152 mm MOR 81: 82mm 81 AD • GUNS 42 37mm M-1939/S 60 ARV T-54/T-55 MW Bozena navy Element The Albanian Navy Brigade, under the command of JFC, is organised into two naval flotillas with additional hy- drographic, logistics, auxiliary and training support ser- vices. eQuiPment By tyPe PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS • PB 3: 2 Po-2† (FSU Project 501); 1 Shanghai II† (PRC) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES • MSO 1 T-43† (FSU Project 254) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT • ARL 1 coast Guard forces By roLe The Albanian Coast Guard (Roja Bregdetare) is under the command of the Navy Brigade’s Coastal Defence Command. eQuiPment By tyPe PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 34 PBF 12: 8 V-4000; 4 Arch Angel (1 additional vessel to be delivered) PB 9: 4 Iluria (Damen Stan 4207); 3 Mk3 Sea Spectre; 2 (other) PBR 13: 4 Type 227; 1 Type 246; 1 Type 303; 7 Type 2010 air Element Flying hours at least 10–15 hrs/year. eQuiPment By tyPe HELICOPTERS TPT • Light 16: 1 AW109; 3 Bell 205 (AB-205); 7 Bell 206C (AB-206C); 5 Bo-105 support command (sc) 4,300 Consists of the Logistics Brigade, GS Support Regiment, Infrastructure Regiment, Personnel and Recruiting Centre, Military Hospital, Systems Development Centre and Mili- tary Police Battalion. D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 89Europe Eu ro pe forces By roLe COMBAT SUPPORT 1 MP bn COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde (1 spt regt (tpt, EOD & maint) 1 fd hospital training and Doctrine command (traDoc) 1,000 Consists of the Defense Academy, Military University, NCO Academy, Basic Training Brigade, the consolidated Troops School, Centre for Defense Analysis and Training Support Centre. Paramilitary ε500 DePLoyment Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Constitution: Codified constitution (1998) Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the parlia- ment upon proposal by the president (Art.171 II) afgHanistan NATO • ISAF 286; 1 inf coy Bosnia-HerzegoVina EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 11 serBia NATO • KFOR 4 foreign forces Italy 18 (Delegazione Italiana Esperti) armenia ARM armenian Dram d 2010 2011 2012 GDP d 3.50tr 3.88tr US$ 9.37bn 10.5bn per capita US$ 3,158 3,533 Growth % 2.10 4.61 inflation % 7.3 8.8 Def exp d 158bn US$ 422m Def bdgt d 163bn 146bn 155bn US$ 436m 395m FMa (US) US$ 3.0m 3.5m US$1=d 373.71 370.27 Population 2,967,975 age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 9.4% 4.5% 5.3% 4.8% 19.3% 3.8% Female 8.2% 4.2% 5.2% 4.8% 24.2% 6.2% capabilities Armenia’s armed forces focus on territorial defence, giv- en tensions with neighbouring Azerbaijan. While overall military doctrine remains influenced strongly by Russian thinking, Armenia’s overseas deployments, which include support to ISAF in Afghanistan, enable the troops serv- ing in the Pul-e Khumri PRT to learn lessons from their NATO counterparts. The ISAF contribution increased in 2011. In Nov 2011, Armenia signed a new Individual Part- nership Action Plan with NATO. While conscription con- tinues, there is a growing cohort of professional officers. The air force reportedly struggles with serviceability and maintenance, while Russia’s air force provides national air defence from a leased base. The army exercises regularly, and aims to be able to deploy and sustain a battalion-sized contingent by 2015 as part of a multi-national mission. To inform these developments, Armenia completed a Strate- gic Defence Review in May 2011. actiVe 48,834 (army 45,846, air/aD aviation Forces (Joint) 1,061, other air Defence Forces 1,927) Paramilitary 6,694 Terms of service conscription 24 months. reserVes some mob reported, possibly 210,000 with military service within 15 years. organisations By serVice army 19,966; 25,880 conscripts (total 45,846) forces By roLe SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (1st) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 maint bn) 1 (2nd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 2 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn) 1 (3rd) corps (1 recce bn, 1 tk bn, 4 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt, 1 arty bn, 1 MRL bn, 1 sigs bn, 1 maint bn) 1 (4th) corps (4 MR regt; 1 SP arty bn; 1 sigs bn) 1 (5th) corps (with 2 fortified areas) (1 MR regt, 1 lt inf regt) Other 1 indep MR trg bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 AT regt 1 AD bde 2 AD regt 1 (radiotech) AD regt 1 engr regt eQuiPment By tyPe MBT 110: 3 T-54; 5 T-55; 102 T-72 AIFV 104: 80 BMP-1; 7 BMP-1K; 5 BMP-2; 12 BRM-1K APC (W) 136: 11 BTR-60; 100 look-a-like; 21 BTR-70; 4 BTR-80 ARTY 239 SP 38: 122mm 10 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 28 2S3 TOWED 131: 122mm 69 D-30; 152mm 62: 26 2A36; 2 D-1; 34 D-20 MRL 51: 122mm 47 BM-21; 273mm 4 WM-80 MOR 120mm 19 M120 D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 92 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 tee; simplified procedure for humanitarian and rescue tasks (Art. 23f IV of the ‘Federal Constitutional Law’; § 2 of the KSE-BVG) afgHanistan NATO • ISAF 3 Bosnia-HerzegoVina EU • EUFOR • Operation Althea 360; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 recce pl; 1 inf coy OSCE • Bosnia and Herzegovina 2 cyPrus UN • UNFICYP 4 Democratic rePuBLic of tHe congo EU • EUSEC RD Congo 1 miDDLe east UN • UNTSO 7 obs serBia NATO • KFOR 592; 1 recce coy; 1 inf coy; elm 1 MP coy OSCE • Serbia 1 OSCE • Kosovo 14 syria/israeL UN • UNDOF 374; elm 1 inf bn Western saHara UN • MINURSO 2 obs azerbaijan AZE azerbaijani new Manat m 2010 2011 2012 GDP m 43.7bn 53.3bn US$ 54.4bn 67.4bn per capita US$ 5,846 7,170 Growth % 5.00 0.19 inflation % 5.7 9.3 Def exp m 1.21bn US$ 1.5bn Def bdgt m 1.27bn 1.33bn US$ 1.59bn 1.68bn FMa (US) US$ 3.0m 3.5m US$1=m 0.80 0.79 Population 9,397,279 age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 12.3% 5.1% 5.2% 4.5% 19.8% 2.3% Female 10.9% 4.8% 5.0% 4.3% 21.7% 4.1% capabilities The armed forces have yet to successfully transition from a Soviet-era model, and the standard of equipment availabil- ity remains uncertain. While defence expenditure contin- ues to grow, fuelled by rising oil revenues, and acquisitions include modern systems such as the S-300, analysts believe the potential benefits have apparently not yet been felt significantly in terms of operational capability. The armed forces still rely on conscription, and readiness within the services varies considerably between units. Peacekeeping deployments have included a small number of personnel in Afghanistan. Azerbaijan maintains defence relationships with NATO through an IPAP, and has a close relationship with Turkey. The Internal Troops are developing, with NATO support, a police support unit to be available for NATO-led operations. US military assistance has included support to maritime-security operations in the Caspian Sea. The air force suffers from training and maintenance problems. The armed forces cannot organically support ex- ternal deployments. actiVe 66,940 (army 56,840 navy 2,200 air 7,900) Paramilitary 15,000 Terms of service 17 months, but can be extended for ground forces. reserVe 300,000 Reserves some mobilisation reported, 300,000 with military service within 15 years organisations By serVice army 56,840 forces By roLe COMMAND 5 corps HQ MANEOEUVRE Mechanised 23 MR bde Other 1 sy bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty bde 1 arty trg bde 1 MRL bde 1 AT bde 1 engr bde 1 sigs bde COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log bde eQuiPment By tyPe MBT 339: 95 T-55; 244 T-72 AIFV 111: 20 BMD-1; 43 BMP-1; 33 BMP-2; 15 BRM-1 APC 357 APC (T) 336 MT-LB APC (W) 21: 10 BTR-60; 4 BTR-70; 7 BTR-80A ARTY 458 SP 52: 122mm 46 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 6 2S3 TOWED 219: 122mm 129 D-30; 130mm 36 M-46; 152mm 42: 18 2A36; 24 D-20; 203mm 12 2S7 GUN/MOR 120mm 18 2S9 NONA MRL 62: 300mm 12 9A52 Smerch; 122mm 43 BM-21 MOR 120mm 107 PM-38 AT • MSL • MANPATS 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel)/9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) AD • SAM • SP 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 2K11 Krug (SA-4 Ganef): 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 93Europe Eu ro pe MSL • SSM ε4 9M79 SS-21 Scarab (Tochka) RADAR • LAND SNAR-1 Long Trough/SNAR-2/-6 Pork Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn/SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty); GS-13 Long Eye (veh) UAV • ISR • Medium 3 Aerostar AEV MT-LB MW Bozena navy 2,200 eQuiPment By tyPe PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 FS 1 Petya II with 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2 (24 eff.), 2 twin (4 eff.) 76mm gun PSO 1 Luga (Woodnik 2 Class) (FSU Project 888; additional trg role) PCC 3: 2 Petrushka (FSU UK-3; additional trg role); 1 Shelon (FSU Project 1388M) PB 3: 1 Bryza (FSU Project 722); 1 Turk (TUR AB 25); 1 Poluchat (FSU Project 368) MINE WARFARE • MINE COUNTERMEASURES 4 MHC 4: 2 Yevgenya (FSU Project 1258); 2 Yakhont (FSU Sonya) AMPHIBIOUS 6 LSM 3: 1 Polnochny A (FSU Project 770) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops); 2 Polnochny B (FSU Project 771) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LCU 1 Vydra† (FSU) (capacity either 3 AMX-30 MBT or 200 troops) LCM 2 T-4 (FSU) LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 2 ARS 1 Iva (FSU Vikhr); AGS 1 (FSU Project 10470) air force and air Defence 7,900 forces By roLe FIGHTER 1 sqn with MiG-29 Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 1 regt with MiG-21 Fishbed; Su-17 Fitter; Su-24 Fencer; Su-25 Frogfoot; Su-25UB Frogfoot B TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-12 Cub; Yak-40 Codling ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 1 regt with Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24 Hind; PZL Mi-2 Hoplite eQuiPment By tyPe AIRCRAFT 44 combat capable FTR 14 MiG-29 Fulcrum FGA 11: 4 MiG-21 Fishbed (+1 in store); 4 Su-17 Fitter; 1 Su-17U Fitter; 2 Su-24 Fencer† ATK 19: 16 Su-25 Frogfoot; 3 Su-25UB Frogfoot B TPT 4: Medium 1 An-12 Cub; Light 3 Yak-40 Codling TRG 40: 28 L-29 Delfin; 12 L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 26 Mi-24 Hind TPT 20: Medium 13 Mi-8 Hip; Light 7 PZL Mi-2 Hoplite UAV • ISR • Medium 4 Aerostar AD • SAM S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline); S-125 Neva (SA-3 Goa)/S-200 Vega (SA-5 Gammon) static MSL • AAM • IR R-60 (AA-8 Aphid); R-73 (AA-11 Archer) IR/SARH R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) Paramilitary ε15,000 Border Guard ε5,000 Ministry of Internal Affairs AIFV 168 BMP-1/BMP-2 APC (W) 19 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 coast Guard The Coast Guard was established in 2005 as part of the State Border Service. eQuiPment By tyPe PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 8 PBF 6: 1 Osa II (FSU Project 205); 2 Silver Ships 48ft; 3 Stenka PB 2: 1 Point (US); 1 Grif (FSU Zhuk) Militia 10,000+ Ministry of Internal Affairs APC (W) 7 BTR-60/BTR-70/BTR-80 DePLoyment Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Constitution: Codified constitution (1995) Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By parliament upon proposal by president (Art. 109, No. 28) afgHanistan NATO • ISAF 94 serBia OSCE • Kosovo 1 foreign forces OSCE numbers represents total deployment in Armenia and Azerbaijan unless stated Bulgaria OSCE 1 Hungary OSCE 1 Lithuania OSCE 1 Poland OSCE 1 United Kingdom OSCE 1 Belarus BLR Belarusian ruble r 2010 2011 2012 GDP r 163tr 245tr US$ 54.4bn 54.9bn per capita US$ 5,656 5,728 Growth % 7.55 4.96 inflation % 7.7 41.0 Def exp r 2.17tn US$ 725m Def bdgt r 2.10tr 2.10tr US$ 702m 470m US$1=r 2,997.60 4,462.01 Population 9,577,552 age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 7.3% 3.0% 4.0% 4.3% 23.4% 4.5% Female 6.9% 2.9% 3.9% 4.2% 26.0% 9.6% D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 94 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 capabilities Belarus inherited the bulk of its military equipment from the Soviet Union, and Russia’s influence over its military doctrine remains strong. Reported poor morale and train- ing within the conscript-based armed forces undermines their capability, and there is little interest in transitioning to fully professional armed forces, although draft numbers have declined. Aircrew flying hours are inadequate for a modern air force. Ground-based surface-to-air missile sys- tems need to be upgraded or replaced and Belarus, which has the S-300, may be eyeing the S-400 system. Belarusian forces exercise with their Russian counterparts regularly and could support a regional joint operation with Mos- cow. A new National Security concept was adopted in late 2010 and, in late 2011, the government was reportedly con- cerned to prevent ‘military security from sliding’ and was advocating a new territorial defence force. actiVe 72,940 (army 29,600 air 18,170 Joint 25,170) Paramilitary 110,000 Terms of service 9–12 months reserVe 289,500 (Joint 289,500 with mil service within last 5 years) organisations By serVice Joint 25,170 (Centrally controlled units and MoD staff) army 29,600 forces By roLe COMMAND 2 comd HQ (West & North West) SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF bde MANOEUVRE Mechanised 1 (mobile) armd inf bde 1 (mobile) mech bde 6 mech bde COMBAT SUPPORT 2 arty bde 1 arty gp 1 MRL bde 2 MRL regt 2 SSM bde 2 AD bde 2 engr bde 2 engr regt 1 NBC regt 1 ptn bridging regt 2 sigs bde eQuiPment By tyPe MBT 515: 446 T-72; 69 T-80 AIFV 1,111: 100 BMD-1; 875 BMP-2; 136 BRM-1 APC 264 APC (T) 72: 22 BTR-D; 50 MT-LB APC (W) 192: 39 BTR-70; 153 BTR-80 ARTY 1,003 SP 432: 122mm 198 2S1 Carnation; 152mm 236: 108 2S3; 116 2S5; 12 2S19 Farm TOWED 228: 122mm 48 D-30; 152mm 180: 48 2A36; 132 2A65 GUN/MOR 120mm 48 2S9 NONA MRL 234: 122mm 126 BM-21; 220mm 72 9P140 Uragan; 300mm 36 9A52 Smerch MOR 120mm 61 2S12 AT • MSL SP 236: 126 9P148 Konkurs; 110 9P149 Shturm MANPATS 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); 9K114 Shturm (AT-6 Spiral); 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn) AD • SAM • SP 350 9K37 Buk (SA-11 Gadfly); S-300V(SA- 12A Gladiator/SA-12B Giant); 9K35 Strela-10 (SA-13 Gopher); 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) (700–2,100 eff.) RADAR • LAND GS-13 Long Eye/SNAR-1 Long Trough/ SNAR-2/-6 Pork Trough (arty); some Small Fred/Small Yawn/ SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty) MSL • TACTICAL • SSM 96: 36 FROG/SS-21 Scarab (Tochka); 60 Scud AEV MT-LB VLB MTU air force and air Defence forces 18,170 Flying hours 15 hrs/year forces By roLe FIGHTER 2 bases with MiG-29S Fulcrum C/MiG-29UB Fulcrum; Su-27P Flanker-B/Su-27UB Flanker C FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK/ISR 4 sqn with Su-24MK Fencer D/Su-24MR Fencer-E; Su-25 Frogfoot/Su-25UB Frogfoot B TRANSPORT 1 base with An-12 Cub; An-24 Coke; An-26 Curl; Il-76 Candid; Tu-134 Crusty TRAINING Some sqn with L-39 Albatros ATTACK HELICOPTER Some sqn with Mi-24 Hind TRANSPORT HELICOPTER Some (cbt spt) sqn with Mi-6 Hook; Mi-8 Hip; Mi-24K Hind G2; Mi-24R Hind G1; Mi-26 Halo eQuiPment By tyPe AIRCRAFT 128 combat capable FTR 38 MiG-29S Fulcrum C/MiG-29UB Fulcrum FGA 21 Su-27P Flanker-B/Su-27UB Flanker C FGA/ISR 34 Su-24MK Fencer D (FGA)/Su-24MR Fencer-E (ISR) ATK 35 Su-25K Frogfoot FGA/Su-25UBK Frogfoot B TPT 15: Heavy 4 Il-76 Candid (+12 civ Il-76 available for mil use); Medium 3 An-12 Cub; Light 8: 1 An-24 Coke; 6 An-26 Curl; 1 Tu-134 Crusty TRG Some L-39 Albatros HELICOPTERS ATK 50 Mi-24 Hind ISR 20: 8 Mi-24K Hind G2; 12 Mi-24R Hind G1 TPT 168: Heavy 43: 29 Mi-6 Hook; 14 Mi-26 Halo; Medium 125 Mi-8 Hip D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 97Europe Eu ro pe RECCE 3: 1 BDRM-1; 2 BDRM-2 AIFV 137: 25 AMX-10P; 112 BVP M-80 APC 127 APC (T) 98: 18 M-60P; 80 M113A2 APC (W) 29: 4 BOV-M; 21 BOV-VP; 4 BTR-60 ARTY 1,521 SP 122mm 24 2S1 Carnation TOWED 730: 105mm 161: 36 L-118 Light Gun; 101 M-56; 24 M101/M101A1; 122mm 268 D-30 130mm 74: 61 M-46; 13 M-82 152mm 30: 13 D-20; 17 M-84 155mm 197: 3 M-59; 194 M114/M114A2 MRL 153: 107mm 28 VLR Type-63; 122mm 43: 37 APRA 40; 5 BM-21; 1 Kacusa; 128mm 77: 21 M-63; 21 M-77; 35 M-91; 262mm 5 M-87 MOR 614: 82mm 81 MB M-69; 120mm 538: 23 2B11 (UK- 2); 11 HADID; 7 KROM; 1 M-38; 1 M-43; 460 M-74/M-75; 30 UBM-52 AT MSL SP 60: 8 9P122 Malyutka; 9 9P133 Malyutka; 32 BOV-1; 11 M-92 MANPATS 641: 508 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger); 76 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot); 1 9K115 Metis (AT-7 Saxhorn); 51 HJ-8; 5 Milan GUNS 175: SP • 82mm 20 M-60PB TOWED • 100mm 155 MT-12/T-12 AD • SAM SP 27: 1 Strela-10M3 (SA-13 Gopher); 20 2K12 Kub (SA-6 Gainful); 6 Strela-1 (SA-9 Gaskin) MANPAD 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin); 9K310 (SA- 16 Gimlet) GUNS 764 SP 169: 20mm 9 BOV-3 SPAAG; 30mm 154: 38 M53; 116 M-53-59; 57mm 6 ZSU 57/2 TOWED 595: 20mm 468: 32 M-55A2, 4 M38, 1 M55 A2B1, 293 M55 A3/A4, 138 M75; 23mm 38: 29 ZU-23, 9 GSh-23; 30mm 33 M-53; 37mm 7 Type 55; 40mm 49: 31 L60, 16 L70, 2 M-12 VLB MTU MW Bozena air Wing 872 eQuiPment By tyPe AIRCRAFT 19 combat capable FGA 7 J-22 Orao ATK 9: 6 J-1 (J-21) Jastreb; 3 TJ-1(NJ-21) Jastreb ISR 2 RJ-1 (IJ-21) Jastreb* TRG 1 G-4 Super Galeb (N-62)* HELICOPTERS MRH 18: 4 Mi-8MTV Hip; 1 Mi-17 Hip H; 1 SA-341H Gazelle (HN-42); 7 SA-341H/SA-342L Gazelle (HN-42M/ HN-45M); 5 SA-342L Gazelle (H-45) TPT 26 Medium 11 Mi-8 Hip Light 15 Bell 205 (UH-1H Iroquois) TRG 1 Mi-34 Hermit DePLoyment Legal provisions for foreign deployment: Constitution: Codified constitution within Dayton Peace Agreement (1995) foreign forces United States US European Command: 1,234 Bosnia–Herzegovina BIH convertible Mark 2010 2011 2012 GDP mark 24.4bn 25.4bn US$ 16.5bn 18.2bn per capita US$ 3,577 3,938 Growth % 0.70 2.20 inflation % 2.1 4.0 Def exp mark 325m US$ 220m Def bdgt mark 335m 346m 352m US$ 227m 248m FMa (US) US$ 4.0m 6.44m US$1=mark 1.48 1.39 Population 4,622,163 age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 7.2% 3.0% 3.7% 3.5% 25.5% 6.1% Female 6.8% 2.8% 3.5% 3.5% 25.4% 8.9% capabilities The Bosnian armed forces are an uneasy amalgam of troops from all three formerly warring entities. Consid- erably reduced to a size that the country can afford, they likely have little capability to mount sustained combat op- erations. They are capable of making minor contributions to international operations, and have identified an infantry company, military police platoon and EOD platoon as pos- sible contributions to international missions. Bosnia has deployed forces to Iraq and Afghanistan. actiVe 10,577 (Joint 500 army 9,205, aF/aD 872) organisations By serVice Joint 500 (Joint Staff 252; Joint Operational Command 148; Support Command 100) army 9,205 1 ops comd; 1 cbt spt comd; 1 trg comd; 1 log comd forces By roLe MANOUEVRE Light 3 inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 cbt spt bde 1 EOD bn 1 CBRN coy COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 5 log bn eQuiPment By tyPe MBT 334: 50 AMX-30; 45 M60A1/A3; 71 M-84; 6 T-34; 162 T-54/T-55 D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 98 ThE MiliTary BalancE 2012 Bulgaria BLG Bulgarian lev l 2010 2011 2012 GDP L 70.5bn 75.1bn US$ 47.7bn 53.8bn per capita US$ 6,672 7,589 Growth % 0.15 2.50 inflation % 3.0 3.8 Def exp L 1.23bn US$ 832m Def bdgt L 916m 1.01bn 1.01bn US$ 620m 725m FMa (US) US$ 9.0m 13.2m US$1=l 1.48 1.40 Population 7,093,635 age 0–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–64 65 plus Male 7.1% 2.6% 3.3% 3.6% 23.9% 7.4% Female 6.8% 2.4% 3.2% 3.4% 25.5% 10.8% capabilities Bulgaria’s armed forces continue to transition from Sovi- et-era to modern force structures commensurate with the country’s national defence needs and NATO membership. The intent is to field smaller but more capable armed forces, and to replace Soviet-era equipment. A White Paper of late 2010 set out Bulgaria’s plans for a force-structure review, which would lead to a reduction in army size, though the expanding ability to carry out such tasks as CIMIC. The armed forces are due to transition to a modified force structure by 2014. Funding shortages, meanwhile, have curtailed or delayed some procurement. The armed forces exercise regularly at the national level, and also participate in NATO exercises. Bulgaria contributes to ISAF and in 2011 sent naval forces as part of Operation Unified Protector. actiVe 31,315 (army 16,304 navy 3,471 air 6,706 central Staff 4,834) Paramilitary 34,000 reserVe 303,000 (army 250,500 navy 7,500 air 45,000) organisations By serVice army 16,304 Forces are being reduced in number. forces By roLe SPECIAL FORCES 1 SF regt MANOEUVRE Reconnaissance 1 armd recce bn Mechanised 2 mech inf bde COMBAT SUPPORT 1 arty regt 1 engr regt 1 NBC regt Specific legislation: ‘Law on participation of military, police, state and other employees in peacekeeping operations and other activities conducted abroad’ Decision on deployment of troops abroad: By the members of the Presidency (2003 ‘Defence Law’ Art. 9, 13) afgHanistan NATO • ISAF 55 Democratic rePuBLic of tHe congo UN • MONUSCO 5 obs serBia OSCE • Serbia 1 OSCE • Kosovo 10 foreign forces Part of EUFOR – Operation Althea unless otherwise stated. Albania 11 Armenia OSCE 2 Austria 360; 1 inf bn HQ; 1 recce pl; 1 inf coy; 3 SA316 Allouette III • OSCE 2 Belarus OSCE 1 Belgium OSCE 1 Bulgaria 117 Canada OSCE 2 Chile 22 Croatia OSCE 1 Czech Republic 2 • OSCE 1 Estonia 1 Finland 10 • OSCE 1 France 1 • OSCE 2 Germany 13 • OSCE 4 Greece 25 • OSCE 3 Hungary 171; 1 inf coy • OSCE 2 Ireland 44 • OSCE 4 Italy 5 • OSCE 5 Kyrgyzstan OSCE 1 Luxembourg 1 Macedonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of 12 Netherlands 76 • OSCE 1 Norway OSCE 1 Poland 47; 1 inf coy • OSCE 2 Portugal 18 • OSCE 2 Romania 59 • OSCE 2 Russia OSCE 3 Slovakia 46 • OSCE 3 Slovenia 15 • OSCE 1 Spain 17 • OSCE 3 Sweden 1 • OSCE 1 Switzerland 20 • OSCE 1 Tajikistan OSCE 1 Turkey 288; 1 inf coy • OSCE 1 United Kingdom 5 • OSCE 4 United States OSCE 11 D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2 99Europe Eu ro pe COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT 1 log regt army reserve 250,500 reservists forces By roLe MANOEUVRE Light 4 inf bde eQuiPment By tyPe MBT 301 T-72 RECCE Maritza NBC AIFV 160: 80 BMP-1; 80 BMP-2/3 APC 1,084 APC (T) 1,002: 315 MT-LB; 687 look-a-likes APC (W) 82 BTR-60 ARTY 738 SP • 122mm 247 2S1 Carnation TOWED 152: 122mm 20 (M-30) M-1938; 152mm 132 D-20 MRL 122mm 124 BM-21 MOR 120mm 215 2S11 SP Tundzha AT MSL SP 24 9P148 Konkurs MANPATS 236 9K111 Fagot (AT-4 Spigot)/9K113 Konkurs (AT-5 Spandrel); (200 9K11 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) in store) GUNS 126: 100mm 126 MT-12; 85mm (150 D-44 in store) AD SAM • SP 24 9K33 Osa (SA-8 Gecko) MANPAD 9K32 Strela (SA-7 Grail) GUNS 400 100mm KS-19 towed/57mm S-60 towed/23mm ZSU-23-4 SP/ZU-23 towed RADARS • LAND GS-13 Long Eye (veh); SNAR-1 Long Trough (arty); SNAR-10 Big Fred (veh, arty); SNAR-2/-6 Pork Trough (arty); Small Fred/Small Yawn (veh, arty) AEV MT-LB ARV T-54/T-55; MTP-1; MT-LB VLB BLG67; TMM navy 3,471 eQuiPment By tyPe PRINCIPAL SURFACE COMBATANTS 4 FRIGATES 4 FFGM 3 Drazki (BEL Wielingen) with 2 twin lnchr each with MM-38 Exocet AShM, 1 octuple Mk29 GMLS with RIM-7P Sea Sparrow SAM, 2 single 533mm ASTT with L5 HWT, 1 sextuple 375mm MLE 54 Creusot-Loire A/S mor, 1 100mm gun FFM 1 Smeli (FSU Koni) with 1 twin lnchr with 2 Osa-M (SA-N-4 Gecko) SAM, 2 RBU 6000 Smerch 2, 2 twin 76mm gun PATROL AND COASTAL COMBATANTS 6 PCFGM 1 Mulnaya (FSU Tarantul II) with 2 twin lnchr with 4P-15M Termit-M (SS-N-2C Styx) AShM, 2 quad lnchr with 8 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 1 76mm gun PCM 2 Reshitelni (FSU Pauk I) with 1 Strela-2 (SA-N-5 Grail) SAM, 4 single 406mm TT, 2 RBU 1200, 1 76mm gun PBFG 3 Osa I/II (FSU)† each with 4 P-15/P-15U Termit (SS-N-2A/B Styx) AShM MINE COUNTERMEASURES 9 MHC 1 (Tripartite – BEL Flower) MSC 5: 3 Briz (FSU Sonya); 2 Iscar (FSU Vanya) MSI 3: 3 Olya, less than 100 tonnes (FSU) AMPHIBIOUS 2 LSM 1 Polnochny A (FSU) (capacity 6 MBT; 180 troops) LCU 1 Vydra LOGISTICS AND SUPPORT 17: 1 AORL; 2 AOL; 1 ARS; 2 APT; 2 AT; 2 YTR; 1 AX; 3 AGS; 1 ADG; 2 ADT naval aviation HELICOPTERS ASW 6 Mi-14 Haze (3 operational; to be replaced by 3 AS565MB Panther) air force 6,706 Flying hours 30–40 hrs/yr forces By roLe FIGHTER/ISR 1 sqn with MiG-21bis/UM Fishbed 1 sqn with MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum FIGHTER/GROUND ATTACK 2 sqn with Su-25/UB Frogfoot TRANSPORT 1 sqn with An-2 Colt; An-26 Curl; C-27J Spartan; L-410 UVP; PC-12M; Tu-134B Crusty ATTACK/TRANSPORT HELICOPTER 2 sqn with AS532AL Cougar; Bell 206 Jet Ranger; Mi-17 Hip H; Mi-24D/V Hind D/E eQuiPment By tyPe AIRCRAFT 62 combat capable FTR 20 MiG-29A/UB Fulcrum FGA 18 MiG-21bis/UM Fishbed ATK 24 Su-25K/UBK Frogfoot (5 upgraded to NATO standard) ISR 1 An-30 Clank TPT 16: Medium 3 C-27J Spartan; Light 13: 1 An-2 Colt; 3 An-26 Curl; 7 L-410UVP/L-410UVP-E; 1 PC-12M; 1 Tu-134B Crusty TRG 12: 6 L-39ZA Albatros; 6 PC-9M (basic) HELICOPTERS ATK 18 Mi-24D/V Hind D/E (12 being upgraded to NATO standard) MRH 12 Mi-17 Hip H (6 to be upgraded to NATO standard) TPT 17: Medium 11 AS532AL Cougar; Light 6 Bell 206 Jet Ranger UAV • EW Yastreb-2S AD SAM S-300 (SA-10 Grumble) (quad) S-75 Dvina (SA-2 Guideline towed); S-125 Pechora (SA-3 Goa); S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) MSL AAM • IR R-3 (AA-2 Atoll)‡ R-73 (AA-11 Archer) SARH R-27R (AA-10 Alamo A) ASM Kh-29 (AS-14 Kedge); Kh-23 (AS-7 Kerry)‡; Kh-25 (AS-10 Karen) Paramilitary 34,000 Border Guards 12,000 Ministry of Interior D ow nl oa de d by [ O hi o St at e U ni ve rs ity L ib ra ri es ] at 0 5: 05 0 6 A ug us t 2 01 2